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ABSTRACT 
 
Negotiated Openness: U.S.-Japan Financial Negotiations  





This study examines the role of intergovernmental negotiations in facilitating 
liberalization of finance in terms of market opening to foreign business. The theoretical 
focus is on the significance of the international network of financial officials. 
Recognized as a highly technical area, the financial issues have been often separated 
from other issue areas in trade negotiations, and administered by a small number of 
governmental financial experts. However, in reality, the exclusivity of financial officials 
on this issue largely resulted from their preexisting international network; these officials 
behaved strategically to maintain this exclusivity in such an institutional context. Yet, 
financial issues became politicized overtime and more actors, including politicians and 
governmental agencies other than financial authorities participated in the negotiations 
after the late 1980s. 
I argue that the structure of intergovernmental negotiations can have a 
significant impact on the outcomes of those negotiations. If negotiations are held 
exclusively among a small number of financial officials who share the understanding of 
the issues on the table and have long-term relationships with each other, the demands 
and offers in the negotiations tend to be more moderate and realistic, and the outcomes 
involve incremental changes. On the other hand, when the issues are politicized and 
more actors are involved, the demands tend to be tougher and the negotiations often 
break off. 
To assess this assertion, this study examines the United States–Japan financial 
negotiations, which were the world’s first intergovernmental negotiations on financial 
liberalization, started in 1983. Initiated as bilateral negotiations, the financial 
negotiations were later incorporated into a multilateral framework, which changed the 
institutional settings. This study divides a series of bilateral negotiations into four 
periods. In the first period, the financial authorities started the bilateral negotiation. The 
second period followed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when the involvement of 
the American Congress had brought a considerable change in the nature and the 
outcome of the negotiation. In the third time period, the bilateral negotiations were held 
under the multilateral framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The case of financial services negotiations and that of insurance are compared 
in this period, as different sets of actors were involved in them.  
 In conclusion, the study discusses the implications of the United States–Japan 
financial negotiations for the more recent developments in opening up the financial 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Financial Globalization and Negotiated Openness 
 
Today, national borders do not limit activities of powerful financial institutions, as 
capital is the most mobile economic factor. Because of technological innovations, 
especially in the field of information technology, financial services can be traded across 
national borders without any time and/or cost constraints. Thus, it is often argued that 
traditional policies of national control over the financial sector have lost their 
effectiveness, and that the worldwide trend for financial liberalization is an inevitable 
consequence of globalization. 
Because of the special role the financial sector plays in any economy, it is one of 
the most heavily regulated and protected industries in most countries. However, several 
constraints imposed on the activities of financial institutions in domestic markets have 
been gradually lifted since the mid-1970s in many advanced industrialized countries. In 
many cases, the removal of restrictions on international capital flows preceded domestic 
deregulation, allowing local financial institutions and other types of firms to engage in 
international financial activities. 
Letting foreign financial institutions operate freely in the domestic markets is a 
different story. The elimination of barriers to new entry into the financial industry, 
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which have protected existing financial institutions, has been generally slow at the 
domestic level. Foreign entry into financial markets has been even more difficult, as it 
was a controversial subject that has sometimes provoked nationalist sentiment and 
political upheaval in addition to the common resistance from the vested interests.  
What determines the manner in which governments open their financial markets 
to foreign institutions? Is opening doors to foreign financial players an inseparable part 
of the broader trend of financial liberalization? Does economic globalization force 
governments to let them in? What are the other factors that explain policy outcomes? 
This study addresses these questions. More specifically, it examines the changes in the 
regulation of foreign financial institutions, focusing on the cases of the U.S. and Japan. 
This study examines the political factors that affect governments’ decisions on 
financial regulation and pays special attention to the institutional settings, in which 
intergovernmental negotiations were conducted. The popular argument of “race to the 
bottom” predicts that the globalized financial market urges governments to lower their 
level of economic regulation to keep up with international competition. Yet, there is no 
clear theory that explains how governments react to this pressure with respect to the 
restriction of foreign access to domestic markets. Do market forces compel governments 
to open up their financial sector to foreign competition? Or, is it left to governments to 
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decide? While pressure from the faceless financial markets seems to be the main driving 
force behind the global trend for financial liberalization, the pressure is insufficient to 
set the details and timings. 
If the market forces still leave room for governments to decide policies, the next 
question would be: What determines the exact policy outcomes and timings? Actual 
policy changes are defined by various types of political factors. It is almost a cliché to 
say “domestic politics matters.” Globalization deepens the division of interests between 
domestically oriented, smaller financial institutions and internationally oriented, larger 
ones. While the smaller ones need continuous protection, the larger ones tend to prefer 
freer markets. When the domestic interests are extremely divided, how do governments 
decide their policies to promote “national interests”? Whose interests are reflected the 
most? Many international political economy researchers have examined the interplay 
among various societal groups and effects of domestic political institutions. 
This study alternatively stresses the importance of intergovernmental 
negotiations in facilitating financial deregulation. More precisely, I examine the role 
intergovernmental negotiations play in determining the degree of foreign entry into the 
domestic financial markets, using the case of the U.S.–Japan financial negotiations that 
occurred during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. In this specific case, there had 
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been conflicts between the two countries over the degree to which domestic financial 
markets should be opened to each other’s economic players and how they should be 
regulated. The issue was subject to intense intergovernmental negotiations. The series of 
talks between the two major economies located across the Pacific Ocean were the 
world’s first bilateral negotiation on the issue. Following the success of the talks with 
Japan, the U.S. sought to negotiate market openings with several developing countries 
in the 1990s, making many of those countries perceive that they were being pressed by 
the forceful superpower. In addition to the fact that the bilateral relations between two 
of the biggest economies in the world are important in their own right, analyzing this 
particular case is also beneficial to understand the processes and outcomes of other 
cases of intergovernmental negotiations on financial openness. 
Theoretically, this study focuses on two aspects of intergovernmental 
negotiations. First, it examines how the preexisting institutional arrangement affected 
the negotiation outcomes. More specifically, the international networks of financial 
experts in governments defined how intergovernmental negotiations were held and 
affected the policy outcomes. Second, it analyzes how the globalization of finance 
affected the negotiation process. It does not simply mean that globalization resulted in a 
convergence of national financial systems toward a neoliberal economic model. As 
5 
 
global finance came to play an increasingly significant role in the economy as a whole, 
financial issues became politicized. More actors from both within and outside 
governments began entering the policymaking process. As a result, the nature of 
negotiation and policy outcomes also changed. 
 
1.1 Globalization of Finance  
Globalization refers to the dramatic increase in cross-national economic transactions as 
well as political and cultural interactions that expanded in tandem with economic 
globalization. As economies have basically been managed along national boundaries, 
deepening globalization presents enormous challenges and new opportunities for 
national governments as well as economic actors. Greater flow of goods, capital, people, 
and knowledge across national borders has the potential to realize the best allocation of 
resources. Economic players can not only move into wide markets outside their home 
countries but also can sometimes take advantage of regulatory arbitrage to evade costly 
regulation. On the other hand, regulators at the national level have struggled to adjust to 
the new reality in which their regulatory oversight cannot keep pace with the expanding 
activities of international financial institutions. 
 The most straightforward method of measuring the degree of economic 
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globalization is to observe the increase in the volume of capital transactions across 
national boundaries.
1
 The amount of global trade has continuously increased since the 
end of the Second World War. The growth rate of trade has surpassed the world GDP. 
The trade to world GDP ratio, which was 5.5 percent in 1950, increased to 17.2 percent 
in 1998 and 19.4 percent in 2005 (WTO 2007: 244, Table 15). Globalization of finance 
followed the expansion of trade in goods and has showed remarkable speed especially 
since the 1970s. According to the triennial research by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the daily average of foreign exchange trading was about $15 billion
2
 
in 1973. In 1980, the figure rose to $80 billion, and the ratio of foreign exchange trading 
to world trade was about ten to one. In 1992, the daily trading was $880 billion with a 
ratio to world trade of fifty to one. In 1995, the daily average was $1,260 billion with a 
ratio of seventy to one (Eatwell 1996: 1). In April 1998, the daily turnover increased to 
$1,490 billion that substantially declined between 1998 and 2001, but resumed 
increasing and reaching $3.2 trillion in April 2007 (Galati and Heath 2007).
3
 The 
banking business has also considerably globalized since the 1970s. Cross-border 
inter-bank liabilities grew from $455 billion in 1970 to $5,560 billion in 1990 and to 
                                                   
1 One can also directly observe cross-border barriers or the degrees to which prices are equalized 
internationally (Frankel 2000). 
2 In this thesis, the symbol “$” indicates the U.S. dollar. 
3
 The growth rate is at current exchange rates. 
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$8,998 billion in 2000. Net international bank loans as a percentage of world output 
were 0.7 percent in 1964, 8.0 percent in 1980, and 16.3 percent in 1991 (UNCTAD 
1994: 128, Nayyar 2006: 142). Such a massive increase, inevitably, has tremendous 
impacts on political processes and policy outcomes. 
 
1.2 Political Economy of the Banking Sector Opening 
Banks can expand their operation either through cross-border provision of lending and 
other types of financial services, or through direct provision of services to customers 
through local presence. During the 1980s and 1990s, the local business of foreign banks 
tended to expand more rapidly than cross-border business (McCauley, Ruud, and 
Wooldridge 2002).  
When financial institutions do business outside the country where they have 
their headquarters, they engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). The significance of 
FDI as the main driver of further economic globalization surpassed that of trade in the 
last quarter century, as the growth of FDI in general outpaced that of the world trade 
since the mid-1980s (UNCTAD 1991: 5, Figure I).
4
 Yet, in the field of political science, 
                                                   
4
 The average annual growth rate was 23.0 percent between 1986 and 1990, 20.8 percent between 1991 
and 1995, and 40.8 percent between 1996 and 1999 (UNCTAD 2001: 10). Then the amount of FDI flows 
dropped in 2001, 2002, and 2003, but began increasing sharply beginning in 2004 to reach a historical 
peak in 2007, when the total amount of inflows hit $1,976 billion (UNCTAD 2012: 2–3). 
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the scholarly attention paid to issues related to FDI began growing only recently. 
Compared to the vast literature on trade openness and monetary policy coordination, for 
example, analysis of political impacts of FDI has been limited, except for Marxist 
interests in the exploitative role of multinational corporations.
5
 On financial openness, 
capital account openness has been at the center of analysis in the literature of 
international political economy (Simmons 1999), and the issues concerning FDI in the 
financial sector have rarely attracted attention, even though the growth rate of FDI in 
the financial sector further exceeded that of FDI in general.
6
  
 The details of existing theoretical attempts to address banking sector opening is 
discussed in the next chapter. Here, I summarize possible lines of argument on the 
factors that can explain the degree of banking sector openness. 
First, one can attribute greater openings to market forces. In popular press, it is 
commonplace to assume that further financial openness in any subfield of finance is an 
inevitable consequence of globalized finance. In an integrated economy, financial 
institutions and their customers move across national borders in search of new business 
opportunities. For example, business corporations hope to raise funds in a country 
                                                   
5
 See Fieldhouse 1986. For a relatively recent study, see Jensen 2006. 
6
 UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2012, Web Table 26, “Estimated world inward FDI flows, by 
sector and industry, 1990–1992 and 2008–2010,” 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx, last accessed on 
September 28, 2012. 
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where the interest rate is the lowest and procedure is least costly. They want to receive 
advice from foreign investment banks if they have better expertise on international 
merger and acquisition (M&A) than their local counterparts. If governments try to 
protect local financial institutions from foreign competition either by restricting access 
from foreign players or constraining domestic companies going abroad to access 
financial services provided there, their economies weaken and resulting in losing out in 
the fierce international competition. 
 Second, political pressure, both from within and outside a country, can explain 
the tendency of liberalization. Domestic political processes matter, as the market 
pressure translates into policy changes only through domestic political processes. A big 
business, which wants to have access to foreign financial services, lobbies the 
governments; the groups that want to stay protected fight. According to the 
globalization thesis, internationally oriented businesses are expected to get what they 
want in the end, as deepening globalization gives them the exit option, and thus 
strengthens their power (Keohane and Milner 1996, Laurence 1999). In contrast, those 
who suffer from global competition win under certain conditions. They can, for example, 




 International politics is a matter of concern. Externally, the banking sector 
opening has been subject to both multilateral and bilateral negotiations. It was also 
discussed at the regional forum, most notably in the European Union. International 
pressure for liberalization can be legitimatized based on the theoretical ground that 
observes greater access and competition as an effective way to enhance efficiency. 
However, most often, powerful interests are behind the pressure. During the 1990s, 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank encouraged less developed economies earnestly to open their domestic financial 
markets to foreign financial institutions. Later, renowned economist Jagdish Bhagwati 
highlighted the role of the “Wall Street-Treasury complex” in the financial liberalization 
of developing economies, which eventually led to the Asian Financial Crisis that began 
in 1997. In his argument, the Wall Street big financial institutions in the U.S. drove 
Washington through a dense network of people to press other governments to take 
advantage of the new opportunities (Bhagwati 1998). International institutions also 
promoted liberalization under the strong influence of the U.S. government (Wade 
1998).
7
 Bilateral pressure was also exerted especially by the U.S. government. As 
                                                   
7
 IMF pushed explicitly for capital account liberalization. Starting as “the steward of a system of pegged 
but adjustable exchange rate,” the IMF found its new role as the advocate of international financial 
liberalization in the mid-1990s. In the World Bank/IMF annual meeting held in Hong Kong in September 
1997, IMF’s articles were amended to require member governments to eliminate capital controls and 
adopt full capital account convertibility, making capital account liberalization one of the purposes of the 
11 
 
stated above, the world’s first bilateral negotiation was that between the U.S. and Japan 
in the 1980s. With the noticeable achievements in a series of talks with Japan, the U.S. 
government started encouraging other countries, most notably in the Asian region, in the 
1990s. This leads us to examine the process of U.S.–Japan negotiations. 
 
1.3 The Case: Why U.S.–Japan Negotiations? 
Despite the conventional wisdom that financial deregulation has been driven mainly by 
the market pressure, intergovernmental negotiations did play a key role in governments’ 
decisions on liberalization. At the multilateral level, negotiations over financial opening 
began in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
After years of deliberation in the 1980s over whether and how to incorporate the 
services sector in the multilateral framework of trade liberalization, substantial 
negotiations on the liberalization of respective sectors, including financial services, 
began in the early 1990s.
8
 
The first bilateral negotiations started earlier in the first half of the 1980s 
between the U.S. and Japan. They began as an extension from a series of trade disputes 
                                                                                                                                                     
IMF (Eichnegreen 2000: 186–87, Wade 1998). 
8
 At the time of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993, negotiations on financial 
services, together with telecommunications and maritime transport, remained incomplete. The extended 
negotiation on financial services was successfully concluded only in 1997. The details of the multilateral 
negotiations over financial liberalization are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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between the two countries, which originated in the 1950s and intensified by the 1980s. 
Starting with textiles in the 1950s, the U.S.–Japan trade friction occurred in specific 
industries, including color TV, automobile, and semiconductors, until the 1980s. The 
U.S. side criticized Japan for unfair trading practices, such as dumping and non-tariff 
trade barriers, in the respective sectors. During the 1980s, however, the focus shifted 
from concerns over specific industries exposed to the inflows of imports from Japan to 
the overall trade imbalances between the two countries. This shift reflected the upsurge 
of the bilateral trade deficits of the U.S. It resulted in two new focuses of the 
intergovernmental negotiations: access to Japanese markets and exchange rate. The 
issue of opening Japan’s financial markets to foreign, especially American, financial 
institutions came at the intersection of the issues of  market access and exchange rate. 
In this sense, the origin of the bilateral negotiations in this issue area can be considered 
as accidental. While there was certain societal pressure, especially on the U.S. side, on 
the governments to initiate intergovernmental talks concerning liberalization of the 
Japanese financial markets, it was only in the larger context of the long-lasting trade 
friction that financial liberalization became the subject of bilateral negotiations. 
 How bilateral negotiations were conducted and what determined the policy 
outcomes have important implications that go far beyond the bilateral relationship 
13 
 
between the U.S. and Japan. Since the 1990s, bilateral negotiations on financial market 
opening have occurred in many countries. Moreover, even under the multilateral 
framework of the GATT Uruguay Round, where access to the financial services sector 
was one of the important issue areas, the substantial negotiations were performed 
bilaterally, as the negotiations in the services sector were held based on the 
request-and-offer format (Cooper 2010). The opening of the financial sector has also 
become a part of many regional trade agreements since 2000 (Marchetti 2008: 300). 
Unlike many developing countries, which launched their liberalization program 
to meet the conditionality imposed on them by international organizations, we can 
expect that the pressure on Japan to liberalize its financial markets is not very 
compelling. As the world’s major creditor, Japan did not have to rely on external 
sources of finance. Consequently, there has been little need for it to obtain credit by 
complying with external pressure. Consequently, foreign countries, as well as 
international organizations, are expected to not assume that applying pressure on Japan 
would be effective. Given these conditions, it is interesting to observe that the world’s 
first bilateral negotiations over the opening of financial markets occurred between the 
U.S. and Japan in the early 1980s. It makes a “hard case” as a case study.
9
 
                                                   
9
 In his comparative study of four emerging economies, Martinez-Diaz (2009) convincingly argues that 
economic crisis is the most important factor to facilitate opening of the banking sector. This point does 
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  Focusing on specific cases allows a close look at idiosyncratic factors unique 
to each country. We cannot understand the dynamics of international negotiations 
without acknowledging the distinctive conditions of individual cases. In terms of case 
study methodology, this study adopts a combination of process tracing and controlled 
comparison. The small-N nature makes it possible to carefully trace the unfolding of 
events over time. In this sense, it employs the method of process tracing (George and 
Bennett 2005, Brady and Collier 2010). With this method, even a single case study can 
contribute to evaluating causal claims. By following the trajectories of policymaking, 
the causal link between variables can be examined. 
 Comparing cases is yet a powerful tool to evaluate the effects of explanatory 
variables. To ensure such a comparison, this study is divided into three periods. From 
1983 to 1988, the two countries engaged in the first set of financial negotiations known 
as the Yen-Dollar Talks. Then, the framework for negotiation was renamed the 
“U.S.-Japan Working Group on Financial Markets,” which lasted until 1991. Even 
though the new framework was created to shift the focus of discussion from specific 
measures to liberalize the Japanese markets to more global regulatory issues, in reality, 
the demands from the U.S. team became tougher. The third period is between 1992 and 
                                                                                                                                                     
not apply to the case of Japan, as it does not have to rely on loans from international institutions. 
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1995, during which the bilateral talks were held under the umbrella of multilateral trade 
talks of the GATT Uruguay Round. This third period is divided into two cases: the 
financial services and insurance talks. This is because the two issue areas involved 
different set of negotiators. 
 In the first period, the negotiations were held among a limited number of 
officials from the U.S. Treasury and Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF). This 
framework was established as a result of careful maneuvering by those officials to 
prevent intervention from other government agencies. In doing so, they took advantage 
of the existing network of international financial officials, which had discussed issues 
such as exchange rates and international debt crisis. In the second and third periods, 
however, the structure gradually changed. As the issues of international finance became 
more politicized, political intervention increased. Moreover, as a consequence of greater 
attention to the need of harmonizing regulation in the service sector across national 
borders, the issue became a subject in the multilateral trade negotiations under the 
GATT. In the process, there was more scope for other government agencies to interfere. 
By comparing these cases, we can evaluate the importance of the independent variable, 




Aside from the importance of these two economies, what is the significance of 
examining the cases of the 1980s and 1990s at this point? This bilateral framework 
anticipated the ongoing creation of a new international economic order in the 21
st
 
century, where the opening of service sectors to international players is a crucial issue. 
This point is further discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 
1.4 Argument 
If the pressure based on economic need is not expected to be effective, what led to the 
successful liberalization of the Japanese financial markets? This study focuses on the 
institutional characteristics of the intergovernmental negotiations. 
 Based on an in-depth case study, I argue that the existing institutional setting in 
which international negotiations occurred had a significant impact on the outcomes. 
More specifically, this study examines the role of the existing international network of 
government officials. In the case of bilateral financial negotiations that occurred 
between the U.S. and Japan from 1983 to 1995, the liberalization of the Japanese 
financial markets was discussed mainly between officials from the U.S. Treasury and 
Japanese MOF. Those officials were specialists on international financial matters in the 
respective governments. Because of this framework, the negotiation had a technical 
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nature. Moreover, the negotiators had built a long-term relationship as well as 
developed common knowledge and understanding through repeated exchanges (Risse 
2000). 
 The consequence of such a structure is moderate success of the negotiations. 
Based on shared understandings of the issues in question, the requests become moderate 
and acceptable. In the first period of the negotiations, the talks resulted in gradual yet 
drastic changes in the Japanese financial regulation, combined with offers to grant 
preferential treatment of the American financial institutions in Japan. 
 However, the framework began changing in the late 1980s. As the salience of 
Japanese financial institutions in the U.S. increased, there was a political backlash. In 
Congress, elected politicians began demanding reciprocity, as they recognized that 
Japanese banks and other types of financial institutions were operating more freely in 
the American markets compared to the U.S. players in Japan. Technically, calling for 
reciprocity instead of national treatment was a double-edged sword for the American 
policymakers. Moreover, the requests were unacceptable for the Japanese officials. 
Because of the politicization of the financial issues, bilateral negotiations became more 
contentious and less productive. 
 Moreover, around 1990, the liberalization of financial services became the 
18 
 
subject of the multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT. As a result, other 
government agencies, most notably the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
began participating in the financial negotiations. This also changed the nature of 
bilateral negotiations. In the third period, the financial negotiations were held on two 
tracks. The first, on financial services, was conducted mostly by the officials of U.S. 
Treasury and Japanese MOF, while the second on insurance was under the jurisdiction 
of the USTR on the U.S. side. When the two cases are compared, the first was more 
moderate, while the second was more contentious. The insurance talks took longer to 
reach the final agreement, since there were severe misunderstandings between the two 
sides.  




1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This study is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I first discuss the relationship 
between economic globalization and financial liberalization in general, and then 
globalization and opening of the financial sector to foreign players in particular. In the 
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following chapters, cases are discussed in detail. In Chapter 3, I describe the beginning 
of the bilateral financial negotiations between the U.S. and Japan, which started in 1983. 
Chapter 4 discusses the process of politicization of the issue that occurred in the U.S. in 
the late 1980s. Chapter 5 deals with the bilateral negotiation in 1990 and 1991, when the 
call for reciprocity intensified in American Congress. In Chapter 6, I first discuss the 
process through which financial services became the subject of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Then, I examine the U.S.–Japan bilateral negotiations held under the 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2 Globalization, Governmental Negotiations, and Banking Sector Opening 
 
In this chapter, I first review the literature on the relationship between globalization and 
financial liberalization. In doing so, I demonstrate why it is insufficient to use economic 
factors to explain policy outcomes. Then, I move on to the significance of 
intergovernmental negotiations and the factors that are the focus of this study. After 
discussing the general importance of intergovernmental negotiations, I move on to 
specifically discuss the institutional settings in and between the two countries under 
study: the U.S. and Japan. 
 
2.1 Consequences of Globalization: Convergence or Remaining Idiosyncrasies? 
State of economic globalization 
As described in the previous chapter, the deepening of economic globalization is more 
than evident. After the Second World War, a liberal international economic order was 
established in part to prevent another world war from happening, although it covered 
only the Western camp in the Cold War. Following the establishment of the GATT 
regime, a remarkable expansion of world trade occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
beginning of the expansion of international financial flows lagged behind, because most 
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countries retained capital control in exchange for trade openness under the Bretton 
Woods regime. This made a clear contrast to the nineteenth-century gold standard 
system, which put fixed exchange rate and capital mobility ahead of domestic 
macroeconomic health. The Bretton Woods system gave countries authorities to impose 
capital controls to balance the promotion of liberal international economic order and 
protection of domestic society from external shocks, the latter being crucial as the 
political influence of organized labor increased to counterweight the interests of capital 
by the end of the Second World War (Ruggie 1982). 
However, the grip of individual states on cross-border financial flows started to 
loosen as the so-called Eurocurrency markets had developed since the 1960s.
1
 Large 
amounts of funds flowed into these relatively unregulated Eurocurrency markets (Cerny 
1993: 58–59). Then in the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates and the oil crises provided greater opportunities for international 
financial actors; globalization of capital markets further accelerated. Another 
development during that decade that facilitated the expansion of capital market 
                                                   
1
 The American domination in world politics and the role of the U.S. dollar as the leading currency 
enhanced the use of dollar in international markets. The postwar Marshall plan and the U.S. 
balance-of-payment deficits of the 1960s resulted in accumulation of dollars in the hands of 
nonresidents. Moreover, restrictive financial regulations of the U.S. government, such as the Interest 
Equalization Tax Act of 1963, the Foreign Direct Voluntary Act of 1965, and Regulation Q also 
promoted the development of Eurodollar markets by driving U.S. banks and corporations to offshore 
markets. For detailed explanations and other factors, see Damanpour 1990: 77–78. 
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integration was growing budget deficits in most OECD countries, which swelled 
governments’ need for international finance. Innovations in communication technology 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) also steadily increased since the 1980s, and that in the 
financial sector expanded especially after the 1990s. In 2007, annual FDI flows in the 
world reached a record high of $1,833 billion (UNCTAD 2008: 3). Directly related to 
the subject of this study, the growth of FDI in the financial sector, which reflects greater 
activities of financial institutions outside their home countries, is worth particular 
attention.
2
 The volume of FDI inflows in the financial sector in the 2009–2010 period 
is almost 12 times as large than it was in the 1990–1992 period, while the total amount 
of FDI increased by eight times.
3
 The faster growth rate of the financial sector FDI than 
the overall FDI resulted in the greater presence of the financial sector FDI in the total 
                                                   
2
 The following figures on the financial sector FDI are calculated based on UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 2012, Web Table 26, “Estimated world inward FDI flows, by sector and industry, 
1990–1992 and 2008–2010,” 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx, last accessed 
on September 28, 2012. 
3
 The FDI inflows in the services sector, of which the financial sector is a part, increased nine fold. 
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FDI. Inward FDI in the financial sector constituted 19.2 percent of the total in 
developed countries in 1990–1992. The ratio increased to 31.5 percent in 2008–2010. 
The growing significance of the financial sector in total FDI inflows is even more 
obvious in developing and transitioning economies. In developing economies, the share 
of financial sector FDI in the total FDI inflows increased from 6.5 percent in 1990–1992 




Effects of globalization 
The huge flow of capital undoubtedly has a profound impact on national economies and 
economic policies.
4
 Generally, mainstream economists would argue that financial 
globalization brings greater efficiency in economic activities, as lower barriers between 
national economies are expected to bring more efficient allocation of resources. On the 
other hand, even if globalization enhances the welfare of the society at large, some part 
of the society suffers disproportionately from greater competition caused by 
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 The effects of economic globalization have been the focus of the study of political economy. 
Comprehensive reviews of globalization literature in political science include Andrews and Willett 




globalization. The distributional effects of globalization routinely evoke bitter political 
controversy. Overall, increased mobility of capital is considered to favor the managers 
and owners of financial assets and transnational corporations, while less mobile labors 
would lose their political power (Frieden 1991, Keohane and Milner 1996, Kurzer 
1993). 
 The role of states in the face of deeper economic integration is also subject to 
heated academic and political debate. In the mid-1990s, Strange (1996), in her book 
titled The Retreat of States, argues that states lost control of domestic issues. Pressure is 
sometimes regarded as one of the structural forces that determine states’ fate (Andrews 
1994, see also Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988: 4). It is a phenomenon that takes 
place somewhere out of the reach of national governments, but nevertheless determines 
their behavior. Although the degree of economic openness is left to decisions of the 
individual government, (Helleiner 1994), the pressure from global capital could be felt 
despite a small loophole. Moreover, “internationalization should affect even countries 
whose economies are not open,” as increased international transactions changes 




                                                   
5
 The effects of globalization on domestic politics have been analyzed from the “second image 
reversed” perspective (Gourevitch 1978). 
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 Since the 1990s, the view that excessive pressure from global capital market 
controls all corners of the world prevails in popular press. In the debate about 
globalization, many academics and policy analysts assume that globalization is likely to 
result in a convergence of national policies. Countries become more similar in issue 
areas ranging from fiscal and monetary policy to economic and social regulation to 
welfare policy. Various national economic systems are expected to converge on the 
neoliberal model including conservative fiscal and monetary policies and arms-length 
regulation. Economic integration has severely limited government options in making 
economic policies, since the global markets reward governments that followed the 
neoliberal prescription. The market punishes those that try to implement interventionist 
policies through capital flight and other forms of exercise of “exit” options. 
What are the implications of globalization on economic regulations in 
particular? Generally, globalization has produced a spiral of competitive deregulation 
among states. This trend is called by such names as “race to the bottom” and 
“competition in laxity.” Firms in a world where FDI is a viable option can move their 
business or capital to the country whose regulatory environment is the most favorable to 
them. In need to keep the business within its territory to secure jobs and tax revenue, 






Data supports this argument. According to United Nation’s World Investment 
Report 2010 (UNCTAD 2010: 77), 89 percent of 2748 FDI policy changes implemented 
between 1992 and 2009 favored investors (Figure 2.3).
7
 There is also a trend to lower 
the corporate tax rate, including the introduction of flat tax rates toward the end of the 
20
th




Such competitive dynamics can have both positive and negative impacts on 
social welfare. On the positive side, downward pressure on existing regulation is 
welfare enhancing if the regulation benefits regulated producers at the expense of 
consumers, as predicted by the theory of regulations (Stigler 1971, Pelzman 1976).
8
 
                                                   
6
 For a general discussion of political influence of economic actors with “exit” options, see Bates 
and Lien (1985). 
7
 The trend reversed to some extent in the new century. The share of investment restricting measures 
increased almost steadily in the first ten years of the new century. In 2010, approximately 32 percent 
of the policy changes affecting foreign investment were new restrictions or regulations for foreign 
investors (UNCTAD 2012: 76). 
8
 The theory of regulation predicts that the regulatory system often serves the interest of the 




Global market integration has made it easier for consumers, who have suffered from 
socially inefficient regulation, to look for foreign products with fairer prices. To retain 
their customers, producers would give up the rent from state-created cartels. On the 
other hand, competitive deregulation may also lead to the abolition of a socially 
desirable regulation, because regulation aimed at protecting social safety is often costly 
for producers. The concern for negative effects of competitive deregulation has been 
high in areas such as environmental and labor regulations.9 
Despite those powerful claims, arguments against convergence abound. Many 
works in political economy have highlighted the continuing idiosyncrasies of economic 
systems, including macroeconomic policies, regulatory practices, and government 
institutions (Berger and Dore 1996, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Vogel 1996). 
There are several plausible reasons for countries to maintain their diverse 
systems in today’s world. First, the idea of “tightness of fit” offers a convincing 
theoretical foundation for such arguments (Berger and Dore1996). Because individual 
economic rules and regulation are embedded in a larger economic system, which, in 
turn, is a part of an even larger social system, it is difficult to change the rules 
                                                   
9
 This concern, however, is not supported by empirical evidence. In fact, economic openness is 
often linked to improvements in labor and environmental standards. This “trading-up” effect, a 
notion originally proposed by David Vogel (1995), means that market integration can create 
incentives for states to adopt more stringent product standards of a dominant regional economy (the 
“California Effect”), at least under certain conditions. See also Vogel and Kegan 2004. 
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individually. A rule that works well in one type of economic and social system does not 
produce expected outcomes in a different system. Incremental changes, therefore, are 
neither viable nor desirable. 
 Second, in clear contrast with the “retreat of state” argument that views the role 
of state shrinking, others maintain that states’ role has become even more important to 
maintain their competitiveness in global markets. To take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by economic integration, a government should provide high quality public 
goods, such as property rights, economic infrastructure, and basic education. There is 
thus a greater need for a capable government (Garret 1998, Garret and Lange 1996, 
Weiss 2003). 
 Third, countries can also maintain policies not favorable to holders of mobile 
capital, either through unilateral standard setting or careful coordination among national 
governments. Especially when a country has a sufficiently big economy and can 
effectively shut firms or products out of its market when they do not meet its own 
standard, it can maintain a high tax rate or costly regulatory requirements. Besides, 
countries with stricter regulation would continue to attract business when meeting 
higher environmental and labor standards result in a stronger brand image, especially 
for producers of consumer products. Furthermore, a country without enough market 
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power to make such unilateral measures effective can still keep high standards if other 
countries also maintain a similarly high level of regulatory standard. In other words, 
governments can overcome the pressure to “race to the bottom” through international 
regulatory coordination (Drezner 2000, Vogel and Kegan 2004). 
 Last but not least, the option of adhering to outdated policies and institutions is 
still available for countries. Even if adhering to the old system is costly for a country, it 
does not necessarily mean that reform occurs. Despite the enormous pressure, 
globalized markets pose on countries toward a certain policy direction, domestic forces 
often work against reform. Once introduced, institutions create vested interests (Pierson 
2000), making it difficult to change them. As North (1990) argues, some countries have 
maintained institutions that led to a low level of economic performance for a long 
period. In a globalized world, where firms compete fiercely at the international level, 
states with inefficient economic institutions lag behind, but rarely deteriorate. 
Financial Deregulation, Re-regulation, and Globalization 
In this subsection, I discuss the impacts of globalization on the area of financial 
regulation. As Bryant (1987: 67) notes, if their home country has constraining regulatory, 
tax, and supervisory systems, financial institutions have “incentives to locate affiliated 
offices outside of their home country and to book transactions through those offices to 
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take advantage of the less constrained operating environments abroad.” The constraints 
include high reserve requirements against deposit liabilities, binding interest rate 
ceilings on deposits, high ratios of required capital to assets, high effective tax rates on 
domestic profits, and unusually strict examination procedures. According to Bryant 
(1987: 139), competitive pressure is especially intense in the financial sector because 
“financial intermediation is more ‘footloose’ than most other economic activities. It can 
shift locations with less difficulty and without incurring prohibitively large cost.” The 
expected outcome is the relaxation of regulation in the financial sector. “Even more than 
for industry in general, therefore, the scope exists for an individual locality or nation to 
try to lure financial activity within its borders by imposing less stringent regulation, 
taxation, and supervision than that prevailing elsewhere” (Bryant 1987: 139). The 
dynamics of such “competition in laxity” in the financial sector is evident from the 
prominence of “offshore centers” for financial institutions. 
 As Perez (1998: 760–761) argues, uncoordinated exit and evasion by financial 
market players is one of the causal mechanisms through which market drives financial 
liberalization. Without raising their voice, they can influence policymakers through 
actual “exit” or threat of “exit,” as policymakers know the cost of losing financial 
business (Laurence 1996, 2001). Even when governments try to prevent capital flight by 
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banning the international movement of capital, mobile capital can easily find loopholes 
in the era of financial globalization. When holders of capital can enjoy less costly 
financial services in other countries, governments have no choice but to ease domestic 
regulations. 
 As discussed above, in terms of economic regulation in general, such pressure 
for deregulation can sometimes be welfare enhancing. Financial regulation can be set 
not to serve the public interests but to create rents for the regulated, which have 
captured the state apparatus (Rosenbluth 1989). In this case, competitive dynamics 
caused by globalization eliminates unnecessary regulation and enhances efficiency in 
the economy. However, the “race to the bottom” in the financial sector can also cause 
severe problems. To keep smooth and stable functioning of financial systems, certain 
types of regulation, namely those called “prudential regulation,” are indispensable. 
Prudential regulation aims at maintaining stability in the financial system and includes, 
among others, capital adequacy requirement, portfolio restrictions, and disclosure 
requirements. Nonetheless, these socially desirable regulations impose immediate costs 
on individual economic players, both providers and users of financial services. A greater 
flow of international capital is therefore considered to be a factor to destabilize the 
financial system, based on the assumption that investors are short-sighted. 
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 Yet, global pressure does not only work to produce laxer regulation. It can also 
facilitate a type of stricter regulation that protects investors. Such opposite dynamics, 
called the “race to the top,” can occur because the holders of mobile asset sometimes 
prefer strict, not lax, regulation in general. This line of argument is supported by ample 
evidence in the field of finance (Cerny 1993, Vogal 1996, Laurence 2001). Tighter 
regulation is not necessarily a bad thing for firms, the users of financial services. Listing 
on a stock exchange that requires strictest disclosure increases the credibility of the 
company with investors. Bank customers also enhance confidence if the bank is 
established in a country with higher capital requirement. 
Since the market pressure is far from being conclusive, economic interests do 
not entirely explain the regulatory dynamics. To have a deeper understanding of the 
regulatory policy outcomes, political factors should also be considered. Political factors 
work through several different mechanisms. Below, I discuss these mechanisms and 
how they can work in the field of financial regulation.
10
 
 First, coercive pressure on governments at the international level can play a key 
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 Simmons, Dobbin, and Garret (2008) raise four mechanisms through which liberal economic 
policies spread globally: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation. While the second 
mechanism based on the notion of competition fits squarely to the economic explanations, the 
remaining three are all political. The categorization below roughly corresponds with theirs. However, 




role in determining both the direction and details of financial regulation. Here, Realists’ 
view of power relations may factor in. The fact that the U.S., either a “hegemon” or at 
least the most powerful country in the capitalist world in the post-World War era, was 
always in a position to pry open domestic financial markets of other countries through 
various bilateral and multilateral negotiations suggest that the superpower used its 
overwhelming power, either military or economic, to make others open doors to 
promote the interests of politically powerful financial institutions. Especially in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, such line of argument gained 
popularity, as some observers recognized the causes of the crisis as premature 
liberalization. The “Wall-Street-Treasury Complex” (Bhagwati 1998) was regarded as 
the driver for liberalization in many less developed economies. The Wall Street financial 
institutions, which had been highly internationally oriented and profitable, aimed at 
promising markets in the emerging world. They successfully urged the U.S. government 
to exert influence on policies in developing countries (Wade 1998). 
The fact that the demand for greater openness comes more from those who 
want to expand their business oversees than from the potential users of their services 
also points to the role of power in international political economy. This is more so 
because in the field of finance, the country with the greatest competitiveness has been 
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the U.S. As opposed to the economic explanation, which mainly focuses on the interest 
of users of financial services, a power-based view can be applied to explain the 
outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations, mainly with demands from players who 
hope to break in a new market. 
Second, a school of thought that emphasizes the role of ideas offers a plausible 
explanation for financial liberalization (Hall 1989, Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 
McNamara 1998). The spread of neoliberal ideas explains the global trend for financial 
liberalization (Pauly 1988, Yergin and Stanislaw 1998).
11
 In the early post-war years, 
the prevailing idea concerning financial regulation is that of “embedded liberalism” 
(Ruggie 1982). While international trade in goods was rapidly liberalized after the end 
of the Second World War, most countries kept capital control to shield their national 
economies from external shocks (Simmons 1999). A different set of ideas, often dubbed 
as neoliberalism, started to take hold first in the U.S. in the 1970s and then spread to 
other parts of the world. The newly accepted ideas call for minimizing the role of 
governments. In the financial sector, the trend toward deregulation that started in the 
U.S. in mid-1975 spread to other advanced economies in the 1980s and to less 
                                                   
11
 In the categorization by Simmons, Dobbin, and Garret (2008), the ideational explanation falls in 
the third and fourth categories, learning and emulation, where the former mainly views ideas as 
somewhat established, causal beliefs, and the latter emphasizes the socially constructed meanings 
attached to ideas. 
36 
 
developed ones in the 1990s. 
Third, domestic politics is another important explanatory factor. To explain the 
process of financial liberalization in general, the society-centered approach focuses on 
the role interests of various societal groups. Organized groups exert political pressure on 
decision makers in search for reform (Perez 1998: 760-761). Their interests vary, and it 
is crucially important to know what determines the balance of power of conflicting 
interests. One may emphasize shifting power within a society as a result of changing 
economic environment. As global financial integration empowers holders of mobile 
capital, policies favorable to those actors are expected to prevail (Keohane and Milner 
1996). In this sense, this approach is likely to produce a similar conclusion to the 
“market forces” approach. On the other hand, the institutionalist approach focuses on 
the effects of political institutions. Even if holders of mobile capital increased their 
influence, the less efficient “losers” in the global competition can be better organized or 
have a better connection with policymakers, including elected politicians and 
administrative officials. They are often desperate to keep existing protections from 
competition, because their vested interests are at stake. Under certain institutional 
conditions, those who are at a disadvantage in the market competition can be political 




In sum, the literature of international political economy gives several distinct 
explanations for the trend toward financial liberalization in general. The widely held 
idea is the argument that emphasizes the consequences of economic globalization. 
Renewed strength of mobile capital has forced governments to adopt economic policies 
based on neoliberal ideas. Opening doors to foreign financial institutions is considered 
to be among such market-oriented policy reform. Yet, it is not the only mechanism, as 
discussed above. Ideas or domestic politics also matter. 
We cannot simply discuss the effects of economic and political factors on 
regulatory policies in general, as financial regulation includes a wide set of policy 
measures. In the next section, I discuss the various aspects of financial liberalization.  
 
2.2 Banking Sector Opening 
Types of Financial Liberalization 
Financial liberalization has many aspects. Liberalization transpires both domestically 
and internationally. Domestic, or internal, liberalization refers to the relaxation of 
financial regulations, such as removal of restrictions on interest rates, credit allocations, 
and range of products. Its main purpose is to allow market forces to work within the 
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domestic financial markets. On the other hand, external liberalization consists of the 
liberalization of international capital flows and internationalization of financial services. 
The former means removal of barriers set by government regulations to limit the 
transnational flow of capital and restrictions on the convertibility of the currency. The 
last couple of decades have witnessed globally a steady trend toward freer flow of 
capital. Simmons (1999: 42, Figure 2.1) points to the almost constant decline of the 
average number of capital controls in fifteen OECD countries from 1967 to 1993. Of the 
total of nine measures, such as restrictions on capital account, deposit restrictions, and 
restrictions on current transactions, the average went down from about 2.5 in 1967 to 
almost zero in 1993. Similarly, Ito and Chinn (2012: 12, Figure 1) demonstrate that 
industrial countries as a group opened their capital account steadily in the 1980s and 
achieved almost full openness by the mid-1990s, using their own index of capital 
account openness. On the other hand, in less developed countries and emerging markets, 
openness increased in most of the years during the 1990s and 2000s, although openness 
decreased during some years when countries faced the global financial downturn in the 
late 1990s and again in the late 2000s. 
 Many political economists have argued that the greater flow of capital is a 
result of the increased internationalization of financial activities in the 1980s and 1990s, 
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as globalization made it difficult for national governments to sustain controls on 
cross-border capital transactions (Goodman and Pauly 1993, Andrews 1994). The 
liberalization measures conducted by respective national governments, in turn, further 
increased flow of capital. The trends reinforce each other. 
 Domestic liberalization of financial regulation is also closely interrelated to 
freer international flow of capital. Basically, financial liberalization at the domestic 
level is accelerated by global competition. In the 1980s, many advanced countries, 
including the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, and France conducted financial 
liberalization, though to varying degrees, at least in part because of the deregulatory 
pressure they felt in global competition (Reid 1988, Cerny 1989, Rosenbluth 1989, 
Laurence 1996, 2001).
12
 Financial authority can even use external financial 
liberalization as a leverage to organize regulatory reform at the domestic level, which is 
otherwise difficult due to the resistance from vested interests. The Japanese version of 
the Big Bang financial liberalization program, which was announced in November 1996, 
started with the revision of the Foreign Exchange Control Law to ease restriction on 
cross-border capital transactions. It was meant by reform-minded bureaucrats of the 
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 It is important to note, however, that earlier cases of deregulation in the U.S. and U.K., which set 
the global trend toward deregulation, started with domestic reasons. In the U.S., the “May Day” 




MOF to spur domestic-level financial liberalization necessary for the survival of the 
Japanese financial system in international competition (Suginohara 2004: 206-209). 
Internationalization of financial services is yet another type of external 
liberalization of finance. It “eliminates discrimination in treatment between foreign and 
domestic financial services providers and removes barriers to the cross-border provision 
of financial services” (Claessens 2002: 299). In this study, I mainly focus on the 
opening of domestic financial markets to foreign players—a type of financial 
liberalization that falls in the category of internationalization of financial services. It 
involves trade in services, which is a relatively newly developed concept in the history 
of international economy.
13
 While opening doors to foreign financial institutions can be 
considered as a part of the increased internationalization of financial business, it is 
different from removing barriers to the international inflows and outflows of capital. 
Different dynamics are at work. 
Internationalization and Banking Sector Opening 
Following the general trend toward financial globalization, the banking sector has been 
internationalized relatively lately. International lending, or provision of credit from 
foreign-headquartered banks to local non-bank borrowers, can be conducted from the 
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home office (cross-border) or through local offices. For banks, the share of international 
lending, including both lending from the home office and local affiliates in foreign 
countries, has increased over the last decades. More than one-third of the total lending 
to non-banks by European banks goes to foreign borrowers in 2009. The figure remains 
less than 15 percent for the Japanese and U.S. banks (BIS 2010: 77). The 
internationalization of lending started with greater cross-border provision of financial 
services but, more recently, banks have increasingly established their direct presence in 
foreign countries (Marchetti 2008: 312, BIS 2010: 77). The methods for foreign 
expansion include joint ventures, subsidiaries, and branches.  
On the borrowers’ side, according to Claessens and van Horen (2012: 5, 22, 
Table 1), who composed a comprehensive database of foreign banks in 137 host 
countries, foreign banks substantially increased their presence in most countries 
between 1995 and 2009. However, the degree of reliance on foreign banks varies from 
economy to economy. In 2007, foreign bank loans account for 10 percent of total bank 
loans in OECD countries as a group, 17 percent in emerging markets, and 24 percent in 
developing countries (Claessens and van Horen 2012: 24, Table 4). Among the 
advanced countries, “foreign banks account for roughly one quarter of overall bank 
credit in the U.S. and EU countries,” while the figure remains about 5 percent in Japan. 
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In emerging markets and developing countries, the operation of foreign banks 
significantly expanded since the mid-1990s, but there is a wide regional variation. More 
than 80 percent of borrowing in emerging Europe comes from foreign-headquartered 
banks, and about 50 percent in Latin America, while emerging Asian economies obtain 
less than 20 percent of their total bank borrowing from foreign banks (BIS 2010: 78). 
 The historical development in the U.S. is impressive. U.S. banking operations 
of foreign banks accounted for 18.2 percent of total commercial and industrial loans in 
the country in 1980. The share expanded steadily since then, culminated in 39.4 percent 
in 1993, and remained high throughout the remainder of the 1990s (IIB 1997: 30). The 
share dropped since then, but the figure was still 27.2 percent in 2006 (IIB 2008: 13). 
The beneficiaries of the increased availability of credit are not limited to economic 
players from the same home country, even though many financial institutions initially 
start foreign operation to serve their internationally oriented customers in their home 
markets. In 1984, loans to Japanese-owned firms accounted for more than three-quarters 
of Japanese branch lending in the U.S., but in 1989, it was no more than two-fifths. 
While they came to the U.S. following Japanese customers, Japanese banks increasingly 
serviced U.S. firms as they expanded their operation in the country (Seth and Quijano 
1991). In 1997, according to a survey conducted by the Institute of International 
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Bankers, about half of the commercial and industrial loans by U.S. banking operations 
of foreign banks went to customers which were subsidiaries or affiliates of the banks’ 
customers in the home countries (IIB 1997: 38). 
 What has driven governments to open their financial markets, which made the 
globalization of the banking business possible? As with other types of financial 
liberalization, the greater flow of capital across national borders is a natural candidate 
for the cause of the opening. Under pressure from the global financial markets, 
governments have no choice but to open their domestic markets to foreign financial 
institutions that offer superior financial services. Otherwise, domestic holders of capital 
exit the country to take advantage of opportunities offered in other countries.  
The most fundamental problem of this line of argument is that the link between 
pressure from global markets and greater access for foreign financial institutions is not 
firmly established. There are clearer causal links between globalization on the one hand, 
and less regulation of domestic financial markets and less control of capital account on 
the other, even though the evidence to support such links is mixed. The greater ease 
with which capital is moved across national borders empowers holders of mobile capital, 
who often prefer laxer regulation. However, allowing more foreign banks into their 
markets is not an obvious consequence of globalization. In theory, under perfect (or 
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near perfect) integration of national economies, holders of mobile capital have little 
need to have subsidiaries and branches of foreign financial institutions established in 
their home countries, as they can move themselves in search of greater returns. This is 
especially true for large-scale users of financial services, such as multinational 
corporations and professional investors, who are footloose in global finance. If 
economic considerations motivate the opening of financial markets, then the driving 
force should be more a demand from service providers to have greater access to foreign 
financial markets, rather than the apolitical pressure exerted by mobile capital with the 
threat of exit. As such, we should turn to the political processes of financial opening. 
Without an effective exit option, the demand from providers should be filtered through 
politics. 
Benefits and Costs of Opening Doors 
Generally, increased competition caused by the entry of foreign players enhances 
efficiency in the financial sector. Opening domestic financial markets to foreign 
financial institutions reduces the distorting effects of protectionist measures that weaken 
discipline on policymakers, give unhealthy discretionary power to bureaucrats, and 
invite rent-seeking behavior by privileged interest groups (OECD 2002: 9). Besides, 
there are more direct benefits of having more foreign financial institutions in the 
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domestic markets. Foreign banks can be an important source of capital to the domestic 
economy. As seen above, foreign-headquartered banks are now substantial sources of 
credits in many countries, both advanced and developing. The entry of foreign financial 
institutions also provides jobs. For example, in the U.S., the total number of people 
directly employed by foreign banks was 118,291 in 1996 and 249,579 in 2006 (IIB 1997, 
2008). In addition, accepting the entry of foreign financial institutions also protects the 
opportunities of domestic banks operating abroad, as it curtails the possibility of 
reciprocal protectionism in other countries. 
 On the other hand, several factors are given to explain and justify restrictions 
of foreign ownership in domestic financial markets (Graham 2001). While most of them 
are often economically unfounded, the logic has provided policymakers with grounds 
for restrictions. 
First, from the economic perspective, the increased presence of foreign 
financial institutions can cause capital flight away from the country at the time of 
economic distress, even though economists also argue that much of the problem derives 
from information asymmetries, and not from foreign ownership. The true solution for 
the problem is to enhance the capability of financial players, both domestic and 
international, of risk-assessment and monitoring, to reduce uninformed capital inflows, 
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which easily disappear at times of crisis. One way of achieving this goal is to import 
foreign know-how of risk-assessment (Graham 2001). Another concern is that greater 
foreign ownership in the financial sector causes “contagion” by transmitting financial 
crisis from one financial system to another. Banks in a country that faces financial 
problems may cut lending in other countries and, in effect, export their own trouble. 
According to a recent analysis (Claessens and van Horen 2012: 17), in 2009, foreign 
banks reduced lending more than domestic banks as a response to the global financial 
crisis. Since the degree of reduction depended on factors such as the market share of 
foreign banks, the situation of home countries, and access to local deposits; however, 
we cannot easily conclude whether the greater presence of foreign banks and other types 
of financial institutions spread the financial crisis. The penetration of foreign financial 
institutions can decrease the risk of systemic financial crisis through diversification.  
Second, there are also regulatory concerns. Foreign banks could circumvent 
more easily than domestic banks regulations of a monetary and/or prudential nature 
(Pecchioli 1983: 71). 
Third, an infant industry argument is often employed to make a case for 
restricting the entry of foreign financial institutions. In less developed economies, some 
period of protection can be justified to let the domestic banking industry grow and 
47 
 
become competitive. The protection, however, in effect taxes the users of financial 
services. Moreover, the protection is more likely to hinder maturation of the domestic 
players than to foster them, as the protected financial institutions become dependent on 
the implicit subsidies. 
 In addition, political factors also influence the decisions concerning whether to 
accept foreign financial institutions into the domestic financial markets. First, 
nationalism plays a role. A sovereign state should not give up control of its financial 
sector, which is considered to be the lifeblood of the national economy, to foreign firms. 
In the discussion of foreign banks’ entry in the late 1970s, for example, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia notes, “Banking is a key sector of the economy providing the 
community with money balances and payments’ arrangements. Control of ownership of 
banks should therefore be maintained in Australian hands to ensure concern for the 
national interest. Foreign banks may be more inclined to give prior place to commercial 
advantage or to another country’s national interest.”
14
 One may contend that a nation 
must have the best-functioning banking system possible even from a nationalist 
perspective, because the performance of the banking sector is crucial to the performance 
of its economy. Still, the nationality of important economic players often causes 
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 Reserve Bank of Australia, “Submission to the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial 
System,” Occasional Paper, No. 7, December 1979, p. 12.6, cited in Pecchioli (1983: 71). 
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concerns in many economies. 
There is additional difficulty peculiar to opening domestic markets to foreign 
companies. As mentioned above, opening doors to foreign financial institutions is 
different from removing barriers to the international inflows and outflows of capital, 
even though it can be considered as a part of increased internationalization of financial 
business. In many cases, it is more an issue of FDI than international trade in the 
traditional sense of the term.
15
 Letting foreigners invest freely in national territory and 
do business involves more complex problems than liberalizing international trade in 
goods. Unlike barriers to trade in goods, barriers to trade in services do not “take the 
form of transparent barriers imposed at the border,” most typically tariffs and quotas. 
Instead, they are generally embedded in domestic regulations (Feketekuty 1999, Cooper 
2010). Often, domestic regulations that do not explicitly discriminate against foreign 
providers curtail access to service suppliers from outside the country, regardless of 
whether the consequence was intended. Consequently, the liberalization of access for 
foreign firms inevitably entails changes in domestic regulation. Yet, individual 
regulation is often embedded in a certain economic and political structure, making it 
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 It is also possible to provide financial services across national borders without establishing 
subsidiaries or other entities in foreign countries. As in the case of consulting, such cross-border 
transactions of services became possible because of innovation in information technology. Yet, they 
also involve regulatory changes in the countries where the customers reside. 
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difficult to change. Amending existing regulation in line with international need is most 
often in conflict with certain vested interests at the domestic level. Besides, it infringes 
the authority of national governments to set their own regulation. 
 These problems have made international negotiations on trade in services more 
complicated than those on trade in goods. Nonetheless, efforts have been made after the 
1980s to promote liberalization through international negotiations at the bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral levels. The next section discusses approaches to explain such 
negotiations. 
 
2.3 Intergovernmental Negotiations and Banking Sector Opening 
Intergovernmental negotiations on issues concerning trade in service and FDIs have a 
much shorter history than those concerning trade in goods. Throughout the post-Second 
World War period, international negotiations had been conducted under the GATT 
framework to eliminate barriers to the cross-national flow of goods. Setting the rules for 
international trade in services lagged behind. The inclusion of trade in services in the 
multilateral framework of trade liberalization became a serious subject only after the 
mid-1980s, and actual negotiations on liberalization began only after the late 1980s. The 
process through which trade in services rose to a multilateral agenda is discussed in 
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detail in Chapter 6. Preceding the formal inclusion of the subject in the multilateral 
framework were bilateral financial negotiations. The U.S.–Japan financial negotiations 
were the first of that type. After the successful conclusion of their initial round in the 
mid-1980s, there were more bilateral talks aimed at opening domestic financial markets.  
Explaining Intergovernmental Financial Negotiations 
Here, I consider three different perspectives in the study of international politics and 
examine their insights and shortcomings in understanding the process of 
intergovernmental negotiations over financial regulation.  
 First, the Realist perspective, which focuses on the rivalry and competition 
among states, emphasizes the role of power in determining outcomes of negotiations. 
All the polite diplomatic exchanges notwithstanding, it is the crude power relationship 
among participants that defines the outcomes. In the case of bilateral negotiation, the 
relative power balance matters. A second set of approaches is based on neoliberal 
institutionalism, which was developed in response to the Realist approach.
16
 While it 
accepts the assumption of anarchy, it emphasizes the role of international institutions 
that facilitate cooperation among states. International institutions, such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) or the IMF, influence negotiation outcomes by reducing 
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uncertainty, providing forums for negotiations, disseminating information, and creating 
shared norms (Keohane 1984). 
 These views see a country basically as a unitary actor. In international 
negotiations among countries with different sets of interests, the government tries to 
maximize the interest of the country. In reality, however, the process of 
intergovernmental negotiations is more complex than multiple unitary countries facing 
each other. There are diverse interests within a single country, and domestic battles for 
influence affect negotiation outcomes. The relationships among various interest groups 
and governmental agencies with conflicting interests are crucial in defining international 
agreements. The third theoretical perspective, the two-level game approach, thus looks 
at domestic political dynamics as well as the intergovernmental exchanges (Putnum 
1988). Essentially, it conceives the politics of international negotiation as a two-level 
game, in which political leaders simultaneously negotiate at both the domestic and 
international levels. The final agreement they work out with their negotiating partners 
has to satisfy domestic constituencies. While such double-edged diplomacy imposes 
great constraints on negotiators, they can use strong domestic opposition as a leverage 
to win more concessions from their negotiating partners. The two-level approach 
challenges the traditional billiard ball image of international politics by introducing 
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domestic factors into the model of international negotiations. Yet, this sophisticated 
approach falls short of capturing an important aspect of intergovernmental relations. It 
basically deals with a national negotiating team as a neutral, unitary player. 
Network of Financial Officials and Intergovernmental Financial Negotiations 
This study sheds light on an understudied aspect of intergovernmental negotiations: the 
institutional setting in which intergovernmental interactions occur. The institutional 
conditions determine those involved in negotiations. Moving away from models that 
view intergovernmental negotiations as being conducted in a neutral arena, it analyzes 
how the arena for intergovernmental interactions is shaped and how the shape affects 
the policy outcomes. In doing so, it stresses the dynamics among officials and agencies 
within a government, and the role played by experts in the bureaucracy, as well as the 
significance of the transnational policy networks. Theoretically, it is based on 
institutionalism, but it takes a nuanced, case-specific approach to contribute to the more 
general theorization that highlights the importance of understudied factors.  
 The argument is that the structure of international financial negotiations affects 
the policy outcomes. An important institutional feature of financial negotiations is the 
extent to which they were exclusively held among specialists in the respective 
government. Contrary to the case in trade, the negotiators in financial talks have been 
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limited to a relatively small number of specialists within governments. In the 
U.S.–Japan cases in the 1980s and 1990s, which are the subject of this study, the talks 
were conducted mostly by officials in the sections of international finance of the U.S. 
Treasury and Japanese MOF. This exclusiveness distinguishes financial negotiations 
from other trade talks. Moreover, while the start of the talks involved decisions by the 
highest-level political officials, there was little political interference regarding the 
substances except for the very early days of the decade-long negotiations. Simply put, 
the negotiation process was mostly insulated from political intervention. 
This exclusiveness is usually attributed to the highly technical nature of finance. 
A senior official of Japanese MOF who belonged to the International Finance Bureau 
and had engaged in a series of international financial negotiations in the 1990s wrote 
that “because the financial services sector is highly technical and requires expertise, it is 
essential to have negotiations among experts with seasoned knowledge” (Hosomi 1995: 
46).  
This line of argument, in general, appears often in the discussion of 
international monetary coordination. As Krasner (1978: 64–66, 80) argues with the case 
of the U.S., the policymaking of international monetary policy was more insulated from 
societal pressure than trade policy. In contrast to trade policy, which involves a large 
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number of institutions, authority concerning international monetary policy in the U.S. is 
concentrated in the hands of the White House, Treasury Department, and Federal 
Reserve Board. All these institutions were well insulated from particular social interests. 
The scarcity of interest groups in the international monetary policy process has often 
been attributed to the nature of monetary policy (Gowa 1988: 19). Odell (1982: 347) 
notes that “the esoteric nature of the subject of international monetary policy and 
ignorance on the part of group leaders” can explain the relative inactivity of interest 
groups in the field of finance. This intellectual barrier to monetary policy is often 
compared to trade policymaking (Gowa 1983: 134). 
However, interest groups routinely engage on other issues as seemingly arcane 
as international monetary issues (Gowa 1988: 19). For example, highly politicized 
agricultural trade involves technical issues, such as health standards and a complicated 
system of taxes and subsidies, which are no less esoteric than monetary issues.  
 This study takes a different view by emphasizing the impact of pre-existing 
institutions on the shape of the forum where a new set of issues are discussed. With the 
specific case of intergovernmental negotiations on the opening of domestic financial 
markets, the existing network of financial experts that was developed to address 
international monetary issues mattered.  
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Global financial governance has been organized by a small number of countries, 
reflecting the overwhelming importance of large economies to the stability of the 
international financial system. After the 1960s, when the international financial system 
became increasingly unstable, a club made of a small number of rich countries primarily 
assumed responsibility for the management of the system. The increasing prominence of 
international financial issues has provided many formal and informal opportunities for 
government officials specializing in international finance to gather and discuss, such as 
the Group of Ten and Group of Five, as well as meetings at more formal international 
institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The same individuals, 
mainly at the deputy level, often represented their countries in each of these 
international monetary forums for years (Russel 1973: 435). As a consequence, those 
officials fostered long-term relationships and developed mutual understanding. All these 
relationships tackle the problems of international payments imbalances and exchange 
rates, which remain important well into the new century. However, the existence of the 
network of financial officials explains the way another, but related, issue of financial 
opening was dealt with. 
The Group of Ten was formed in 1961 to address the problem of international 
payments imbalances. Overrepresentation of Europe in these forums later led the U.S. to 
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form the Group of Five, an informal group of financial ministers from the U.S., France, 
Germany, the U.K., and Japan, accompanied by senior officials or deputies. It started as 
the Group of Four when the U.S. Treasury Secretary George Schultz informally invited 
finance ministers from France, Germany, and the U.K. in the Library of the White 
House, together with high ranking officials, to discuss the problems of the exchange rate 
regime in the spring of 1973. The officials from bureaucracy who were present in the 
first Library Group were Paul Volcker of the U.S., Claude Pierre Brossolette of France, 
Karl Otto Pohl of Germany, and Derek Mitchell of the U.K. (Baker 2006: 24). Japan 
joined several months later. Central bank governors began participating in the meeting 
in the fall of the same year (Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 134-135).
17
 Since then, 
officials from the five countries frequently held meetings about international financial 
problems.
18
 The 1986 Tokyo Summit of G7 established the G7 finance ministers’ group 
as a separate entity from the summit meeting, making it a more visible gathering.
19
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 For an account by participants in these early events, see Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 101–135. 
18
 The G5 remained as an informal meeting hidden from the public until September 1985, when the 
G5 issued the first formal statement on the international currency issue, which was called the “Plaza 
Accord.” The end of the secrecy led to mounting pressure from Italy and Canada to expand the 
membership so that they could also join just as they did in the G7 summit meetings, which started in 
1975 (Baker 2006: 24–26). For the origin and significance of the G7 summit meetings, see Putnam 
and Bayne 1984. 
19
 Another predecessor of the international financial policy network was the Bellagio group, which 
was a private study group constituting economists and government officials responsible for 
international financial issues, established in 1963 (Cooper 1999). Japan first joined the group in 1968 
when Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs Yusuke Kashiwagi was invited. See 
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In history, central bankers have been at the center of the international network 
of financial officials, which began developing among them in the 1920s in an effort to 
reestablish the global gold standard system (Helleiner 2013). Yet, finance and treasury 
officials became active as the postwar monetary regime of the Bretton Woods System 
faltered. Furthermore, the role of financial regulators and supervisors in the 
international network of financial officials expanded over time, as the importance of the 
coordination of financial regulation and supervision increased beginning in the 1970s 
(Kapstein 1994). 
In such meetings, the same individuals often represented their countries in each 
of these international monetary forums for years (Russel 1973: 435). This tendency is 
the clearest at the deputy level of government agencies, as officials at the deputy level 
both of finance ministries and central banks often stay longer at their positions than 
ministers and central bank governors.
20
 Regular meetings among officials from 
financial ministries and central banks at this level fostered enduring friendships among 
them and increased mutual understandings not only of the questions at stake but also of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Kashiwagi’s memoir, “Watashi no rirekisho” [My personal history], in Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
September 27, 1986. 
20
 For a comparison of rates of turnover at the top and deputy levels in the early years of 
international financial governance by the “club,” see Russel (1973: 440). 
58 
 
each other’s intentions (Russel 1973: 439).
21
 
Therefore, the personal relationships among financial officials from major 
economies in some sense resemble what Haas (1992: 3) called the “epistemic 
community.” It is a network of professionals who share a set of normative and causal 
beliefs as well as have common policy enterprises “presumably out of the conviction 
that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.” 
Helleiner (2013) stresses that financial officials shared a certain set of ideas 
concerning the goals of international financial governance. These shared ideas changed 
over time. In the interwar period of the 1920s, the shared goal was the reestablishment 
of the gold standard system, which was based on the liberal economic ideas. In the 
Bretton Woods era after the mid-1940s, the common idea shifted to that of “embedded 
liberalism” (Ruggie 1982). Then after the 1980s, more liberal norms reappeared. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that international monetary negotiations occurred 
on the ground of shared understandings.
22
 
As Kapstein (1992: 266–267) argues, however, government officials and 
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 In the more private Bellagio group, government officials were exposed to academic arguments on 
exchange rate issues and developed a common understanding (Cooper 1999). 
22
 On central bankers, Paul Volcker states that they “are almost uniquely able to deal with each 
other on a basis of close understanding and frankness” because of their common “experience, tenure, 
and training” (Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 99, 201). 
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central bankers are not neutral experts who provide purely scientific knowledge. They 
represent the interests of their respective countries. Moreover, their proposals and 
decisions are based not only on what economic theories suggest to be the best choice 
but also on the judgment about what is politically acceptable. In this sense, the group of 
financial experts from governmental agencies should not be regarded as an epistemic 
community. Similarly, Helleiner (2013) notes that the shared ideas and purposes should 
not be overstated, because financial diplomats nevertheless represent their respective 
countries’ interests. They ultimately have to serve the interest of their home countries. 
Consequences of the International Network of Financial Officials 
What differences does this structure of intergovernmental negotiations make? When 
negotiators share knowledge of the issues in question and have developed long-term 
personal relationships with each other, these relationships have a profound impact on 
policy outcomes. 
On the positive side, mutual understanding and trust facilitate mutually 
beneficial negotiations. With a deep knowledge of the financial markets in the 
counterparts’ country, the negotiators can come up with realistic proposals that both 
sides can accept. Long-lasting relationships also make it possible for policymakers to 
negotiate with a long time horizon. When he made the following comments after a 
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series of bilateral financial negotiations of the first half of the 1990s with the U.S. ended, 
one of the Japanese senior officials had such positive effects in his mind: “An important 
feature of the negotiations was that they were held on the basis of mutual trust. It was 
because of the close relationship between the Japanese MOF and U.S. Treasury, which 
had been developed since the start of the Yen-Dollar Talks in 1983. The chairs and 
participants in the working group from both Japan and the U.S. not only had a thorough 
knowledge of the situation in the partners’ country but also knew each other personally 
well before the series of negotiations” (Hosomi 1995: 46). 
On the other hand, the closed nature of such a policy network can have a 
negative impact for the society at large. The participants may prioritize protecting their 
own interests, such as their jurisdiction in the case of the government officials at the 
expense of the public interest, for example, by ignoring the economically most efficient 
policy. Since financial officials tend to have close ties with the private financial industry, 
the officials may also protect the commercial interests of those within the existing 
financial system. Moreover, officials might not recognize their previous policy failures 
and try to avoid blame, leading to mere incremental policy changes even when changing 
circumstances require drastic reform.  
Tsingou’s analysis (2010) of the informal transnational policy community in 
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global financial governance resonates with this study in its interest in the role of the 
transnational network of financial experts. In discussing the global financial crisis since 
2007, Tsingou (2010: 22, 34) highlights the surprising resilience of a network 
constituting governmental regulators and supervisors, as well as private sector actors 
after the crippling crisis. The consequence of such a network is incremental reform 
rather than wholesale change even at a time of an acute crisis, and policies that serve the 
interest of the members of the policy community rather than the public. 
Politicization of Financial Negotiations 
However, the institution at the international level is not static. It changes as its 
environment changes, and such changes affect negotiation outcomes. 
As the salience of financial issues increased during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
exclusiveness of intergovernmental financial negotiations became lost. More and more 
political actors, including other economic agencies within the governments and 
legislative bodies backed by the private interest groups and the general public, came to 
be involved in the process. Moreover, as the GATT talks on service issues evolved, the 
issue was set in the multilateral framework, reducing the exclusive nature of finance. 
First, at the domestic level, issues in the financial sector attracted more 
attention from the society at large since the 1980s. The relative economic importance of 
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the financial sector has increased in the last couple of decades in developed economies 
as a result of deindustrialization. As Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate, the share of the 
financial sector in GDP surpassed that of the manufacturing sector in 1998 in the U.S. 
Even though Japan still has a bigger manufacturing sector than the financial sector in 
2007, the gap has become steadily smaller since 1970.
23
 
 Alongside this “financialization” of economies, there has been a trend that 
finance penetrated into the societies of advanced economies since the 1980s. Ordinary 
people became investors, shifting their money from bank deposits to financial markets 
by purchasing various financial products, such as the money market funds (MMF). The 
trend has been especially noticeable in Anglo-American societies (Langley 2008). It was 
observed in Japan as well, where ordinary people began engaging in more speculative 
investment, such as investment trusts and foreign exchange markets. The term “Mrs. 
Watanabe” was widely used in the late 2000s to refer to ordinary Japanese housewives 
who engage in foreign currency speculation. As a wider segment of the society becomes 
involved in financial activities, we can expect that their interest in financial issues 
increases. In his analysis of exchange rate policies, Frieden (1994) argues that the 
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 Since the 1980s, the share of the manufacturing sector in the national economy declined not only 
in the U.S. and U.K., countries with the world’s major financial centers, but also in Japan and 




distributional impact of exchange rates increases as the world becomes more financially 
and commercially integrated. As a result, the salience of international monetary issues 
has grown in the arena of domestic politics. 
 Second, the increased activities of foreign institutions in the financial sector 
caused by globalization began invoking economic nationalism and became a politically 
sensitive issue. Generally, the expansion of inward FDI can invoke nationalism, as 
people sometimes feel that their territory is invaded by outsiders when foreigners take 
control of important economic sectors. Even worse, local companies that are exposed to 
foreign competition may attempt to appeal to nationalism to preempt foreign takeover 
and protect their own self-interests (Suginohara 2008). 
 In the U.S. in the 1980s, a sense of insecurity spread as competition with the 
rising East became visible (Spero and Hart 2003: 136–138). In the financial sector, 
Japanese financial institutions significantly expanded their presence, as I discuss more 
in detail in Chapter 4. In hindsight, this was in large part due to the economic bubble of 
Japan in the latter half of the 1980s. At that time, however, there was a widespread fear 
of being intruded upon in the U.S., leading to mounting political pressure on Japan. 
Combined with the swelling bilateral trade imbalances, matters in the arcane financial 
world became the subject of domestic political debate. 
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Third, at the international level, the issue of financial sector openness became a 
subject of multilateral negotiations under the framework of the GATT.
24
 The financial 
sector remained to be discussed mainly among government officials specialized in the 
field of finance, even within the GATT. Yet, the incorporation of the sector into the 
larger framework of international trade negotiations entailed some involvement of 
actors outside the network of financial administrators.  
Consequently, the nature of international financial negotiations defined by the 
cozy relationships among a relatively small number of well-informed specialists 
changed over time. More political concerns were reflected in the demands. Requests 
became more short-sighted. Financial issues were also linked to other issues more 
frequently. 
On this point, this argument relates to the literature of issue linkage. The 
existing studies often place a high value on issue linkage, since combining issues that 
are valued differently by each party can yield mutually beneficial solutions to otherwise 
insolvable issues. Each side can benefit on the issue it values highly by making 
concessions on issues less important to it (See Sebenius 1983: 293-94). Similarly, 
unrelated issues can be used as side payment to overcome distributional obstacles to 
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 The process through which the issue was included in the multilateral framework in the 1980s is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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international cooperation (Tollison and Willett 1979). In a more abstract term, linking 
unrelated issues is the equivalent of making one-shot games to repeated ones, thus 
facilitating international cooperation (Keohane 1984). 
In the study of international trade negotiations, issue linkage is often 
considered to be an effective strategy to overcome obstacles to a successful conclusion. 
One of the strengths of multilateral trade negotiations under the umbrella of the GATT 
and WTO in the post-war years lies in their encompassing nature. If negotiated sector by 
sector, fundamental and unresolved conflicts of interests between the North and South, 
as well as between food exporters and importers would have blocked any meaningful 
trade liberalization. Linking such issues in a package of liberalization agreement has 
enhanced trade liberalization (Davis 2004). On financial services, Dobson (2002) points 
to the division of the WTO negotiations along sectoral lines as one of the weaknesses of 
the GATS framework. Separating services from goods and individual services from 
each other makes the use of reciprocity more difficult. “Reserving financial services 
negotiations for finance ministers makes such linkages even more difficult” (Dobson 
2002: 5). 
Yet, the other side of the same coin is that the relatively “easy” issues may be 
sacrificed for accomplishments in “difficult” issues. In the case of financial negotiations, 
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for example, financial officials in Japan were deeply worried that their government 
might unduly sacrifice the financial sector by opening it up excessively to foreign 
players—at least against their standard—to protect the agricultural sector because of the 
political importance of rice farmers in Japan. For them, separating financial issues from 
others and keeping them for a relatively small number of specialists on finance 





Global foreign exchange transactions 
per day 
 
1983  $60 billion 
1992 $820 billion 
1998 $1.5 trillion 
2001 $1.2 trillion 
2004 $1.9 trillion 
2007 $3.3 trillion 
2010 $4.0 trillion   
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Figure 2.2 Share of Inward FDI in Financial Sector to Total FDI Inflows 
 



























































































Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, p.77. 
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Figure 2.4 Growing Importance of Financial Sector in GDP in Japan 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Growing Importance of Financial Sector in GDP in the U.S. 
 
The periods covered by two charts differ due to different availability of data. The 
financial sector includes finance, insurance, real estate and business services. 
 
Source: Author’s conpilation based on OECD STAN Databanses. 
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Chapter 3   World’s First Bilateral Financial Negotiation: The Yen-Dollar Talks  
 
In 1983 and 1984, the governments of the United States and Japan held a series of 
negotiations over liberalization of the Japanese capital markets. The event, called the 
Yen-Dollar Talks, was the world’s first bilateral negotiations aimed at opening the 
domestic financial markets (Frankel 1984: ix), paving the way for a more extensive US 
efforts to pry open financial markets in many less developed economies, especially 
those in the Asian region, in the 1990s. Another significance of the talks is that it was 
considered to be one of the exceptional successes in a series of frustrating U.S.-Japan 
trade negotiations in the 1980s. It resulted not in market-distorting voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) or an all-out trade war, but in some opening of Japan’s previously 
closed financial markets to foreign players. It also triggered, or at least accelerated, the 
broad financial liberalization in Japan in the following decade. 
It has been argued that the main reason for this success lies in the existence of 
groups that support the financial liberalization within Japan. While most domestic 
financial institutions resisted the opening as they had enjoyed the protection from 
competition through heavy regulation, the users of the financial services, most notably 
large firms, supported the liberalization. As Schoppa (1997) demonstrated in his study 
71 
 
of the outcomes of US-Japan trade negotiations, domestic interests matter considerably 
in explaining the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations.
1
 However, this 
explanation is insufficient to explain the difference between the outcomes of the 
Yen-Dollar Talks and more contentious U.S.-Japan trade frictions of the time in general. 
 This chapter explains the Talks focusing on the institutional features of the 
financial issue area, and discusses the implication of the international negotiations. It 
argues that the unique institutional characteristic of financial negotiations between two 
countries is the key factor to understand the outcomes. 
 
3.1 Agenda Setting: Why did Financial Liberalization Become a Bilateral Issue? 
The framework for the series of negotiations was officially launched at the summit 
meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Japan’s Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone held in Tokyo in November 1983. The official name given to the framework 
was the Joint Japan-U.S. Ad Hoc Group on Yen/ Dollar Exchange Rate and Financial 
and Capital Market Issues, but it was known as the Yen-Dollar Committee. In the 
subsequent meetings under the framework, the government officials from the two 
countries discussed financial market issues, with the focus on internationalization of yen 
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and liberalization of Japan’s domestic financial markets. While trade conflicts had been 
common for the two countries and other part of the world, it was the first time that the 
opening of domestic financial markets became the subject of formal intergovernmental 
negotiations. Why was the issue put on the negotiation table precisely at that time? 
 As the official name suggests, the initial focus of discussion by the government 
officials from the two countries was the exchange rate. Financial liberalization was 
taken up as a means to address the problem of exchange rate, but later became the core 
subject. The exchange rate between the US dollar and the Japanese yen became a 
political issue because it was considered to be the main cause of the ballooning trade 
imbalances between the two countries. After the FRB under Paul Volcker raised interest 
rate to a historical high since 1979, the value of the US dollar jumped despite the 
already huge trade deficit the country had run. The trade deficit continued to grow, with 




Besides the overall trade imbalance, the imbalances in financial markets had 
become a source of concern in U.S.-Japan economic relationship since the 1970s. The 
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successful inroads of Japanese financial institutions in American markets contrasted 
sharply with the problems they had in penetrating Japanese markets. The US financial 
institutions started to complain in the late 1970s to their government about policies 
taken by the Japanese government. It should be noted, however, that the failure of US 
banks in making profits in the Japanese markets was not directly linked to trade 
imbalances at that time. 
Japan’s position in international financial markets had changed drastically over 
the post-war period. For two decades after the Second World War, the Japanese 
government’s greatest concern regarding the control of international capital flow had 
been the lack of capital to finance domestic investment. The MOF placed restriction on 
capital outflows in order to alleviate the balance-of-payment problem. However, Japan 
had overcome its chronic balance-of-payment problem by the middle of 1960s and 
became a net creditor by 1969. Since the early 1970s, the MOF had gradually relaxed 
the restriction on capital flows in and out of Japan.
2
 As Japan’s balance-of-payment 
position improved and barriers to international financial transactions became lower, 
Japanese financial institutions expanded their international operations. They were 
especially successful in the American market where they rapidly expanded their 
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 The new Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law of 1980 changed Japan’s policy toward capital 
control into “free in principle” (Rosenbluth 1989, Chapter 4). 
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presence, in part taking advantage of the lax regulation there on foreign banks.
3
 
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, foreign banks had hard time in Japan 
since the mid-1970s. Right after the end of the Second World War, Citibank returned to 
Japan, together with Bank of America and Chase (Brown 1994: 16). Throughout the 
post-war period, foreign banks in Japan operated rather inconspicuously, enjoying the 
niche market in the Japanese financial market as they could mostly monopolize the 
business of connecting international capital markets and the Japanese economy. They 
faced increased difficulty since the mid-1970s, however. It was a result of gradual 
opening and liberalization rather than the closed nature of the Japanese market. In the 
past, even though it had been difficult for foreign financial institutions to enter Japan, it 
was a lucrative market for those who had established a sure footing. They were allowed 
to engage in a limited scope of business reserved for them. In the absence of many 
rivals, they could enjoy high earnings. After 1968, however, the MOF began to let a 
substantial number of major foreign banks into Japan.
4
 The number of foreign banks 
operating in Japan grew from mere 18 in 1970 to 41 in March 1974 to as much as 61 in 
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 See next chapter for more details. 
4
 After giving license to J.P. Morgan in 1968, the MOF permitted the entrance of foreign banks into 
the Japanese banks in an orderly fashion.  The permission was based on strict reciprocity. Moreover, 
the MOF did not allow banks already entered Japan to expand branch networks. See Brown 1994. 
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1978 (Brown 1994: 58). As a result, competition had turned increasingly fierce and the 
profits thin. 
At the same time, changes in Japan’s economy had diminished the advantages 
foreign financial institutions used to have. For example, as Japan accumulated foreign 
reserves and Japanese banks established their creditworthiness in international capital 
markets, the role of foreign banks as conduit to the international capital markets was no 
longer needed (Brown 1994: 51).
5
 Foreign banks in Japan used to have exclusive right 
to make foreign currency loans, which was called “impact loan.” However, the 
introduction of the new Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law (Foreign Exchange 
Act) of 1980, which allowed Japanese banks to engage in foreign currency lending, 
deprived the foreign banks of the lucrative and stable business and introduced intense 
competition. They tried to find new sources of profit, such as leasing and consumer 
financing, but those business proved to be risky and unprofitable. As their earnings 
declined sharply, they began asking their home government for assistance (Brown 
1994:68–9). 
In that sense, gradual liberalization especially of international business, 
combined with remaining regulations on the banking sector in general, had actually 
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 In 1951, Japanese banks raised 16 percent of lending funds from foreign sources, and even in 1970, 
12 percent of all lending were financed from abroad (Brown 1994: 62). 
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worked against foreign banks in Japan, as the profitable niche markets they have 
dominated were being eroded. Foreign banks in Japan were at a competitive 
disadvantage to Japanese banks, because they lacked the network of branches that 
would provide the low-cost deposits, as well as the close relationships with Japanese 
corporations. Without further deregulation, these banks would not be able to overcome 
these problems by, for example, having more branches or offering attractive interest 
rates. 
By 1978, foreign banks began complaining publicly about the difficulty of 
raising yen funds. Led by Citibank, they demanded the right to issue certificates of 
deposits (CDs). In November 1978, four foreign banks testified in the Financial System 
Research Council, an advisory body for the MOF’s Banking Bureau. The council’s final 
report, however, described their complaints to be unfounded. Moreover, some observers 
viewed the permission for the Japanese banks to make “impact loans,” which was 
granted in 1979, as a penalty imposed on foreign banks for having been outspoken 
(Brown 1994: 69–70). At that time, Japanese banks raised dollar funds by issuing CDs 
in New York, while issuing CDs was not permitted to Japanese banks in Japan as well 
as foreign banks there. 
As their banks faced trouble in Japan, some sections of foreign governments, 
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including that of the US, started to pay attention to the plight of foreign banks in Japan, 
even though the US Treasury was slow to move. In May 1978, John J. Balles, then 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and Christopher Tugendhat, 
member of the European Commission, visited Japan respectively to discuss the issue 
with the Japanese government. Tugendhat asked for the permission to issue CDs and to 
establish branch networks (Tatewaki 2002: 217–18, Brown 1994: 68–70). The Japanese 
government responded that it would let foreign banks to issue CDs at the same time 
their Japanese counterparts would enter the business. Also in the US, a Congressional 
report, called the Jones Report and published in January 1979 to examine the problems 
in the U.S.-Japan trade relations, pointed to five discriminatory measures against U.S. 
banks in Japan. It included the restriction on establishing more than one branches and 
the issuance of CDs and bonds.
6
 As for the CDs, Japanese banks, too, had long desired 
to obtain the permission to issue CDs in the Japanese markets. It was in May 1979 when 
the MOF allowed both Japanese and foreign banks to engage in that business.
7
 
The U.S. Treasury held an intergovernmental negotiation on Japan’s financial 
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regulation for the first time in 1979. In top-level talks of the officials from the two 
countries, the U.S. side asked Japan to ease restrictions on foreign banks operating in 
Japan, based on the idea of reciprocal treatment for U.S. bank branches. On the U.S. 
side, the private financial sector was not monolithic, however. Big banks (Citibank, 
Chase Manhattan, and Bank of America) hoped sweeping structural changes in the 
Japanese financial regulations. There requests included the elimination of barriers 
between short-term and long-term lenders and the diminution of the deposit-taking 
power of the Japanese Postal Saving System. Middle-sized ones, however, did not want 
such changes, as they feared that those changes would benefit big ones at the expense of 
the weaker.
8
 This negotiation did not produce any significant policy change in Japan. 
In the early 1980s, the U.S. efforts to open up Japan’s financial markets became 
more systematic and government-wide. Here, the sense of unfairness played a role. The 
concern for the penetration of foreign banks into the U.S. markets started to grow in the 
1960s. It began to attract political attention in the next decade, and in the 1980s, the 
rapid expansion of foreign banks, especially Japanese ones, became an important 
political issue, as I will discuss more closely in the next chapter. The unease came from 
the “invasion” by foreign players in an important sector in the U.S. economy. 
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In the bilateral negotiations, however, the liberalization of Japan’s financial 
market became a highest-level agenda only when it was combined with the issue of 
yen-dollar exchange rates, and was regarded as one of the potential solutions of the 
huge trade deficit of the U.S. It was in the context of the overall U.S.-Japan trade 
imbalances that financial regulation was elevated to the highest-level of 
intergovernmental relations. 
Even though bilateral trade imbalance itself is not a serious economic problem 
in multilateral trade, the surge of Japanese products into the American market caused 
severe tension as it translated into job losses. Frustrated observers often thought that 
Japanese protectionism, not the cost or the quality of products nor the macroeconomic 
policies of the two countries, caused such a trade imbalance. In addition, it was also 
argued that undervalued yen gave Japanese producers an unfair advantage. C. Fred 
Bernstein, a well-known economist who served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for International Affairs during the Carter administration, insisted that the misalignment 
between dollar and yen was the most important cause of the periodic outbursts of 
U.S.-Japanese economic conflict between 1970 and 1982 (Bergsten 1982). As Bergsten 
pointed out, the misalignment was mainly caused by macroeconomic policies of the two 
countries. To correct the undervalued Japanese yen, therefore, both countries had to 
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change their macroeconomic policies. 
However, those frustrated with Japan accused the country of artificially holding 
down the value of the yen in order to discourage imports and encourage exports. It was 
Lee L. Morgan, chairman of Caterpillar, who seized on the issue of exchange rate and 
brought it into the political arena. Morgan’s company had faced intense worldwide 
competition with Japan’s Komatsu in selling construction equipment (Frankel 1984:1). 
In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee held on 
November 30, 1982, Morgan regarded the undervaluation of yen as the single most 
important cause of the trade imbalance with Japan.
9
 To make his point stronger, he then 
commissioned Ezra Solomon, Professor of Stanford University, and David Murchison, a 
Washington lawyer, to draft a report on the issue. The Solomon-Murchison Report, 
released in September 1983, argued that the Japanese should contribute to a stronger 
yen by removing all artificial obstacles on the demands for yen, such as interest rate 
controls, and by making the yen a more attractive investment currency. 
The assumption that overvaluation of the dollar was caused by Japan’s 
microeconomic policies was obviously flawed, however. Computing the value of each 
currency in terms of a weighted average of trading partners, Frankel (1984: 13) 
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concludes “the primary problem is with the strong appreciation of the dollar and the 
root of that appreciation within U.S. economic policy, not with the yen or Japanese 
economic policy.” Moreover, economic theories suggest that the net effect of financial 
liberalization on the value of yen was ambiguous in direction and in any case likely to 
be small. Bernstein (1982: 1069–73) recommended reduction of U.S. budget deficit and 
more public spending in Japan, while he also suggested that Japan should actually 
restrict capital outflow. He noted that Japan’s significant liberalization of foreign access 
to Japanese capital market since 1980 was “a desirable step from the long-run point of 
view, but one which adds to capital outflow from Japan and thus weakens the yen in the 
short run.” Curiously, the Japanese MOF officially reported that no official in the U.S. 
administration truly believed the positive relationship between the liberalization of the 
Japanese capital markets and the value of yen.
10
 
Still, the Solomon paper caught attention of the Reagan administration. The 
argument made by Morgan appealed to the people in the Reagan administration, who 
had strong belief in freer markets (Brown 1994: 92). It also fit the aggressive orientation 
of Treasury Secretary Donald L. Regan. Moreover, Morgan’s recommendation could be 
traded off domestically against strong election-year pressure for protection of U.S. 
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business from Japanese imports (Frankel 1984: 2).
11
 
Turf Battle and the Establishment of the Yen/Dollar Committee 
Importantly, the Yen-Dollar Committee was also a byproduct of turf battle within the 
executive branch of the government. In 1983, the trade imbalance and the exchange rate 
became an important political issue in the U.S. in the year preceding the presidential 
election. Even though the exchange rate was a matter under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Treasury, frustrated members of the Reagan administration started to show signs that 
they would intervene in the matter of exchange rate. 
On September 28, 1983, in the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George 
P. Shultz and Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Shintaro Abe, Schulz pointed out that 
the issue of the Yen-Dollar exchange rate should be examined from various points of 
views and stated that if the Treasury and the MOF would not work on the issue, it could 
be handled by the Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Abe replied that he 
would inform the MOF and the Bank of Japan.
12
 Earlier that month, Schulz called for 
efforts by the US and Japanese governments to address the problem of strong dollar and 
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weak yen together with taking other policy measures to expand access of American 
products in Japan and to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance.
13
 Yet, his comments in 
the foreign ministerial meeting shocked the Treasury and the MOF. They feared that 
diplomats would interfere in a crucially important issue under their jurisdiction. As the 
summit meeting between Reagan and Nakasone was planned in November, R. T. 
McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and Tomomitsu Oba, Vice Minister for 
International Affairs of the MOF, met secretly in Honolulu, Hawaii, on October 10 in 
preparation for the summit meeting.  
 According to a former senior official of the Japanese MOF, there was a move 
within the US Reagan administration in the fall of 1983 to create an interdepartmental 
forum to deal with the issue of foreign exchange. The State Department, the Commerce 
Department, and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) wanted to establish 
such a forum, which would also include their Japanese counterparts such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
14
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Within the US administration at that time, the Treasury was at a vulnerable position as it 
could not take effective measures to solve the problem of the exchange rate especially 
with Japan. Frustrated with the lack of solutions proposed by the Treasury, the White 
House, the Commerce and the USTR all severely criticized the Treasury. However, the 
involvement of other governmental agencies would be a nightmare both for the 
Treasury and the Japanese MOF. They did not want to have others interfere into the 
issue of exchange rate, which had been handled quite exclusively by a small number of 
financial officials at the international level. 
 At that time, the Commerce and the USTR also considered new steps to 
establish new international rules on trade in services, a new concept to deal with 
international investment and other types of transactions in the services sector, including 
the financial business.
15
 For that purpose, too, they had an incentive to intervene in the 
financial negotiations. 
 To counter such moves, the officials in the international sections of the 
Treasury and the MOF, who had worked together before that point and known each 
other well, started to develop a new framework to deal with the currency problems 
combined with the problem of foreign banks’ operation in the Japanese financial market. 
                                                   
15
 For more details on the U.S. moves on trade in services, see Chapter 6. 
85 
 
This is how the Yen-Dollar Committee came into existence. 
 
3.2 Setting up the Yen-Dollar Committee 
As discussed above, the U.S. government intensified pressure on Japan to raise the 
value of the yen and to reduce bilateral trade surplus as the summit meeting planned in 
November was approaching. In an effort to placate the U.S. government, the Japanese 
government incorporated the goals of reducing trade surplus and making the Japanese 
yen stronger into the Comprehensive Economic Plan announced in the end of October. 
Originally, the plan was prepared to fulfill Prime Minister Nakasone’s pledge to expand 
domestic demand made at the Williamsburg summit in May 1983 and included 
measures such as expansion of public investments and tax cuts,. To address the issue of 
the exchange rate, "internationalization of yen" was added as one of the pillars of the 
plan. More specifically, the plan said that the Japanese government would consider 
significant changes in the real demand rule in forward exchange transactions and it 
would examine the possibility of creating a yen-denominated banker’s acceptance (BA) 
market, among other things.
16
 The plan fell short of offering concrete schedule for 
reform and was far from enough to satisfy the U.S. side, however. More concrete 
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proposals should be made. 
 The Treasury and the MOF continued to negotiate, and agreed to make more 
specific promises at the summit meeting and to set up a committee to further discuss the 
issue between the two agencies. Right after the summit meeting between Reagan and 
Nakasone, on November 10, 1983, U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Japan’s 
Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita announced an agreement in which the Japanese side 
agreed to eight specific measures on financial market liberalization.
17
 The eight 
measures are: 
(1) Real demand rule in forward exchange transactions would abolished on April 1, 
1984. 
(2) A bill to eliminate the designated company system would be submitted to the 
next Diet session in order to abolish the rule barring Japanese from foreign 
exchange speculation in the yen. It opened some Japanese industries, such as 
mining, to U.S. and other foreign investment. 
(3) The bill to allow the issuance of foreign currency denominated national bonds 
abroad would be submitted to the next Diet session. 
(4) The creation of Yen-denominated banker’s acceptance (BA) market would be 
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(5) The minimum denomination of CDs would be lowered to 300 million yen from 
500 million yen on Jan 1, 1984. 
(6) The ceiling on each bank’s CD issues would be enlarged on April 1, 1984. 
(7) The guidelines on the issue of Euroyen bonds by residents would be eased on 
April 1, 1984. 
(8) The abolishment of the withholding tax on non-residents’ interest earnings on 
investment in Euroyen bonds issued by Japanese residents would be studied. 
 
 To monitor the implementation of the measures and to discuss additional 
measures, they also agreed to set up an ad hoc working group. Under the Committee 
co-chaired by Regan and Takeshita, a working group was established. The co-chairmen 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group were Beryl W. Sprinkel, Undersecretary for Monetary 
Affairs, U.S. Treasury, and Japan’s Tomomitsu Oba (Frankel 1984: 2).  
Negotiators 
On Japan’s side, two officials in the MOF played a crucial role in establishing the 
Committee. The first was Tomomitsu Oba, who became Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in June 1983. After his entry into the MOF in 1953, he mostly worked in 
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international sections of the ministry. Oba was Senior Deputy Director General of the 
International Financial Bureau since 1979, then appointed to be Director General in 
June 1982, and was elevated to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs next year. Measured 
against the routine personnel practice of the MOF, Oba was relatively young when he 
became the vice minister.
18
 The appointment of Oba, a man with a distinguished career 
in the international sections of the MOF and tactical skills to deal with conflicts of 
interests within the ministry, reflected the awareness within the ministry of the 
increasing importance of international relations to the Japanese financial system in the 
early 1980s, just before the US linked the exchange rate issue to the reform of the 
Japanese financial system. Before Oba’s appointment, the position of Vice Minister for 
International Affairs, or Zaimukan, was considered to be an outsider to the mainstream 
MOF and often went to the runner-up to the administrative vice minister. Oba was 
sometimes called the first true Zaimukan (Brown 1994: 95–96).
19
 
The second key person was Makoto Utsumi, who was at the Embassy of Japan 
in Washington, D.C.
20
 Before moving to Washington, Utsumi’s had a successful career 
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in the Tax Bureau of the MOF, but it hit a wall when the MOF’s attempt to introduce a 
new system to reduce tax evasion failed in 1982. Oba sent him to the U.S. in June 1983, 
however, as his right arm in the expected interaction with the U.S. on financial issues. 
Fluent in English and French, Utsumi began to serve as a critical pipeline between 
Washington and Tokyo. In addition to meeting Treasury officials to exchange 
information, he also developed personal relationship with them by, for example, 
organizing karaoke parties. Later, he continued to advance in the international section of 
the MOF, returned to Japan in 1986 as the Director General of the International Finance 
Bureau, and eventually became a zaimukan (Brown 1994: pp.97-98)
21
 
On the U.S. side, because of the government change from Democrat Jimmy 
Carter to Ronald Reagan in January 1981, all top-ranking officials of the Treasury 
changed. Consequently, we cannot expect much continuity of US officials from the 
1970s. And yet, the new leaders of the Office of International Affairs worked together 
with the Japanese MOF officials before the establishment of the Yen-Dollar Committee, 
especially on the issue of the Mexican debt crisis (Brown 1994: 93). The US negotiating 
team was led by Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Beryl W. 
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 He received his Ph.D. in economics from University of Chicago. Before 
entering in the government, he had worked for the Harris Trust and Saving Bank in 
Chicago from 1952 to 1981.
23
 His personal policy position affected the negotiation 
outcomes, as I will discuss later. Those who set up the Committee with their Japanese 
counterparts were Deputy Secretary of the Treasury McNamar and Assistant Secretary 
for International Affairs Marc E. Leland.
24
 Both were lawyers, and appointed by 
President Reagan to the Treasury positions at the beginning of 1981.
25
  
On the Japanese side, in addition to these officials from the international 
section of the MOF, Director Generals of domestic bureaus became members of the 
international negotiation team. The internationally oriented officials within the Japanese 
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MOF perceived the establishment of the framework as an opportunity to expose 
domestically-minded financial industries and their regulators in the Japan to a rapidly 
internationalizing world of finance.
26
 After the establishment of the working group was 
agreed on in November 1983, the Japanese MOF established intra-ministry committees 
to identify problems and collect their ideas through discussions (Kuribayashi 1988: 
79–81). As these committees cut across the bureaus, they included director generals of 
domestic sections, such as the Banking Bureau and Securities Bureau, together with 
officials from the International Finance Bureau. The talks thus directly involved 
officials who usually deal mainly with domestic matters, working closely with domestic 
financial institutions they regulate. This domestic group remained by the sideline in the 
course of the negotiations, however, being pushed by the U.S. team into liberalization, 
while negotiations on terms of liberalization were mostly carried out by Oba, Utsumi, 
and other officials from the International Finance Bureau. 
By contrast, the U.S. side was consisted of officials from the Office of 
International Affairs, reflecting the asymmetrical nature of the talks. However, the 
American side surprised the Japanese side with its detailed knowledge on Japan’s 
financial system, including informal practices and tax systems. The Japanese negotiators, 
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many of whom were generalist career bureaucrats and not specialists of financial issues, 
were no matches for their U.S. counterparts in the negotiations. The U.S. negotiators 
were very well-informed of the complaints from the Japanese industry on Japan’s 
inefficient financial regulations.
27
 That was the result of the International Banking Act 
of 1978. Based on the law, Congress ordered the Treasury to draft a report examining 
the treatment of U.S. banks in other countries. Since the drafting of the first National 
Treatment Study in 1979, the department sent a fact-finding mission to Japan. The 
Treasury also had an attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Japan. The increased contact 
between the Treasury attaché and the foreign banking community in Japan developed 
information on foreign banking problems within the department (Brown 1994: 70, 85, 
92).  
Such commitment of the Treasury to the situation of US banks in Japan was 
another important factor that contributed to connecting the exchange rate problems and 
the reform of the Japanese domestic financial markets. 
Negotiation Process 
The working group had six meetings before the two countries agreed on the final accord. 
The first three were held once a month from February to April. In the first meeting, the 
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two sides exchanged their views. The main topics for the second and the third meetings 
were liberalization of Japan’s financial markets and the internationalization of yen, 
respectively. Then in the following three meetings held in May, negotiators drafted the 
final accord (Oba 1984). 
The relationship between liberalization of financial markets and the exchange 
rate remained unclear. The aim of the series of talks, therefore, eventually became the 
opening up of Japan’s markets to U.S. financial institutions rather than the correction of 
the exchange rate (Kojima 1985: 35). In the early stage of negotiations, the U.S. 
negotiators directly demanded to improve the access to the Japanese markets. They 
shifted to more indirect strategy of focusing on liberalization of Euroyen markets by 
mid-March. The shift in focus was at least in part caused by the appointment of David 
Mulford in February 1984 as Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs in 
the Treasury to succeed Marc Leland.
28
 Mulford had been the head of the investment 
advisers group for the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency before that appointment, and 
had over nine years of experience at Merrill Lynch Capital Markets.
29
 As an expert on 
the Euromarket, Mulford aimed to achieve U.S. objectives by promoting the 
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development of an international yen market, based on the expectation that the growth of 
a relatively unrestricted Euroyen market would break the restrictions in Japan’s 
financial markets. 
The U.S. team thus placed special emphasis on the development of the Euroyen 
as a measure to enhance overall financial liberalization. And it was particularly difficult 
to overcome the differences on the issue. In early May, the two parties attempted to 
prepare a draft of the final accord but failed, mostly because they could not agree on the 
specifics of liberalization of the Euroyen market.
30
 The Japanese government feared 
that a free Euroyen market would seriously disturb the established order of the heavily 
regulated financial markets of that country. It also had concern that the 
internationalization of yen would result in loss of control over the domestic money 
supply. The U.S. side insisted the liberalization of medium- and long-term Euroyen 
loans to residents, swift relaxation of the guidelines for issuance of Euroyen bonds by 
non-residents, and the abolishment of the withholding taxes on Euroyen bonds issued by 
residents, while the Japanese side proposed gradual liberalization. 
Interestingly, it was not exactly the U.S. financial institutions operating in 
Japan hoped for. The U.S. banks in Japan did not welcome their home government’s 
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effort for internationalization of yen, because increased use of yen in international trade 
and investment would possibly erode their global advantage obtained through their 
ready access to dollar sourcing and investment (Rosenbluth 1989: 75). Nevertheless, the 
idea of securing interests of the American companies by promoting Japan’s 
liberalization appealed to the market ideology of the Regan administration and of the 
Treasury, and the strategy was adopted.  
In addition to help American financial institutions that were already operating 
in Japan, there laid an increased concern for trade in services, which was becoming an 
important part in the world trade system. Unlike the trade in goods, the rules for the 
trade in services were almost nonexistent in the GATT system at that time, and the U.S. 
began working to establish a new regime for the sector. The U.S.-Japan negotiations 
over the exchange rates thus served as a test for the establishment of a new global 
framework for trade in services.
31
 
On domestic liberalization, there was also a major disagreement. The Japanese 
side insisted on step-by-step, incremental reform of interest rates and other financial 
regulation. The U.S. team was frustrated and demanded “step-by-step with long 
stride”(Takita 2006: 77–78).  
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3.3 The Outcome 
The Committee issued a report in the end of May 1984. The Yen/ Dollar Accord was a 
comprehensive agreement committing the Japanese government to substantial reform of 
the financial markets. The issues were divided in four issue areas: (1) domestic capital 
market liberalization, (2) access of foreign financial institutions to Japanese money and 
capital market, (3) the “internationalization” of yen, or the development of a Euroyen 
market, and (4) the enhancement of cross-border direct investments. To make the talks 
two-way at least on paper, the Japanese concerns on the U.S. financial issues were also 
listed in the Accord. Yet, it was obvious that at the center of the Accord was the 
liberalization of the Japanese financial markets. The Accord set direction toward 
liberalization of the domestic financial markets of Japan. While it pointed to detailed 
issues, it did not set specific schedule for the implementation on most of them. The pace 
was mostly left to the MOF. The bilateral committee was to examine the progress in the 
subsequent follow-up sessions. 
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(1) Domestic capital market liberalization 
- Liberalization of interest rates  
The MOF offered a specific time schedule on the liberalization of large 
denomination deposits (mostly CDs), and stated that it would move on to interest 
rates on smaller deposits. 
(2) Access of foreign financial institutions to Japanese money and capital market 
- The management of investment funds in Japan by foreign firms 
The MOF would license qualified foreign banks to participate in trust banking 
activities. A concrete scheme would be announced by the end of 1984. 
- Membership of foreign securities firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
The MOF “requested the TSE to study ways of providing opportunities of 
membership to foreign and domestic non-member firms.” 
- Dealing in Japanese government securities by non-Japanese banks 
Qualified Japanese branches of non-Japanese banks would be allowed to trade 
government securities soon. 
(3) “Internationalization” of yen and the development of a Euroyen market 
- To enlarge the Euro-yen markets, the following measures were carried out. 
First, Euro-yen CDs were introduced in December 1984. Second, short term 
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Euro-yen lending by banks outside of Japan to Japanese residents was permitted 
in June 1984.
33
 Liberalization of long-term lending was more difficult because 
the lending by foreign affiliates of Japanese banks to Japanese residents could be 
a violation of the Long Term Credit Bank Act, which separated the long-term and 
short-term bank lending. Nevertheless, the ban on long-term Euro-yen lending to 
non-residents was lifted in April 1985 and that to residents in May 1989. Third, 
external yen lending by banks in Japan to non-residents was also liberalized. 
- International bond issues 
The liberalization of euro-yen issues from 1984 to 1986 led to the liberalization 
of yen-dominated bonds issues in Japan by non-residents. The Japanese 
government also deregulated Euro-yen bond issues by residents, which in turn 
enhanced the liberalization of non-collateralized bond issues in Japan. 
Responding to the U.S. demand, the Ministry of Finance also granted equal 
treatment of domestic and foreign underwriters of Euro-yen bond issues. 
- Relaxation of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions 
The “real demand principle” was abolished in April 1984. The MOF announced 
that it would remove the “swap limit rule” on the conversion of foreign currency 
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into yen both for foreign banks and Japanese banks, effective June 1, 1984. 
 
(4) Enhancement of cross-border direct investments. 
- Designated company system 
A bill to eliminate the designated company system was passed by the Diet on May 
18, 1983. 
 
Domestic Liberalization and U.S.-Japan Talks 
On the same day, the Ministry of Finance issued a separate document titled “Current 
Status and Prospects for Financial Liberalization and Internationalization of the Yen,” 
which outlined specific measures to deregulating financial markets and promoting 
internationalization of the yen. The Financial System Research Council (Kinyu Seido 
Chosakai), an advisory body to the Minister of Finance, began discussions on how to 
handle financial liberalization in the fall of 1982. The final report was originally 
scheduled to be issued in April. In response to the establishment of the Yen-Dollar 
Committee, the issuance was delayed so that the report would also cover the issue of 
liberalization of the yen including recommendation to establish the Japan Offshore 
Market (Kuribayashi 1988: 91–92). The report covered some domestic issues that were 
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not subject to the Yen-Dollar Accord, such as the scope of business allowed to each type 
of financial institutions and the maintenance of stability of financial systems. 
 As these developments demonstrated, the U.S. pressure was not the only factor 
that caused the liberalization of financial markets in Japan. It was working in tandem 
with internal demands for decontrolling the compartmentalized structure of the financial 
system and the regulations over interest rates. 
Three changes in the Japanese economic system facilitated financial 
liberalization in the 1970s. The first is the massive issuance of government debt since 
1975. The introduction of public auction system in 1978 brought market-based interest 
rates in a heavily regulated financial system. The second was the accumulation of funds 
in big corporations. Major companies became less dependent on bank lending. Thirdly, 
at the international level, deepening integration of national financial markets and 
innovations in financial technologies, the tight regulations in Japan became increasingly 
outdated. Major companies started to raise funds in Euromarket rather than in the 
heavily restricted domestic markets since 1975 (Kaizuka 1986). 
Gradual liberalization of interest rates and relaxation on foreign exchange 
transactions began in the late 1970s. Japan’s MOF had recognized the need to make the 
Japanese financial sector more efficient by the 1970s. Until the end of the 1970s, 
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however, its efforts were mostly directed at guiding mergers of financial institutions to 
make them stronger and more competitive rather than enhance efficiency by removing 
excessive regulation and introducing more competition. In response to the demand for 
financial liberalization, the MOF started to deliberate the strategy in 1975. At the end of 
the 1970s, call market rates and interests on bills were liberalized. The establishment of 
CDs in 1979 was also an important step toward further liberalization of deposit interest 
rates. As for the external liberalization, the Foreign Exchange Law was amended in 
1979 and the new law became effective in December 1980. Under the new law, all 
external capital transactions became free unless explicitly prohibited. The revision was a 
reaction to overseas criticism mounted against Japanese controls on most international 
financial transactions (Nishimura 2003, Rosenbluth 1989). 
Yet, the reform dynamics within consensus-prone Japan is known for its 
time-consuming and incremental nature. The use of an advisory council, the MOF’s 
Financial System Research Committee, was a typical way with which financial 
regulatory changes were discussed in Japan. Advisory councils have played important 
roles in Japanese policymaking. Usually consisted mainly of scholars, representatives of 
various interest groups, retired bureaucrats, and journalists, their most straightforward 
function has been to provide outsiders’ advice and to pluralize governmental 
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decision-making, but in reality, a more important function of the councils is adjusting 
all kinds of conflicting interests (Schwartz 1993). In the case of financial liberalization, 
severe conflicts of interest among different types of financial institutions, such as 
various types of banks and securities companies, often constitute the main obstacle to 
substantial reform. Rather than excreting strong leadership, nor having the issue 
discussed in the parliament, it has been customary for the MOF to take time to 
coordinate in the advisory council and outside of it to hammer out a compromise. As a 
consequence, reform is always extremely slow and only gradual. In the history of 
liberalization of financial markets in Japan, therefore, the accord with the U.S. crucially 
accelerated the process. Even though the liberalization process dated back to the 1970s, 
it was this 1984 agreement that made the Japanese government commit itself to a 
specific time schedule for deregulation (Frankel 1984, Osugi 1990:7-9). 
Follow-up Sessions, 1984–1988 
After the Yen/Dollar Accord was concluded, the officials of the two countries had a 
series of meetings to follow-up the agreement. The main task was to see whether Japan 
would abide by the agreement. Starting from the first follow-up session in November 
1984, six sessions were held until April 1988. The liberalization measures pledged by 
the Japanese side were mainly examined, while the U.S. promises, including the efforts 
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to reduce budget deficits, were not seriously scrutinized.  
During this period, the MOF presented the progress in liberalization of interest 
rates on wholesale transactions. More importantly, the MOF also tried to give 
preferential treatments to some foreign financial institutions by allowing some of them 
to enter into the Japanese financial markets, or letting some existing firms engage in 
some new types of business. In June 1985, the MOF announced that it would allow all 
of the nine foreign banks that had applied for the license of trust banking. Since the 
MOF did not permit Japanese commercial banks to engage in trust banking, it was 
“more-than-national treatment.” At that time, the management of ballooning pool of 
retirement savings in Japan attracted attention of Japanese and foreign financial 
institutions alike. In the summer of 1983, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and the 
Nomura Securities surprised the financial regulators by announcing their intention to 
form a joint venture to enter the investment management business. The MOF officials 
declined to accept it, but they felt that it would not satisfy the U.S. government (Pauly 
1988: 87). 
Furthermore, in November 1985, six foreign securities firms were given 
membership of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In December 1985, the MOF permitted 
some European commercial banks to open securities subsidiaries in Japan on the basis 
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of reciprocity. Furthermore, in June 1987, the MOF gave securities licenses to ten 
American and European securities companies. Four of them were securities subsidiaries 
of American commercial banks. The same was not allowed to Japanese banks until 
1993. 
In the course of the follow-up sessions, the U.S. brought up new issues, such as 
the liberalization of the interest rates on small denomination deposits, claiming that the 
remaining regulations on those interest rates had depressed domestic consumption in 
Japan.
34
 However, both sides were generally satisfied with the results, as the terms of 
agreement were generally met and the Japanese capital markets were gradually 
liberalized. 
In the last of the follow-up sessions, held in April 1988, the mood was primary 
positive and buoyant. Even though the issue of foreign institutions’ access to the 
Japanese government bond market, which became the main issue in the bilateral talks 
remained to be unsolved, Mulford noted after the meeting that “important 
achievements” were made since the talks began in 1984. The two countries agreed to 
reorganize the framework to go beyond the Yen-Dollar Accord, and renamed it the 
“U.S.-Japan Working Group on Financial Markets”. The new group would take a more 
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global perspective and discuss the function and regulation of global and domestic 
markets among other topics.
35
 
Evaluating the Outcome 
How should the negotiation outcome be evaluated? In almost all negotiations, the 
outcome falls somewhere in between the competing interests, and it is hard to say which 
side wins. Overall, however, the U.S. side won a series of liberalization measures both 
in international use of the yen and of domestic regulation. Even though financial 
liberalization was already under way in Japan, the scope and speed of liberalization of 
Japan’s financial markets were unthinkable without the pressure from the U.S. 
government. Measures to liberalize Euroyen transactions were taken, liberalization of 
interest rates was launched, and U.S. financial institutions were given access to the 
Japanese market. Of course, the Japanese negotiators did not concede to every 
American demand. Most notably, the MOF did not offer specific time table for the 
liberalization of interest rates of small-denomination deposits, and did not allow 
medium- and long-term Euroyen lending (Rosenbluth 1989: 82). Those are the 
measures that could rock the foundation of the tightly regulated and compartmentalized 
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Japanese financial system of the time. The system had been under pressure for reform, 
even without the pressure from the U.S. government. However, the MOF carefully 
guided the reform process throughout the 1980s to carry it out in an incremental matter. 
The medium- and long-term Euro yen lending was liberalized only in May 1989, and 
the liberalization of interest rates of small-denomination deposits was completed in 
1994. 
 Importantly, the MOF also made concessions of a different kind. Especially in 
the follow-up sessions of the Yen-Dollar Talks, the MOF granted preferential treatment 
to certain foreign, chiefly American, financial institutions. Some of them are allowed 
into the business that was not permitted to their Japanese counterpart. A significant 
example is trust banking. 
This policy caused concern among other countries. Out of the fear that U.S. 
banks and financial institutions would take all the best opportunities preserved for 
foreigners as a result of tough negotiations, the British Treasury also started a series of 
negotiations with Japan in October 1984. Germany, France and Italy followed suit. 
Geoffrey Littler, then second permanent secretary in the U.K. Treasury, led the British 
negotiating team, which met twice a year with the Japanese team (Cortazzi 2001: 
439–448). His list of key demands included licenses for securities firms, and 
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liberalization of rules for professional investment management. Over time, the British 
team echoed the U.S. team to demand liberalization of interest rates on savings and 
other rigidly controlled financial regime in general. Membership of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange was also on the table. Littler noted that “changes seemed to have been limited 
to small incremental steps” in Japan, referring the situation with the term “notorious line 
of ‘step-by-step’ changes.” The two sides also started to exchange views on a number of 
international financial problems toward the end of the negotiations (Cortazzi 
2001:445–6). 
 
3.4 Explaining the Outcome 
There are a couple of different perspectives to explain this outcome. Here, I discuss 
three approaches. The first is based on the realist view of international politics, the 
second the ideational explanation, and the third interest based approach. Then I proceed 
to use my own explanation, which rest on institutional conditions. 
Power-based Explanation 
First, the Realist camp would see the results as the product of power relationship 
between the two countries. More specifically, the result should reflect the superior 
power of the US. In reality, the impact of military power on the economic negotiations 
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is hard to observe, but there were two instances in which the US side resorted to 
coercive measures in some sense. The first was the effort to link the issue to Japan's 
contribution to the World Bank. During the negotiations, the US government blocked 
the enlargement of Japan’s role in the World Bank, asserting that the Japanese should 
open up their capital markets more than they had offered if it would hold enhanced 
status in the World Bank. Japan was to be moved in shareholder strength in the bank 
from fifth place to second in recognition of its contribution to the $9 billion aid program 
for poor countries. The strategy did not work in favor of the U.S, since not only Japan 
but also most other countries criticized the US for linking the bilateral issue to the issue 
of international aid, which was urgently needed in the international society.
36
 
 The second was the more general use of reciprocity by the U.S. Congress. At 
the time the bilateral talks were held, efforts were being made there to introduce 
reciprocity in dealing with applications by foreign banks to open a Federal branch or 
agency. In early 1984, Jake Garn, Republican senator and Senate Banking Committee 
chairman, introduced an amendment to the International Banking Act of 1978. 
At that time, the Business Week argued that the reciprocity bill was effective in 
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making Japanese concessions even though it did not pass.
37
 However, the effect was 
very limited at best, since the administration and the private financial sector of the U.S. 
did not want to use it as leverage. At the hearing on the bill, S. 1293, held on September 
26, 1984, Treasury Secretary Regan opposed the bill. He stated that countries such as 
Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and Portugal made progress in liberalizing their 
financial markets. He also noted that reciprocity requirements could be 
counterproductive. On Japan, he said that the Yen-Dollar Accord was being 
implemented smoothly. Witnesses from the private financial sector also cautioned the 
committee against the reciprocity bill. Robert P. Williamson, president of the Bankers’ 
Association for Foreign Trade (BAFT) and senior vice president of Security Pacific 
National Bank in Los Angeles, told the committee that the “informal policies or 
administrative practices” in each country should be dealt with through negotiations. 
Peter Howell, vice president of Citibank, gave similar testimony. No U.S. banks pushed 
for the bill earnestly. 
At the same time, Regan added to his caution to reciprocity that the 
administration would not “hesitate to take vigorous actions to promote or protect our 
interests.” Senator Garn asserted that Congress would monitor the situation and his 
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pending bill or stronger legislation “will remain a threat.” He promised to introduce his 
bill again next January so that it would be available for action.
38
 The development since 
then will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
Interest-based Approach 
The second explanation of economic negotiations focuses on interests of important 
economic groups. Schoppa (1997) argues that, in intergovernmental economic 
negotiations, outside pressure to open a market works only when such pressure 
resonates with domestic demands. Rosenbluth (1989: 53) also puts, “[f]oreign 
diplomatic pressure is effective only when market forces have already altered domestic 
costs and benefits or when there is a perceived threat of retaliation.” We can argue that 




 The opinion expressed by big business in Japan have been in powerful concert 
with the pressure from the U.S. Ryoichi Kawai, then chairman of Komatsu and the head 
of Keidanren’s panel for discussing industry and finance, told Nihon Keizai Shimbun in 
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May 1984 that the Japanese industrial circle mostly agreed to what the U.S. government 
demanded. Kawai said that Japan should have liberalized its financial markets on its 
own initiative. Interestingly, he stressed in the interview that he did not have technical 
knowledge of financial matters and avoid discussing the details, apparently not to 
irritating the banks too much. Kawai nevertheless emphasized that the MOF should 
allow issuance of convertible bonds without collateral. The leaders of Keidanren, 




 On the other hand, the main opponents of liberalization within Japan were two 
types of specialized banks: the long term credit banks and trust banks. As they engage in 
a narrow range of banking business protected by regulation, it was very crucial for them 
whether regulation on scope of business would be lifted or not. 
On the demand side, the financial negotiations took place in the first place 
because of the intense pressure from a wide-range of import-competing industries in the 
U.S., which called for the immediate correction of the exchange rate. On more specific 
issues, certain private companies were associated with certain demands. For example, 
big U.S. banks operating in Japan, such as Citicorp, hoped for liberalization of 
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international use of the yen. Merrill Lynch, the investment bank where Treasury 
Secretary Regan had served as its head before he came to the government, was often 
associated with the American demand for the membership of the TSE. 
However, the changes achieved in the negotiations were not necessarily 
promising for U.S. banks operating in Japan. It was likely that only a couple of big 
foreign banks, such as Morgan and Citicorp, that would benefit from the outcomes. 
Indeed, it was likely that the greatest beneficiaries were Japanese big business, which 




Generally, the requests from major American banks influenced the negotiation 
outcomes as they provided information to U.S. negotiators. However, their lobbying 
was not directly reflected in the negotiation outcomes mainly because of the lack of 
unity among them. Their trade organization, the Institute of Foreign Bankers in Japan, 
was established only in November 1984, after the issuance of the Yen/Dollar Accord. 
The MOF strongly hoped to have an organization of foreign banks in order to simplify 
the process of hearings from foreign bankers.
42
 Finally in 1984, some European banks 
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decided to establish a new association with 31 member banks. Since then, the institute 
played a key role in communicating with the MOF and realized some of their requests. 
For example, it successfully requested the MOF to ease some tax exemption procedures 
(Tatewaki 2002: 297).
43 
Many leading U.S. banks remained outside, however. Citicorp, 
which had been the most influential foreign bank in Japan, was not a member even in 
1988. The bank saw that it would be more effective to lobby the MOF independently
44
 
The interest-based approach is insufficient in explaining the outcome if it is 
useful in understanding demands. Most importantly, there are always conflicting 
interests over almost any economic policies. In order to explain policy outcomes, some 
other variables should be factored in. 
Ideational Explanation 
The third line of argument is an ideational explanation. The policy orientation of two 
top negotiators in the U.S. team contributed greatly to the negotiation strategy and 
outcome. The head of the U.S. team, Beryl Sprinkel, was a well-known monetarist. He 
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was heavily influenced by Milton Friedman when he was at University of Chicago. 
Before entering in the government, he had worked for the Harris Trust and Saving Bank 
in Chicago from 1952 to 1981.
45
 His commitment to monetarist ideal had substantial 
impact on the outcome of the negotiation. Rather than forcing Japan to accept measures 
to give direct access to U.S. financial institutions, the U.S. head believed that by 




 Another key person on the U.S. side that gave an ideational base to U.S. 
demands was David Mulford, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs 
and the substantial leader of the U.S. team at the working level. As a former private 
banker, he had more experience in the Euromarket than anybody else in the bilateral 
committee. The appointment of Mulford just when the bilateral talks started had a 
significant influence on the negotiation. As the specialist of the Euro market, he led the 
strategy of liberalizing Japan’s market rather indirectly through the expansion of the 
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Euroyen market.  
Less significant but not negligible was the policy orientation of Prime Minister 
Nakasone. As a political leader who carried out a series of economic reform, such as 
privatization of Japan Railway and Nippon Telecom, Nakasone was sometimes 
compared to Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as the champions of neoliberal reform. The 
idea of liberalizing Japan’s financial markets appealed to Nakasone. With the tacit 
support from the prime minister, deregulation worked more smoothly (Takita 2006: 
108–9). 
 The significance of the ideational factor notwithstanding, it does not wholly 
account for the final negotiation outcome. In addition to liberalization of the Euroyen 
markets, the May Accord also included some measures to directly increase access of 
U.S. financial institutions to the Japanese markets, causing concern among other 
countries, which worried that American financial institutions would unfairly obtain all 
the best opportunities in the Japanese markets. This strategy went clearly against the 
market oriented views of the financial markets. Moreover, the Japanese side was 
reluctant to carry out drastic reform despite the policy orientation of the prime minister.  
Institutional Setting 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the existing network of international financial 
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officials played a pivotal role in defining the format of the world’s first bilateral 
negotiations over the financial regulation. Even though the leading members in the U.S. 
Treasury and the Japanese MOF were not long-time friends due to the government 
change and the mechanism of political appointment of top administrative officials in the 
U.S., they worked together since 1982 over international financial issues, especially the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s. When mounting pressure in the U.S. made it inevitable to 
work out certain framework to address the issue of exchange rate, the two government 
agencies cooperate with each other to exclude other government agencies from the 
framework. 
 As a result, the focus shifted from the exchange rate to overall liberalization of 
the Japanese market, especially the creation of a more active Euroyen market. It was 
also combined with some direct demands to give preferential treatments to the U.S. 
financial institutions operating in Japan, since the Treasury had obtained detailed 
information from them. The idea of correcting of the exchange rate through 
microeconomic policy changes, which was politically popular but technically not 
plausible, was mostly shelved. 
 In establishing the negotiation framework of the U.K.-Japan financial talks, the 
head of the British team, Geoffrey Littler, proposed to include staff members from the 
117 
 
Bank of England and the Department of Trade, two agencies that shared responsibilities 
for the matters under discussion, but the Japanese MOF refused to include people of the 
Bank of Japan and the MITI as the official members of the negotiating team. Littler 
noted the “problems of inter-departmental jealousy in Tokyo” which he found much 





The main feature of the bilateral negotiations between the US and Japan in the 
mid-1980s was the institutional setting in which participants were mostly limited to 
financial officials who had been involved in international negotiations over the matters 
of international finance. The financial talks, which started with the keen interests in the 
misalignment of dollar-yen exchange rates, attracted the interests of a wide range of 
governments and political actors on the US side. However, the financial officials 
succeeded to set up a Treasury-MOF committee and to exclude participation of other 
governmental agencies. 
The result of such institutional arrangement was a successful conclusion based 
on deep understanding of the issues. Through a series of tough negotiations, the 
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negotiators also developed a sense of friendship and shared political commitment 
(Takita 2006: 146-47). In the end, the negotiations led to gradual liberalization of the 
Japanese financial markets, combined with the grant of “more-than-national treatment” 
to some American financial institutions in terms of access to certain business that were 
not allowed to the Japanese financial institutions.  
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Chapter 4   Call for Reciprocity: Congress and the Bilateral Financial 
Negotiations 
 
By the mid-1980s, the expansion of the Japanese economy brought the foreign concerns 
over financial issues in general and domestic regulation in particular into sharper focus. 
Indeed, the issue of domestic financial regulation closely relates to international 
financial relations, the details were discussed only within the closed network of 
specialists of finance by that time. However, as the influx of Japanese companies on the 
U.S. soil became visible, the number of people who were interested in the behavior of 
Japanese financial institutions increased. The result was the bigger voice that claimed 
reciprocity rather than the principle of nondiscrimination to deal with the bilateral 
financial relations. 
This chapter examines the process through which the call for reciprocity 
produced a new policy on the side of the U.S., and the effect of such policy on the 
bilateral financial relationship. 
 
4.1 The Background: Foreign Financial Institutions in the US before the IBA of 
1979 
The history of foreign banking in the U.S. dates back to the 19
th
 century. In the early 
days, foreign banks were established mainly to facilitate trade and international 
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investments. The number of foreign banks in the U.S. increased first in the post-World 
War I era, and then after the WW II. However, they remained only a marginal part of 
U.S. banking industry until the late 1960s and the 1970s, when their presence increased 
dramatically.
1
 Before then, the expansion of U.S. banks overseas was far more visible 
in the post-war era, in tandem with the expansion of the U.S. international trade. 
The main characteristic of the U.S. regulation toward foreign-owned financial 
institutions had been the lack thereof, as the “laws regulating foreign-owned banks were 
written when there were not enough foreign banks in the U.S. to bother about.
2
” 
Consequently, the regulatory system did not have an adequate mechanism to regulate 
and oversee non-American financial institutions. There was no federal regulation and 
supervision. Foreign banks were usually regulated and supervised by states. Such a 
system had given foreign banks operating in the U.S. significant advantages over 
domestic ones, as the former were not subject to costly regulations. Most notably, 
foreign-owned banks could set up interstate branches or agencies, while their domestic 
counterparts were not allowed to establish interstate branch networks by the McFadden 
Act.
3
 Moreover, foreign banks could engage in some types of non-bank business, such 
as stock brokerage, while U.S. banks were strictly kept from securities business by the 
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Glass-Steagall Act. They were also able to purchase banks in the U.S. in a manner that 
the antitrust laws prohibited to U.S. banks. Foreign banks were also exempted from 
some types of mandatory payment. They usually need not pay the non-interest bearing 
reserve to the Federal Reserve System, as they were not required to be members of the 
system. Similarly, their deposits were usually not covered by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. In sum, the laxity of U.S. regulations of foreign banks had given 
advantages to them over their domestic competitors. Moreover, they also posed 
problems for stability of the American financial system. 
Their access to cheaper capital and lower capital requirement at their home 
offices were also considered to be the sources of unfair advantages, while they were 




As the presence of foreign banks in the U.S. became salient in the 1960s, those 
problems came to attract attention of some policymakers. In 1966, the Congressional 
Joint Economic Committee published a report on foreign banking activities, titled 
"Foreign Banking in the United States."
5
 The report recommended the inclusion of 
foreign banks’ activities under the supervision of national banking authorities, the 
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Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve System. The report was especially 
significant in that it called for the principle of national treatment, which later became 
the basis for U.S. policy development toward foreign banks (Damanpour 1990: 47, 
Pauly 1988: 30–31). 
Shortly after the publication of the report, some bills were introduced in 
Congress to address the problem of oversight of foreign banks in the U.S. Some of them 
were based on the principle of reciprocity, not national treatment. In 1966, Senator 
Jacob Javits of New York introduced a bill, which called for the expansion of federal 
authority over foreign banks. The bill also insisted on a reciprocity test for federal 
license (S. 3767). Next year, Wright Patman, chairman of the House Banking 
Committee, introduced a similar bill in the House. Neither the Javits bill nor the Patman 
bill reached to the hearing, however, reflecting the indifference of Congress to the issue 
at that time (Pauly 1988: 31–33).  
In 1969, Patman again targeted foreign banking activities in the U.S. by 
introducing provisions that would affect some types of foreign banks operating in the 
U.S. into the revision of the Bank Holding Company Act, which primary aimed at 
reforming regulation of domestic bank holding companies. The bill passed in 1970, but 
the ambiguous wording of the law allowed the Fed to interpret it flexibly with regard to 
distinctly foreign operations. Foreign banks operating domestically as branches and 
agencies, as opposed to subsidiaries, remained unaffected and outside the federal 
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jurisdiction (Pauly 1988:32–33). 
 
4.2 Foreign banks in the US in the 1970s and the International Banking Act of 1978 
The concern over lax regulation of foreign banks in the U.S. grew as a result of the 
dramatic increase of foreign presence in the U.S. banking industry. By 1980, foreigners 
owned approximately 12 percent of American banking assets.
6
 Most foreign banks 
clustered in and around New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago but some also 
appeared in Houston, Atlanta, Miami and Boston. 
 As they increased their presence, the nature of operation of foreign banks had 
changed.  In early years, foreign banks established subsidiaries mainly to meet the U.S. 
banking needs of their own home customers. Later, they started to engage in U.S. 
corporate business.
7
 For example, many of the offices of Japanese banks were set up in 
the U.S. in the 1970s to help the expansion of Japanese exports and to court the retail 
business of Asian people in California. Then, the banks began attracting medium-sized 
American companies.
8
 The primary method of U.S. entry also changed. In the 1970s, 
the purchase of the U.S. banks came to outnumber new subsidiaries of foreign banks 
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established in the U.S. The wave of acquisition in the 1970s was the consequence of the 
lower value of the U.S. dollar and the depressed U.S. stock market values (Damanpour 
1990: 61). 
 




In response to the growing importance of foreign banks in the U.S., two 
Congressmen, Wright Patman and Thomas Rees, introduced their respective bills in 
1973, which would limit foreign banks to the subsidiary form, restrict their operations to 
one state, and impose Federal Reserve requirements. Moreover, they attempted to 
establish “a ceiling on aggregate foreign participation in the U.S. market and prohibiting 
foreign acquisition of American banks.” Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns 
opposed to those restrictive bills, for they could lead to limiting activities of American 
banks abroad (Pauly 1988: 33–34).
9
 
The Federal Reserve itself initiated a data collection program in 1972. It also 
set up a committee to review the regulatory aspects of international banking. A bill 
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 In the same year, in California state legislature, a bill to restrict further penetration of foreign 
actors in the California banking market was narrowly defeated after Bank of America, out of concern 
for foreign reprisals against its overseas network, lobbied intensely against it. 
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based on the study was sent to Congress during the closing days of the 93rd Congress in 
1974 in an attempt to preempt the introduction of more restrictive bills such as those 
proposed by Patman and Rees. With some revisions, the bill was reintroduced in 1975, 
titled the International Bank Act (IBA) (Damanpour 1990: 47–48, Pauly 1988: 33–36). 
It took three more years that the IBA was finally passed in August 1978, and enacted on 
September 17.
10
 Together with the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency 
had also “been urging Congress to bring the foreign banks under tighter control.”
11
 
In essence, the IBA established the principle of national treatment. Under the 
law, the operation of international banks was subject to the same regulatory 
requirements as U.S. domestic banks. Interstate activities of foreign banks were 
restricted, foreign branches and agencies were subject to the Federal Reserve 
requirements and interest rate regulation, and branches engaged in retail banking were 
required to have deposit insurance. Non-bank financial activities were subject to the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. The IBA permitted foreign banks to own Edge 
corporations. It also allows agencies and branches access to the discount window and 
payment services provided by Federal Reserve banks (Damanpour 1990: 51, Hultman 
and McGee 1989: 386). 
 Interestingly, the attitude of various types of American banks toward regulation 
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of foreign banks was determined mainly by their concern for competition with their 
domestic rivals rather than the foreign ones. The main opposition of tighter regulation 
came from large, internationally oriented American banks, even though they did 
compete with foreign-owned banks for large multinational customers. Rather than 
asking protection from foreign competition, they would rather use foreign “invasion” to 
remove the restriction on interstate banking imposed on them.
12
 They also feared 
foreign retaliation against their own operation overseas.
13
 When the deliberation on the 
IAB was carried out in Congress in 1978, however, they remained silent. According to 
Pauly (1988: 54), the “growing scope of competitive pressure from foreign bank activity 
could no longer be treated as a peripheral matter even for major banks.” On the other 
hand, large regional banks, such as Philadelphia National and Wachovia in 
Winston-Salem, which felt the foreign competitive pressure less immediately than the 
money-center banks, were among the staunchest advocates of tighter rules on foreign 
banks. They believed that “if the foreigners continue to be given free rein to roam the 
American landscape…, the New York banks will one day obtain a similar privilege.”
14
 
Investment bankers, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Solomon Brothers 
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have been active on behalf of foreign clients with the cases of foreign acquisitions.
15
 
For the moment the prospect of introduction of some restrictions in the near future made 




 When the IBA established the principle of national treatment, as opposed to 
reciprocity advocated by some politicians, importance of foreign investment was well 
taken into consideration in the process of creating regulation of foreign banks. 
Aftermath of the IBA 
One of the ramifications of the passage of the IBA was the subsequence issuance of the 
National Treatment Study by the Treasury, which assessed whether U.S. financial firms 
received national treatment abroad. The first National Treatment Study was published in 
September 1979, as the IBA mandated the Treasury to issue one. The report 
recommended that diplomatic efforts continue to press for further progress toward 
national treatment abroad (Pauly 1988: 63). Since then, Congress had requested periodic 
updates of the study. The updates took place in 1984 and 1986 at the request of Senator 
Jake Garn, the-chairman of the Senate Banking Committee.  The fourth national 
treatment study, issued in December 1990, was a reaction to the requirement of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The legislation required updates of 
                                                   
15
 Ibid, p. 95. 
16
 “Chasing the U.S. Dollar—at Home,” op. cit. 
129 
 
the study in every four years (Bayard and Elliot 1994: 269). Importantly, the 
requirement had an unintended side effect that influenced intergovernmental financial 
negotiations. In order to analyze financial barriers, the Treasury attaché started to have 
constant contact with the foreign banking community in Japan. As a result, the Treasury 
became familiar with problems confronted by U.S. banks in Japan. The detailed 
knowledge helped the Treasury to make concrete demands to Japan in bilateral 
negotiations (Brown 1994: 92, 122).
17
 
Toward the end of the 1970s, foreign acquisition of large U.S. banks attracted 
further attention to the operation of foreign banks in the U.S. Especially in 1978, the 
acquisition of Marine Midland, then the 13th largest bank in the U.S., by Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corp (HSBC), a British-owned Asian bank, brought the issue of 
foreign banks into public notice. The acquisition, one of the largest takeovers in the 
American banking history, was carried out despite the opposition from New York State 
banking superintendent.
18
 The caveat is that “[t]hey are paying premium prices for 
what must at present be considered very weak banks.”
19
 From economic point of view, 
new investment from abroad in the banking sector should benefit the American 
                                                   
17
 See also the hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, 
House of Representatives, July 29, 1991, p.5. 
18
 Atkinson, op. cit. For the issue of foreign acquisition during this period, see Pauly 1988: 57–62. 
The policy debate on the acquisition of Marine Midland took place during final congressional 
deliberation on the IBA. 
19
 Cates, op. cit., p. 96. 
130 
 
economy. Yet, the acquisition spurred concern. In response, the Depository Institutes 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, whose main aim was to increase 
competition through deregulation, imposed a six-month moratorium on the purchase of 
U.S. banks by foreign bank holding companies until July 1, 1980 (Damanpour 1990: 
60–62). 
 
4.3 The Issue of Primary Dealers  
 
In the early 1980s, foreign bank expansion in the U.S. slowed due to global recession, 
the international debt crisis, appreciation of the dollar, and intensification of competition 
within the American market (Pauly 1988: 61–2). However, the presence of foreign 
banks, especially the Japanese ones, started to bring policy concerns again by the 
mid-1980s. In the international ranking of banks in terms of assets, Japanese banks 
started to dominate the top ten of the list. Moreover, in the latter half of the 1980s, 
Japanese companies took over many U.S. firms, some of which with symbolic 




To address the rising concern, in the 100
th 
Congress (1987–1988), the Senate 
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passed two reciprocity bills related to the field of finance, which failed to clear the 
House. The first was Title XV of S1407 and sections 909-910 of the Proximire 
Financial Modernization Act of 1988.  Subsequently, the issue of financial market 
reciprocity surfaced again in the drafting of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988. In the end, one such provision, the Primary Dealers Act or the Schumer 
amendment, was included in the legislation. As the name shows, the provision focuses 
on the endowment of the status of primary dealers to financial institutions that would 
handle the U.S. treasury bonds. 
The issue surfaced in response to the Federal Reserve’s December 1986 
decision. That month, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced the addition of 
five new primary dealers. Among them were the U.S. units of Nomura Securities and 
Daiwa Securities. Moreover, in the same month, the New York Fed approved two 
foreign acquisitions of existing primary dealers, one of which was the acquisition of 
Aubrey G. Lanston by the U.S. unit of the Industrial Bank of Japan.
20
  
The decision provoked resentment from Congress because the share of foreign 
financial institutions in Japanese government bond market was very limited. In fact, 
foreign participation in the dealings in government bonds was one of the subjects in the 
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 Primary dealers can deal directly with the New York Fed when it buys and sells U.S. government 
securities as part of its open-market operations. Since some large institutional investors will do 
business only with firms that are primary dealers, the status is more than just permission to engage in 
one type of business. 
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Yen-Dollar Talks. The Japanese MOF granted foreign banks membership of the 
government bond syndicate for the first time in April 1984. Moreover, as a part of 
efforts to fulfill the promise to enhance the functioning of the secondary market in 
Japanese government securities, the Japanese government allowed qualified Japanese 
banks to buy and sell government securities in the secondary market starting in June 
1984. At that time, the MOF began informal discussions with interested non-Japanese 
banks and, in October, the ministry allowed them to deal in public bonds. Still, the share 
remained close to null at the time of the Fed’s decision, as the closed nature of the 
syndicate underwriting system, which was sharply different from the American system 
of open bidding, contributed to limit the role of foreigners in Japan’s government bond 
market. All Japanese government bonds were issued and underwritten through 
negotiations with a syndicate of banks and securities firms until 1984. The MOF and the 
syndicate members decide on coupon rates and allocation.
21
 This arrangement was not 
always favorable for financial institutions that were members of an underwriting 
syndicate, because they had to accept unattractive, as well as attractive, primary issues. 
The Wall Street Journal cited comments by analysts who attributed the reluctance of the 
Japanese government to grant foreigners a sizable underwriting position to the fear that 
foreign firms would not “play by the same rules.”
22 
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 Nevertheless, from the perspective of Congress members, the efforts by the 
Japanese government to grant foreigners some share in its government bond markets 
after the Yen-Dollar Talks were far from enough as they witnessed more and more 
Japanese financial institutions obtaining the status of primary dealers. The problem of 
foreign participation in the Japanese government bond market took on symbolic 
importance. 
 In response to criticisms, the New York Fed released a letter from Corrigan to 
Congressman Schumer to explain its decision. Corrigan stressed the benefits of foreign 
participation in the U.S. government debt market “at a time when the enormous burden 
of our cumulative fiscal deficits makes this especially important.” Moreover, he 
emphasized the importance of maintaining the soundness of global financial markets. At 
the same time, noting recent actions of the Japanese government to liberalize its 




 The letter did not convince Schumer. In March next year, he introduced an 
amendment to HR 3, the House’s version of the Omnibus Trade bill of 1988. The 
Schumer bill (HR1463), titled Primary Dealers’ Fair Competition Act, would prohibit 
the Federal Reserve from designating, or continuing a prior designation of, foreign 
                                                   
23




firms as primary dealers of U.S. government securities if their home government denied 
U.S. firms “equal access” in their government securities market. It required foreign 
countries to “accord to United States companies the same competitive opportunities in 
the underwriting and distribution of government debt instruments issued by that country 
as it accords to domestic companies.” In other words, the bill would prohibit the 
acquisition by a foreigner of a primary dealer in U.S. securities if the country involved 
did not grant U.S. securities dealers the same access to its markets that the foreign 
country's dealers were afforded in the United States. The bill thus “substituted reciprocal 
national treatment for mirror-image reciprocity or “equal access” to American 
institutions.” The Fed would be required to act within one year of enactment.
24
 
According to a Japanese newspaper, the primary purpose of the bill was to use it as 




In the late April, Donald Riegle, Senate Banking Committee Chairman, also 
introduced a bill (S1101) that was virtually identical to the Schumer bill (Bayerd and 
Elliot 1994: 278). In the House, Schumer’s measure was incorporated into the omnibus 
trade bill and approved on April 30 by a 290-137 margin.
26
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The U.S. side was far from being united in the call for reciprocity on this issue, 
however. First of all, the financial authorities, mainly the Treasury Department and the 
Federal Reserve, made their objection clear. 
The Treasury had strongly opposed to the notion of reciprocity in the area of 
financial services until the beginning of the 1990s. In his response to Senator Garn’s 
request for a national treatment study, for example, Secretary James Baker stated, “the 
Treasury continues to believe that a policy of national treatment, seeking equality of 
competitive opportunity, is preferable to a policy based on reciprocity.”
27
 In addition to 
its conflict with the principle of free trade, the Treasury warned that U.S. firms would 
be particularly vulnerable to demand for mirror-image reciprocity from countries with 
universal banking systems, such as Germany and France (Bayard and Elliot 1994: 270). 
David Mulford, Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, expressed 
opposition to the mandatory nature of the provision when the bill was approved later.
28
 
The Fed was also opposed to the use of reciprocity. For example, in May 1987, 
E. Gerald Corrigan, the president of the New York Fed, said before the Senate Budget 
Committee that he opposed to barring Japanese firms from primary dealer status, citing 
Japan’s recent efforts and the possibility of limiting capital flows into the U.S.
29
 It 
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concerned that retaliatory measures would induce foreign counter-retaliation, impeding 
international financial flaws. Its main concern was to keep international financial 
markets open. The U.S. financial authorities’ aversion to reciprocity was reinforced in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s by the growing importance of foreign purchases of U.S. 
government debt, as the U.S. budget deficit grew. The Treasury tried to respond to the 
pressures from Congress and private sector to secure access of U.S. financial firms to 
foreign markets through multilateral forums, the OECD and the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the GATT, and bilateral negotiations (Bayard and Elliot 1994, Chapter 
11). According to one estimate, Japanese-owned dealers do about 20 percent of their 
business with Japanese investors.
30
 Up until the middle of 1990, Japanese institutional 
investors had bought about 30 percent of U.S. treasury bills.
31
 
 Even more noticeably, the opposition also came from U.S. private financial 
industries. Industrial Bank of Japan faced the possibility of losing the primary dealer 
status after its U.S. unit purchased primary dealer Aubrey G. Lanston. Citing this case, 
the opponents contend that the introduction of penalties retroactively could deter future 
foreign investment in the U.S. by signaling foreign investors that they risk losing their 
investment if the U.S. had a dispute with their government.
32
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 Actually, Schumer's move was in part a response to the complaints he heard 
from U.S. securities firms in Japan during his trip to Japan in April 1987, when he heard 
the complaints from U.S. securities firms operating in Japan about the Japanese 10-year 
government bond market.
33
 However, U.S. financial companies changed their tone later, 
at least publicly.  Commercial banks no longer saw access to the Japanese government 
bond market as a pressing issue.
34
 Noting the reluctance of U.S. financial firms with 
substantial operation in Japan to support the Schumer amendment, Bayard and Elliot 
(1994: 279) stipulate that they avoided supporting the provision publicly for fear of 
retaliation by Japan’s Ministry of Finance. Moreover, they also did not want to set the 
precedence of reciprocity legislation. 
 Despite these objections, Congress continued to move with reciprocity bills. 
On July 21, Senate passed the bill. While the administration signaled its intention to 
veto the legislation, the sweeping Senate’s vote, 71-to-27 in favor of the bill meant it 
had sufficient support to override a veto.
35
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Japan’s Efforts to Give More Access 
While the legislation was moving, Japan continued its efforts to placate foreign 
governments, especially the U.S., by giving new ability to foreign firms in Japan. As to 
the government bonds, in March 1987, the MOF decided to expand the auction system 
in the future issues of government bonds. In the same month, the MOF and Japanese 
banking and securities industries agreed to raise the share of foreign securities firms in 
the underwriting of 10-year bonds from about 0.3 percent to about 1.6 percent.
36
 
 Furthermore, a fundamental change in the underwriting of government bonds 
was announced in April. Starting in November 1987, the MOF would launch a new 
auction method for 10- year bonds, for which the market was the largest. Under the new 
modified-auction system, each syndicate member could bid for additional bonds.
37 In 
addition, in August, the government abolished the requirement that foreign banks had to 
operate in Japan for at least five years to become eligible for membership of the 
syndicates. In September of that year, the MOF also began auctioning of 20-year 
government bonds. First issued in October 1986, it was the second issuance of this 
long-term bond. 
Besides, in December 1987, the Tokyo Stock Exchange announced that it 
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would grant 16 of the new 22 TSE memberships to foreign companies. The new 
members began trading in May 1988. In addition to some American firms, the new 
members included four British, two French, two West Germany and two Swiss firms. 
The selection was apparently political.
38
 
These developments seem to be a notable victory of U.S. Congress. Charles E. 
Schumer was reported to have said, “We’ve gotten the changes we have [in Japan’s 
policies] because the Japanese realize our legislation is going to pass.”
39
 However, even 
without the American pressure, the system had been under stress since the late 1970s 
because of the development of the domestic government bond markets. By the 
mid-1980s, it would be no longer possible to issue government bond irrespective of 
market prices. Then-chairman of the Japan Securities Dealers Association stated that the 
auction system should be expanded regardless of foreign pressure.
40
 The large Japanese 
securities firms, whose share in the 10-year bond syndicate was disproportionately 
small compared to banks and smaller securities houses, supported the liberalization of 
the 10-year bond market. Within the MOF, the Securities Bureau and some officials of 
the International Finance Bureau and the Government Debt Division Bureau supported 
                                                   
38
 Elisabeth Rubinfienm “Tokyo Exchange’s new foreign members begin trading, but with little 
fanfare,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1988, p.1. 
39
 Michael R. Sesit and Tom Herman, “New York Fed to admit Nikko Unit as primary U.S. dealer, 
sources say,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 1987, p.1. 
40
 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 16, 1987, p.3. 
140 
 
the expansion of the auctions system, while the Banking Bureau opposed to it (Bayard 
and Elliot 1994:277). 
Yet, the timing of the decision doubtlessly reflected the American influence. 
The April 1987 decision was made just before Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the 
U.S. in the end of the month.
41
 Some officials in U.S. securities firms complained that 




Primary Dealer Provision Became Law 
Despite these efforts of the Japanese government further intrusion of Japanese firms in 
the U.S. government bond market irritated Congress, which further moved toward the 
introduction of the reciprocity legislation. As of December 1987, foreign institutions 
controlled eight of 40 primary dealers in the U.S.: three Japanese, two British and one 
each from Australia, Hong Kong and Canada.
43
 In addition, a unit of Nikko Securities 
was allowed to become the forth Japanese primary dealer that month. Also added to the 
dealers list were a unit of Chicago Research & Trading Group and a subsidiary of 
Britain’s Lloyds Bank. Schumer criticized the move of the New York Fed. In a letter to 
Schumer, Corrigan noted that in the future the bank would continue to weigh 
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geographic concentration when awarding primary dealer status.
 44
 
That month, House-Senate conferees were trying to work out differences in the 
two bills. The Senate legislation would allow Lanston to retain its primary dealership. 
Christopher J. Dodd, a Democratic Senator from Connecticut, tried “to alter the 
provisions in such a way as to permit his constituent, primary dealer Greenwich Capital 
Markets Inc. to be acquired by Long Term Credit Bank of Japan Ltd. If allowed, the 
Dodd changes would also permit Japan’s Sanwa Bank to buy another primary dealer, 
Brophy, Gestal, Knight & Co.”
45
  
 In March 1988, the House-Senate conferees agreed on the securities dealer 
provision. While foreign firms would be barred from serving as dealers unless the 
government allowed U.S. firms to become primary dealers in the securities, the period 
before the decision was extended from six months in the original provision to one 
year.
46
 In April, the House and Senate agreed to substitute reciprocal national treatment 
for mirror-image reciprocity. The final version of the Primary Dealers Act of 1988 
would require the Federal Reserve to seek reciprocal national treatment only in the area 
of the underwriting and distribution of government bond. The act would grandfather 
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firms that had acquired, or informed the Fed of their intention to acquire, a primary 
dealer before July 31, 1987. The cutoff date meant that bank-owned primary dealers 
(Sanwa’s Brophy Gestal Knight, LTCB’s Greenwich Capital Markets, IBJ’s Aubrey G. 
Lanston) were exempted from the bill provisions. The main target would be Japanese 
securities firms, particularly Nomura Daiwa, and Nikko.
47
 The provision also allowed 
an exception to such prohibition for countries having or negotiating bilateral agreements 
with the United States. 
 A senior executive at a major Japanese bank in New York was reported to have 
said that there was no way that Japan could have full reciprocity in one year.
48
 U.S. 
financial companies operating in Japan also expressed concern that “Japanese investors 
might start to avoid the U.S. bond market. This would interrupt the flow of funds from 
Japan that has become crucial to financing the U.S. budget deficit.”
49
 Other provisions 
in the omnibus trade bill (HR3) also reflected the growing concern over foreign 
takeover of American assets, and the administration and multinational corporations 
opposed similarly, complaining that it would drive out needed foreign investment.
50
 
                                                   
47
 Bayard and Elliot 1994: 280, Robert M. Garsson and Jed Horowitz, “Japan dealers in U.S. 
unfazed by trade bill,” American Banker, August 26, 1988 p.2. 
48
 Langley, op. cit. 
49
 Kathryn Graven, “Trade bill’s proposal on primary dealers causes concern at U.S. firms in Japan,” 
Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1988, p.1. 
50 John Cranford, “Alarm over foreign investment in the U.S.” CQ Weekly, March 19, 1988. 
143 
 
While the bill was being discussed in Congress, the U.S. and Japan continued 
intergovernmental negotiations to address the issue, among with other issues. In the 
sixth follow-up session of the Yen Dollar Talks, held in April 1988, they discussed the 
handling of Japanese government bonds through syndicate. The U.S. side used the 
primary dealer provision to obtain greater leverage on Japan and urged that foreign 
firms be allocated larger shares within the syndicate and that an auction system be 
created to allow Japanese and foreign firms to compete in the important 10-year bond 
market (Brown 1994: 114–115). 
 In the meantime, Fuji Bank failed to acquire the entire outstanding shares of 
Kleinwort Benson Government Securities of Chicago, which held primary dealer status. 
The U.S. monetary authorities’ inclination to limit geographic concentration seemed to 
have affected the failure. The British government delayed approving the London-based 
local affiliates of Nomura Securities and Daiwa Securities to engage in the British 
government bond market business. Apparently the British government took advantage 
of this approval to get the membership of Tokyo Stock Exchange for two securities 
houses from the country, Barclays de Zoete Wedd Securities and James Capel Pacific.
51
 
Still, in June 1988, the Fed approved the acquisition of two U.S. primary dealers by 
Japanese banks: Brophy, Gestal, Knight by Sanwa Bank and Greenwich Capital 
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Markets by the Long Term Credit Bank.
52
 
 On August 23, the Omnibus Trade Bill was signed into law 
(HR4848-PL100-418) by President Reagan. The first version of the bill (HR3) was 
vetoed May 24, for a reason unrelated to the primary dealer provision.
53
  
After the passage of the bill, the Treasury continued to use it as leverage in 
bilateral negotiations. In July 1988, the Treasury demanded an auction system of 
10-year government bonds. The move confused the MOF, because by then the MOF 
believed that it could deal with the problem by increasing the fixed share of foreign 
financial institutions in underwriting the bonds. However, the U.S. side decided that 
such a measure would not increase the fairness and called for a full-auction system.
54
  
In response, the MOF announced the new system of issuing government bonds 
on September 6, 1988. Starting in April next year, the Japanese government would sell 
40 per cent of the monthly issue of 10-year bonds by competitive bidding. The 
remaining 60 per cent would be allocated to the members of the syndicate at the average 
auction price. Of that amount, the share of foreign financial institutions would be raised 
from 2.5 per cent to almost 8 per cent. The Ministry also said that it would name four 
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foreign firms co-managers of the syndicate.
55
 E. Gerald Corrigan, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and David C. Mulford both praised the moves.
56
 
Japanese securities companies, whose U.S. units had attempted to acquire the position 
of primary dealers, had also publicly lobbied for an auction system. They were “angry 
that three bank-owned primary dealers…were exempted from the trade bill provisions,” 
since “the major share of Japanese 10-year notes goes to banks, and yet banks are the 
ones who are protected under the legislation.”
57
 
In early 1989, the Federal Reserve undertook a study of foreign bond markets 
in preparation for its ruling under the primary dealer provision. The focus of its report 
was to assess the de facto, not de jure, treatment of U.S. financial institutions abroad. 
The report assessed the government bond markets of Japan and the United Kingdom 
(Bayard and Elliot 1994: 281–282). In preparing its study, the Fed asked for comments 
from the public. Several U.S. securities houses send letters to the Fed. “The most 
vigorous criticism came from Morgan Stanley, which asserted that important Japanese 
government economic data was being leaked to Japanese competitors.” Yet, the 
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company “did not recommend that the primary dealerships be denied to the Japanese.”
58
 
In August 21, 1989, the Fed eventually decided not to bar Japanese securities 
companies from primary dealer status. It voted 5 to 1 to accept a stuff report that 
acknowledged progress in the Japanese policies in opening their securities market. 
 
4.4 Summary 
During this period, the expanding presence of foreign players, especially those from 
Japan, invoked the sense of unfairness in the U.S., which spurred legislative actions. 
Consequently, the principle of reciprocity was advocated to deal with the issue of who 
could handle government bonds. While it was incorporated into a law, its final version 
gave considerable discretion to the regulatory agencies, and the measure was not 
invoked in the end. Yet, it did seem to enhance intended expansion of foreign access to 
the Japanese government bond market. It should be noted, however, that the reform of 
government bond system in Japan was already undergoing, and the rule would be 
changed sooner or later even without the American pressure. 
 For the purpose of this analysis, what is important in this case was the limited 
use of retaliatory threat produced moderate negotiation outcomes between the two 
governments. The financial authorities tried to limit the involvement of outside players 
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in the process, mainly for fear of disturbing flow of funds into the U.S., even though 
officials sometimes attempted to take advantage of the Congressional moves to gain 
greater concession from Japan. The Japanese side offered some placatory measures, and 
the U.S. side accepted them. 
 However, after this period, the demand from the American Congress escalated 
and, as a result, they changed the nature of the bilateral financial negotiations, which is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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Figure 4.1 U.S. Banking Operations of Foreign Banks: 
Percentage of Total U.S. Banking Assets 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, “Share Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks,” June 2002. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 U.S. Banking Operations of Foreign Banks: 
Percentage of Total U.S. Business Loans 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, “Share Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks,” June 2002. 
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Figure 4.3 Foreign Banks in the U.S.:  
Share in Commercial and Industrial Loans, 1980-2010  
 
Source: FRB, Structure and Share Data for U.S. Banking Offices of Foreign Entities 
 
Table 4.1 The Banker's Top World Banks in terms of Assets, 1989 
1 Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank JPN
2 Sumitomo Bank JPN
3 Fuji Bank JPN
4 Mitsubishi Bank JPN
5 Sanwa Bank JPN
6 Industrial Bank of Japan JPN
7 Norinchukin Bank JPN
8 Credit Africole FRA
9 Tokai Bank JPN
10 Mitsubishi Trust JPN
 
Source: The Banker, July 1989, “Top 1000.” 
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Chapter 5  Out of Control? Tougher Demands for Openness 
 
At the turn of the decade, there was a growing sense of insecurity among Americans 
concerning the international expansion of Japanese economic players. The fear of being 
taken over led Congress to be tougher on Japan. The U.S. demands against Japan during 
this period, especially those delivered by Congress, were characterized by the demand 
for reciprocity. Without Japan opening its markets to US players, the lucrative US 
markets should be also closed to Japan. The administration tried to contain the outrage 
so that it would not harm the overall U.S.-Japan relations. The trend spread to the area 
of finance, which had been politically less salient for the public and Congress as other 
trade issues including automobile and computer-related products. The U.S. side also 
became increasingly hawkish in its demands to open up Japanese financial markets to 
American players. 
 In this chapter, I examine how the changing climate affected the bilateral 
financial negotiations during this period. Specifically, I focus on how the structure of 
the negotiations, such as the arena and players involved in the process, changed and 




5.1 The U.S.-Japan Relationship around 1990 
As the Communist threat had waned during the last years of the Cold War, economic 
competition among countries came to be seen as an issue of national security. In 1989, 
by a 3-1 margin, the American respondents of an opinion poll named Japan’s economic 
challenge as a great threat to America’s future than the Soviet military.
1 
 Since the mid-1980s, there was a growing concern in the U.S. over the loss of 
control of sensitive industries, especially to the rapidly expanding Japanese. In 1987, a 
Japanese company, Fujitsu, tried to purchase an 80-percent share in Fairchild 
Semiconductor Corporation, a large supplier of computer chips for the U.S. military, 
from a French company. The proposed acquisition raised concern among U.S. 
government officials, and Fujitsu eventually withdraw its offer (Spero and Hart 
2003:137). The Exon-Florio amendment of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, established 
in 1991, would prohibit mergers, acquisitions, or takeover of American firms by foreign 
interests when such actions are deemed injurious to the national security of the U.S. 
(Spero and Hart 2003: 149). 
 One of the consequences of the tough attitude of the American public toward 
Japan was the greater demands for reciprocity in dealing with the bilateral economic 
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relationship. The post-war international trade regime under the GATT had developed 
liberal international economic order on the principle of nondiscrimination. However, the 
idea of reciprocity appealed because the notion not merely suggests sanctions for 
undesirable behaviors of other countries, but it was meant to introduce the sense of 
fairness. The tendency to resort to reciprocity was especially visible in Congress. On the 
other hand, the administration tended to be cautious out of the fear of retaliation and 
spillover effects on overall diplomatic relationship.  
In the field of finance, the administration had been far more cautious than 
Congress in applying the principle of reciprocity to gain greater access to the Japanese 
financial markets. The importance of inward investment affected the attitude. Yet, over 
time, the Treasury came to take advantage of the Congressional calls for reciprocity to 
win more concessions from Japan, while it maintained its opposition to automatically 
applied reciprocity bills.  
 Ironically, in the hindsight, the era corresponds with the burst of the economic 
bubble in Japan. Japanese financial institutions started to lose its competitiveness in the 
world market toward the end of the 1990s. However, the perception in the early 1990s 




5.2 U.S. Fair Trade in Financial Services Act (FTFSA) 
In the 100th Congress (1987–1988), in which the reciprocal treatment of American 
financial institutions in the Japanese market with respect to dealing of government 
bonds was demanded, the legislature also took up the issue of reciprocal access of 
American financial institutions in general to the Japanese market. The call for 
reciprocity in the financial sector dated back in 1983, when Senator Garn introduced 
legislation that would require regulators to use reciprocity as a criterion in considering 
foreign banks’ application to establish branches in the U.S. (Bayard and Elliot 
1994:270). In 1987, the Senate Banking Committee considered the so-called “Fair Trade 
in Financial Services” provision as part of the Omnibus Trade Bill. The Senate adopted 
the “national treatment” provision,
2
 but it was “dropped in conference at the urging of 
House Banking on grounds that it would be better considered as part of comprehensive 
banking legislation.
3
” The Senate then added the language to the Proxmire Financial 
Modernization Act later in 1988,
4
 which was passed by the Senate but was not 
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 Congress (1989–90), the reciprocity bill was again introduced at 
the beginning of 1990. In January, Donald W. Riegle, Chairman of the Senate Banking 
Committee, introduced the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act to the Senate as S. 2028 
for the first time. In a markup held in May, the Committee incorporated S. 2028 into the 
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1989 (S. 1379). The Senate passed the bill on 
October 3. While the House version of the Defense Production Act (DPA) Amendments 
(HR486) did not have the provision, the Conference Committee filed a DPA Conference 
Report that contained the Fair Trade in Financial Services provisions later that month, 




The main purpose of the Senate bill was to allow U.S. regulators to take action 
against banks in countries that did not grant U.S. banks “effective market access.” The 
bill would give regulators, the FRB and the SEC, authority to deny applications from 
foreign banks and securities firms for new branches, or other changes in operations, if 
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Treasury Secretary determined that the home country did not extend national treatment 
to U.S. banks. It would not allow existing operations to be curtailed. It would not 
require true “reciprocity,” where a foreign country would be required to allow U.S. 
firms to operate with the same freedom they enjoy in the U.S. 
The Bush administration had been opposed to the bill, despite some indication 
by David C. Mulford, the Under Secretary for International Affairs, Treasury 
Department who was in charge of the U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiations, that it might 
shift to supporting it if Japan would not move forward with financial liberalization 
swiftly enough. The Head of House Banking Committee Henry B. Gonzalez expressed 
concern over the bill, as the retaliation provision could also affect banks from Latin 
American countries.
7
 On the other hand, some pointed to the link between Riegle’s 
home-state auto industry, which was ravaged in the early in the early 1980s as a result 
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5.3 Bilateral Negotiations: U.S.-Japan Working Group on Financial Markets 
In the field of finance, despite the reforms in Japan after the conclusion of the 
Yen-Dollar Accord in the middle of 1980s, the market shares of foreign banks did not 
improve. This situation irritated U.S. Congress (Brown 1994: Chap. 7). In such irritation, 
the new framework of bilateral negotiations, the U.S.-Japan Working Group on 
Financial Markets, was launched in November 1989. When the establishment of the 
new framework was agreed to replace the follow-up sessions of the Yen-Dollar Talks, it 
was intended to move away from issue of domestic liberalization to discuss those in 
international financial system more generally.
9
 When it started, however, the focus 
shifted to even more domestic issues in Japan's financial markets. Moreover, the U.S. 
side started to stress more general liberalization, such as deregulation of interest rates, 
rather than measures that directly affected American financial institutions. The former 
could be a more difficult issue, as it touched directly on the structure of the whole 
financial system. 
The first meeting of the new working group was held in Washington, D.C. in 
November 1989. The main subjects were the liberalization of interest rates, the 
complicated and opaque procedure for introducing new financial products, and the 
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difficulties for Japanese investors to access foreign markets. In this meeting, the two 
governments agreed to establish a working group to deal with technical issues.  
Why did the U.S. begin to change its position despite the initial expectation 
that the working group would be a forum for discussing management of international 
financial markets? The personal relationship in the international network of financial 
officials continued. Even in Japan, where career-track bureaucrats routinely rotate posts, 
provoking criticism that they cannot accumulate sufficient expertise nor develop close 
relationship with their foreign counterparts, respective vice financial ministers for 
international affairs in the 1980s served for three years, which was longer than the 
normal two-year tenure. Moreover, all vice ministers since 1983 were promoted directly 
from the post of Director-General of the International Finance Bureau. As such, they 
had engaged in international negotiations over financial issues before they became the 
vice minister. In the U.S., David Mulford served first as assistant secretary for 
international affairs from 1984 and then as under-secretary for international affairs from 
May 1989. Until his resignation in 1992, Mulford played a key role in preparing for the 
annual summit meetings as “financial sherpa,” addressing the Latin American debt 
crisis, and restructuring the foreign debt of the former Soviet Union.
10
 Given his long 
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experience and deep knowledge in international financial affairs, the Guardian wrote 
upon his resignation that “there have been few G7 decisions outside Mulford's range.
11
” 
One of the factors that triggered the change was the success of the U.S.-Japan 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, which took place from July 1989 to June 
1990.
12
 As mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, in the late 1980s, the 
American public came to regard Japan’s economic “intrusion” as a national-security 
issue and, in reaction, politicians attempted to introduce bills to counter the Japanese 
expansion. The Bush administration tried to contain such moves for fear that the effects 
would spill over on the overall relationship with Japan, including the security relations. 
One of such efforts was the SII talks held between the two countries. In order to counter 
Congressional moves to introduce threat of retaliation, the Bush administration 
proposed the bilateral negotiation framework to discuss barriers to trade and investment 
in Japan outside of the shadow of the Super 301 of the Trade Act (Schoppa 1997: 
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While liberalization of financial services in Japan were not among a wide range 
of issues covered by the SII, bilateral negotiations on the domestic financial 
deregulation continued as follow-up of the Yen-Dollar Talks. As the SII covered areas 
that had been considered domestic matters (Janow 1994), the bilateral financial 
negotiations also came to cover apparently purely domestic issues.  
The SII also affected the nature of the composition of participants in the 
negotiations. Before the SII, negotiators in the area of finance were limited to Treasury 
officials on the U.S. side. In the SII talks, however, officials from other governmental 
agencies also played a role. This change pushed the Treasury to a tougher position 
against Japan. Before the talk, the negotiations over financial matters were left almost 
exclusively to the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese MOF. However, in the talk, 
legislatures and other governmental agencies began to intervene. Because of this change, 
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 Ironically, the introduction of the BIS capital adequacy requirement and the 
crash of the Japanese stock market, which brought the weakening of Japanese banks 
operating in the U.S. also contributed to the change. The resulting decline in the volume 
of lending by the Japanese banks in the U.S. deteriorated the already problematic credit 
crunch there. The U.S. officials aimed at reviving the Japanese economy through reform 
of the financial sector.
15
 Soon after the first meeting, Mulford wrote in the Financial 
Times about Japan’s financial liberalization. While he noted that some important 
progress had been made since the Yen-Dollar talk, he complained that the Japanese 
markets were still far from a truly market-based financial system. Although measures 
such as partial deregulation of interest rates, development of the money market, and the 
new membership of foreign financial institutions in the Tokyo stock exchange should be 
commended, overall, the remaining regulations, such as those on interest rates, and on 
new, innovative products and services, are regrettable. Mulford also complained that 
opaque informal practices limit the entry of foreign firms in the Japanese markets. He 
linked financial liberalization to the issue of trade imbalances by claiming that 
competitive interest rates would increase the personal income of depositors, thereby 
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boosting consumption and imports.  Moreover, development of efficient, liquid money 
market in Japan would encourage greater use of the yen in international transactions.
16
 
FTFSA, the Government Agencies, and the Private Sector 
Even though the first bilateral meeting was held before the submission of the FTFSA 
bill, the meeting also reflected the growing call for reciprocity in Congress. On 
February 28, Mulford signaled a potential shift toward a reciprocal policy at a House 
Banking Committee task force. Mulford told a House Banking Committee Task Force 
on International Competitiveness that negotiations with Japan to increase the access of 
U.S. banks to Japanese financial markets had not been wholly satisfactory. Mulford also 
said that the EC had decided in 1989 to adopt the principle of “reciprocal national 




 Yet, the Treasury did not openly back the idea of reciprocity in the area of 
finance. In his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in April 1990, Mulford 
said the administration preferred to push for more open market abroad for U.S. firms 
rather than impose retaliatory measures, noting that the risk that retaliations would 
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follow reciprocity once it would be used.
18
 He also told that the U.S. was pressing for 
more rapid interest rate deregulation in Japan.
19
 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the 




 U.S. bankers also expressed disdain. They say the legislation would serve no 
purpose and was a reckless Japan-bashing exercise for Congress.
21
 New York bankers 
warned that U.S.-Japan relations could deteriorate if the bill passed. One of those 
bankers said that approving the bill could make Japan less willing to back U.S. 
administration efforts to provide financial assistance to Third World countries.
22
 In his 
testimony before the Task Force on International Competitiveness of U.S. Financial 
Institutions, John S. Reed, Chairman of Citicorp, raised his concern that the Fair Trade 
in Financial Services Act “could be counter-productive if it plays to the tendency of the 
Europeans to talk of reciprocity.” He said to negotiate open markets and transparency of 
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regulation should be the better approach.
23
 He also stressed the importance of lifting the 
regulations that had rendered the U.S. financial industry highly fragmented and 
compartmentalized both by function and by geography. He especially emphasized how 
the Glass-Steagall Act made the U.S. banks disadvantaged against European banks. 
Despite these oppositions, the reciprocity bill moved through the process. On 
May 24, the Senate Banking Committee approved the Fair Trade in Financial Services 
Act (S2028), which was attached by voice vote to a measure amending the Defense 
Production Act. President Bush opposed the Riegle bill and would veto it if it was send 
to him as a freestanding bill.
24
 The committee defeated an amendment by Phil Gramm, 
which would have prohibited sanctions against foreign banks and securities firms unless 
it was shown that there would be no adverse effects for U.S. consumers.  On the other 
hand, it accepted an amendment by Christopher J. Dodd, which called on regulators to 
exempt from future punitive actions financial institutions from counties that had 
extended national treatment to U.S. financial firms in the past. This amendment would 
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5.4 Liberalization of Interest Rates in Japan 
During this period, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) attempted to liberalize 
interest rates gradually. In the early March of 1990, the Japanese MOF asked various 
types of financial institutions to submit their proposals for interest rate liberalization.
26
 
By April, the MOF was reported to set a plan to complete the deregulation of time 
deposit interest rates by the fall of 1993. The Ministry began consultation with various 
types of banks, and by the end of April, they accepted the plan.
27
 In the meantime, the 
MOF also decided to allow banks to introduce a new financial product in October 1990, 
a step toward liberalization of interest rates. The new instruments, with the minimum 
sales unit of 3 million yen, would have interest rates that would float with deregulated 
large-denomination time deposit rates.
28
 
Besides these moves toward interest rate liberalization, just before the second 
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meeting of the Working Group, the MOF made some decisions that would give foreign 
banks more favorable treatment than the domestic ones. In April 1990, the Ministry 
announced that the restriction on new branched would not be applied to foreign banks. 
This decision would work especially favorably to Citibank, which tried to expand its 
retail network in Japan.
29
 Japanese banks criticized the policy for being discriminatory 
against them. In doing so, however, major banks hoped to achieve complete removal of 
the restrictions on branching by using the American pressure.
30
 
In the same month, the MOF also announced that it would permit foreign 
securities firms, such as Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Solomon 
Brothers, to open bank subsidiaries in Japan and authorized the establishment of such 
branches in February 1991. Japanese banks were strictly prohibited from engaging in 
securities business by the Securities Exchange Law. 
 Yet, the U.S. negotiators continued to complain the slow pace of financial 
liberalization in Japan. In the second meeting of the working group was held in Tokyo 
in May 1990, the focus was on further deregulation of deposit rates in Japan. The 
meeting ended with both sides far apart on the question of how quickly Japan should 
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deregulate interest rates on bank deposits. The U.S. side was adamant in insisting on the 
basic principle of market liberalization through the deregulation of interest rates.
31
 
Behind the tough U.S. requests was the persistent expansion of Japanese banks’ 
shares of U.S. and other overseas markets.
32
 In the hindsight, Japanese financial 
institutions had already begun losing their strength by then. After the economic bubble 
of the latter half of the 1980s, stock and land prices started to fall in 1990 and 1991 
respectively. They subsequently plunged by more than 50 percent in a few years. A 
direct result of the burst of the bubble was the plight of the financial sector, riddled with 
non-performing loans. At that time, however, most observers did not anticipate that 
consequence. Mulford aggressively pressed for further steps to liberalize Japan’s 
financial markets. He demanded the immediate decontrol of interest rates. 
 When the talk was held, the MOF did not present a concrete schedule for 
interest rate deregulation. As mentioned above, the MOF had already begun 
negotiations with domestic banks over the timetable for further interest rate deregulation. 
However, the Ministry and the private sector could not reach an agreement on the 
concrete timetable due to the fierce opposition from small- and medium-sized banks, 
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which were strongly against quick deregulation of interest rates.
33
 There was also the 
question of how to deal with the government-run postal saving system, which did not 
fall under the jurisdiction of the MOF. 
 The U.S., however, demanded complete liberalization of interest rates on all 
bank deposit within one year. The firm demand came from the belief that the remaining 
interest rate regulation in Japan had given Japanese banks a substantial advantage. 
According to the argument, the regulation kept interest rate in Japan artificially low, 
providing Japanese banks with an unfairly cheap source of funds.
34
 
 The proportion of deposits with liberalized interest rates in Japan’s major banks 
was about 60 percent at that time. The figure varied across different types of financial 
institutions. As of the end of February 1990, that of city banks was 59.3 percent, 
regional banks 48.4 percent, second regional banks 45.5 percent, and credit associations 
30.7 percent.
35
 This meant that the liberalization would affect smaller financial 
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institutions more severely. 
 Other major demands were the deregulation of restrictions on foreign currency 
deposits and on new financial opportunities. The Wall Street Journal remarked that “this 
time around, the U.S. is seeking broad deregulation of deposit rates, widespread direct 
dealings in the currency markets and greater opportunity for foreign financial 
institutions to manage Japanese cash,” while in the past, the U.S. had primary sought 
specific openings for U.S. banks and securities firms into Japan’s financial markets on a 
case-by-case basis.
36
 The IMF also urged Japan to liberalize interest rates in its meeting 
with Japan in July 1990.
37
 In its Annual Report, the IMF especially noted the need for 
further liberalization of interest rates in Japan.
38
 
The MOF briefed the U.S. officials on a schedule for liberalizing interest rates 
and promised to allow foreign securities firms to conduct foreign exchange business 
through their subsidiaries in Japan. Under the pressure, there were some signs that the 
Japanese government would accelerate the schedule for interest rate liberalization. In 
July, Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto suggested to Treasury Secretary Brady that 
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Japan might move up its schedule for the liberalization of interest rates of time 
deposits.
39
 Moreover, the MOF eased restrictions on Japanese residents’ overseas 
deposit accounts in foreign-denominated currencies, as it promised to the U.S. in May. 
Permission was no longer necessary for amounts worth 30 million yen or less.
40
 
The MOF and banks were also negotiating over the introduction of a new 
saving deposit in the spring of 1992. The new product would be a non-time saving 
deposit that would carry a higher interest rate than ordinary liquid deposits, with the 
withdrawal frequency limited. The introduction would be a step toward deregulation of 
interest rates on liquid bank deposits.
41 
 
5.5 Developments related to the Reciprocity Bill in the US. 1990 and 1991 
Bill Close to Passage, Fall 1990 
The efforts made by the Japanese government notwithstanding, in October, the Senate 
floor passed the financial services provision as a part of the Defense Production Act 
Amendments. In the previous month, the House approved a version of the Defense 
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Production bill (HR486) that did not include the Japan provision. Some major Japanese 
banks applied for underwriting of debentures and CPs to the FRB in order to obtain 
approval before the passage of the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act.
42
 The bills 
moved to a House-Senate conference committee, as the Senate and House versions must 
be reconciled. The administration continued to oppose the measure, arguing it ran 
counter to free-trade principle, and lobbied for a one-year extension of a Defense 
Production Act without the Riegle provision. The Treasury said the original measure 




Even though the Senate and House conferees agreed to incorporate the measure 
into the bill renewing the Defense Production Act, the Senate accepted the modification 
of the measure, which would give the Treasury greater discretion. The new version of 
the bill would not mandate the Treasury to shrink the U.S. services provided by foreign 
banks and brokerage. The bill directed the Treasury to conduct negotiations with any 
country that would be found to engage in “significant” discrimination against U.S. 
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financial institutions. If the negotiations would be unsuccessful, the U.S. regulatory 
agencies could deny applications of financial institutions from that country for entry, 
mergers, acquisitions, and other activities. Moreover, the new version of the bill reduced 
the requirement for the Treasury to report to Congress from once a year to once in two 
years. This effectively extended the deadline for the first report to the end of 1992. 
Although the Treasury withheld comment on the conference action, the press observed 
that the department no longer opposed the legislation in its new form.
44
 One factor that 
contributed to the expansion of Treasury’s discretion was the request of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee, which had been concerned about the possible 
impact the bill would have on inflows of foreign investment.
45
 
 The Japanese MOF lobbied the Treasury, the FRB, and influential members of 
Congress to stop the passage of the fair trade bill at this stage.
46
 Under these 
circumstances, however, the expectation was high that the bill would be enacted in the 
101
st
 Congress. Still resisting the bill, Japanese banks speeded up applying for new lines 
of business in the hope of obtaining approval before the passage of the bill and thereby 
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gaining exemption from retaliatory measures.
47
 
Yet, the bill died with adjournment. The House floor passed the provision on 
October 26.  Ironically, the Senate, which passed the provision earlier that month, 
could not clear the bill by the end of the Congressional session on October 28, largely 
because of the Bush administration objection to some provisions concerning defense 
procurement.
48
 The death of the legislation implies that passing the bill itself was not 
the high priority for the administration. 
Changing Attitude of the U.S. Side, 1991 
Yet, the Treasury Department’s National Treatment Study of 1990, published in the 
early December, was especially critical of Japanese barriers of entry by U.S. banks and 
securities firms. Undersecretary Mulford hinted in a press briefing on the report that the 
Bush administration might support retaliatory legislation next year. He said Japan could 




Since the start of the new year of 1991, the media pointed out that the Bush 
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administration began to toughen the U.S. trade policy against Japan. Recession in the 
U.S. helped stiffen the U.S. attitude toward the slow progress in reducing the huge U.S. 
trade deficit against Japan. Japan’s passive role in the Gulf war and the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT also made the view on Japan severer. Furthermore, concerns for the 
possible shift in American public opinion at the 50
th
 anniversary of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor might also affect the stance of the U.S. government.
50
 The New York Times 
reported that some Congressional staff members suggested that the administration 
intended to head off an expected drive in the 102
nd
 Congress to enact punitive 
legislation on foreign investment and trade.
51
 
 In the same period, the Interior Department tried to prevent Japan’s Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Company from retaining the right to do business in Yosemite 
National Park by acquiring MCA Inc. The Justice Department was preparing to file a 
civil antitrust lawsuit to stop an attempt by Nippon Sanso KK of Japan to take over 
Semi-Gas System, a U.S. semiconductor company. The acquisition was sharply 
criticized in Congress. The Interior and Justice moves made a sharp contrast to 
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previously expressed positions of the Reagan and Bush administrations, which had 
generally accepted any foreign acquisitions.
52
 
 In the field of finance, in January 1991, Treasury officials suggested that the 
administration was considering to shift their attitude and to support the Fair Trade in 
Financial Services Act. In the third meeting of the working group held in January 1991, 
the main subject was again the liberalization of interest rates in Japan. It was the 
meeting originally scheduled in March. The schedule was moved forward to January at 
the request of the U.S. side, as the U.S. negotiators wanted to start negotiations before 
the resumption of Congress.
53
 
 The U.S. negotiating team, led by Mulford, called for the liberalization of 
interest rates for time deposits within months, as well as further opening of the 
investment advisory business and the transparency of financial administration. 
Frustrated by the slow progress in the talks, the U.S. side warned Japan that Congress 
would pass retaliatory measures unless Tokyo would act rapidly to deregulate its 
financial markets and increase access for foreign businesses. The U.S. was “seeking 




 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 25, 1991, p.5. Aside from the Congressional schedule, the U.S. 
administration might also wanted Japan make concessions in the context that Japan’s contribution to 
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commitments from Japan for a much faster timetable for deregulating interest rates and 
freeing money markets and foreign exchange controls that the three-year period so far 
promised.” It also wanted foreign concerns would be “allowed to act as lead managers 
and underwriters on corporate issues and to bring financial products to Japan.” In 
addition, they also called for fairer and more transparent rules in general. The U.S. 
Treasury was deliberately ambiguous about the fair trade in financial services bill.
54
 
 In response, the Japanese side, led by Makoto Utsumi, the Vice Minister for 
Finance for International Affairs, only told that the MOF planned to complete 
liberalization of interest rates for time deposits in 1993.
55
 Moreover, Utsumi cautioned 
that the reciprocity bill would backfire on the U.S. In an unusually blunt warning at a 
news conference with Mulford after the meeting, Utsumi stated that if the U.S. would 
apply sanction against Japan through the reciprocity bill, Japanese financial institutions 
would curb credit to the U.S., which would be “very harmful” for the US. He warned 
that the bill, if approved, could send a “very serious signal” to the Japanese banks and 
could worsen the existing credit crunch within the U.S.
56
 The meeting did not produce 
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any significant results. 
 As the tension between the two sides increased, the Fair Trade in Financial 
Services Act was introduced to the 102
nd
 Congress in 1991 and 1992. In 1991, the 
sponsors of the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act in the Senate suggested that they 





It indeed became parts of various bills and passed the Senate during that Congress, and 
it was also introduced in the House. Compared to the previous Congress, the prospect 
for passage was brighter, because the stance of the Bush Administration had changed. 
While it was not enthusiastic about the bill, it aimed at more aggressive use of the bill as 
leverage for pushing Japan in the bilateral negotiations. However, due to disagreements 
between the two Chambers, the Conference Committee eventually dropped the 
provision in the end. 
In February 1991, Chairman Riegle reintroduced the Fair Trade in Financial 
Services Act again as a part of the Defense Production Amendments Act of 1991 (S347), 
a bill to extend the expiration date of the Defense Production Act of 1950, which had 
expired in 1990. On February 22, the Senate passed it by voice vote despite opposition 
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from the Treasury as well as foreign countries including Japan.
58
 Later, the provision 
was also attached to a separate bill for sweeping reform of the U.S. financial system.
59
 
When Riegle introduced the bill, he said the provision was aimed primary at Japan. 
Even though European banks were slow to oppose the bill, because the measures were 
not aimed at them, the EC send a letter of objection to the legislation.
60
 
Also in the House, Representative Stark, Democrat from California, introduced 
the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act on January 29, 1991.
61
 It was the first time that 
the provision was introduced in the House.
62
 The provision did not proceed in the 
House, however, and the House version of the Defense Production Act Extension and 
Amendments (H.R 991) did not contain the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act.
63
 
In the July testimony, Senator Riegle raised some points to explain the need of 
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the legislation, which he said was aimed especially at Japan. First, he mentioned the 
asymmetry between the U.S. and Japan. While the European banks controlled 184 
billion dollars’ worth of banking assets in the U.S., U.S. bankers held 230 billion dollars 
of banking assets in Europe.  On the other hand, while Japanese banks controlled $ 435 
billion of banking assets in the U.S., the U.S. banks had merely $19 dollars of banking 
assets in Japan. He regarded this asymmetry as a result of Japan’s strategy of protecting 
its home market from foreign competition and using higher profit at home to subsidize 
market advances abroad.
64
 He also cited another comment made by Alex Sheshunoff in 
1989 that allowing foreign banks to have a major share of the U.S. market 
asymmetrically created risk because control over a nation’s financial institutions meant 
control over other businesses.
65
 
On the other hand, in the same hearing, Richard Self, Deputy Assistant U.S. 
Trade Representative for Service, stated that the negotiations with countries should be 
discretionary, rather than mandatory. He also demanded that the authority to negotiate 
with other countries should reside “within the executive branch, rather than within 
regulatory agencies.” He also raised concern for the bill’s implication on policies of EC. 
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Riegle stressed the range of flexibility given to the Treasury Department and the role of 
the provisions as leverage in international negotiations.
66
 
 The turning point came in April, when the Treasury started to openly support 
the provision. Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry Newman told Carper’s Subcommittee 
on Economic Stabilization at an April 24 hearing that the department now supported the 
measure. At the same time, the State Department and the USTR raised concerns over the 
details of the bill, while they expressed support for the overall intention of the bill.
67
 
In the meantime, the Japanese MOF took some important steps toward 
liberalizing the country’s financial markets. In May 1991, an advisory committee of the 
MOF issued a report to propose liberalization of interest rates on demand deposit, which 
would be started in the spring of 1992.
68
 Next month, a subcommittee of the Financial 
Research Council released its final report on comprehensive deregulation of Japan’s 
financial system. Its recommendations included the permission of cross-entry of banks 
and securities industries into each other’s business through subsidiaries. Based on the 
report, the MOF submitted bills for comprehensive deregulation of the financial system 
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next year. The Diet approved them in June 1992 without substantial discussion. These 
moves were mostly driven by domestic dynamics, but the pressure from American 
Congress and the bilateral talks apparently had some impact (Suginohara 2004). 
 In October, the fourth meeting of the working group was held between the U.S. 
and Japanese financial officials. The main subject of the talk was the financial scandals 
that surfaced that year. In 1990 and 1991, a series of financial scandals hit Japan. The 
media uncovered illicit loans major banks had made. Securities firms were found to 
have made illegal compensation payments to major clients over several years for 
losses caused by stock market declines. The Ministry of Finance was accused of 
overlooking, and sometimes tacitly permitting, these activities. 
At that time, financial scandals also took place in other industrial countries. 
The most notable was the scandal that involved the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), a bank with worldwide network, whose offices were closed in 
July 1991 in a coordinated action of world financial regulators. It had committed a 
startlingly wide range of criminal activities, including illicit purchases of banks and real 
estate, money laundering, and support of terrorism. This BCCI affair highlighted the 
vulnerability of the financial regulatory system to international crimes.
69
 In the U.S., 
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Solomon Brothers was found to have engaged in illegal bidding in the Treasury 
securities market. The trades of the firm bought far more than legal limit during the 
government sale of Treasury securities. In the communiqué issued on October 12, the 
Group of Seven took an unusual step of commenting on recent financial scandals. It 
called for “effective measures to avoid the recurrence” of the “irregularities that were 
revealed in some financial markets.” 
 Even though the scandals were not limited to Japan, U.S. chief negotiator 
Mulford ascribed those in Japan to the lack of transparency in its financial system. In 
the bilateral talks, Mulford denounced Japan’s Ministry of Finance for permitting 
anticompetitive practices in the financial markets. He was not satisfied with the 
explanation of the measures the MOF had deployed to prevent further misconducts.
70
 
 The strategy of focusing on financial scandals rather than interest rate 
liberalization reflected the U.S. concern over Japan’s sluggish stock prices. After it 
peaked at 38,915 yen at the end of 1989, the Nikkei Stock Average started its long slide. 
If stock prices would continue to decline, foreign securities firms, whose main revenue 
came from commission revenue, would be seriously damaged. Moreover, since the 
stock market slump began at the same time as the introduction of the new BIS capital 
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accord, the Japanese banks were forced to reduce the amount of loans. Whereas it 
spread to the domestic market through the 1990s, the reduction started in overseas 
markets, where the banks did not have longstanding relationship with the borrowers. It 
led to the further credit crunch in the U.S. For these reasons, the U.S. government 
shifted its focus to the issue of structural reform of the Japanese financial markets.
71
 
 However, this does not mean that the U.S. softened its position. On the eve of 
the meetings with Japanese officials, Mulford said that the steps the MOF had taken 
thus far did not address the root cause of the financial scandals. He demanded the 
ministry to stop the practice of informal administrative guidance and to issue clear, 
written policies to manage Japan’s financial markets. He said that the Bush 
administration might become more favorably disposed to congressional action 
threatening sanctions if Japan will not introduce “real” reforms.
72
 Besides, the demands 
for further liberalization of the Japanese financial markets continued. In the negotiation, 
Mulford also demanded further liberalization of interest rates and the opening of Japan’s 
pension fund management business to foreign firms. In response, Tadao Chino, 
Japanese new Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, said that Japan had a 
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plan to phase out fixed brokerage commissions but that the timetable had not been 
established. 
The U.S. also called for the opening of the corporate pension market, citing 
that the share of foreigners in pension fund management in Japan was only 0.25 percent. 
The MOF explained its recent decision to give favorable treatment to foreign companies. 
Starting in December, foreign pension-fund and investment-management companies 
that operate in Japan would be allowed to increase the amount of foreign stocks they 
hold to 70 percent of their total holding from 50 percent. The MOF would also reduce 
the minimum assets needed by foreign companies to qualify for management to 500 
million yen from the current one billion yen. The old rules would continue to apply to 
their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. was not satisfied, however. Mulford noted that 
foreign companies were limited to the management of pension money taken only after 
April 1990. On the other hand, the Japanese companies complained that these measures 
were “reverse discrimination” against the domestic players.
73
 
 By the time the October meeting was held, the nature of the bilateral 
negotiation changed from mostly technical negotiations between close specialists to 
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more contentious ones, reflecting the Congressional in the U.S. Tougher demands and 
threats of retaliation did not lead to greater achievement, however. The Japanese side 
stiffened its attitude in response, and the negotiations did not produce significant results. 
 Since the October meeting, the U.S.-Japan financial talks were not held until 
May 1993, after the change of the American government. However, it did not mean that 
the two governments stopped efforts to discuss financial issues, especially the problem 
of financial liberalization in Japan. The financial authorities continued their talks under 
the multilateral framework of the GATT Uruguay Round. The bilateral negotiations 
under the umbrella of the GATT will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 In November, interest rates for time deposits of 3 million yen or more in Japan 
were liberalized as scheduled. 
U.S. Congress 
Later in 1991 and 1992, the reciprocity bills in financial services appeared repeatedly, 
attached to many different bills. There were also efforts to introduce even more punitive 
versions of the FTFSA. Even though the various versions of the provisions were passed 
both by the House and Senate, they could not agree on the details. In the end of the 
102nd Congress (1991-1992), all of those reciprocity provisions were dropped. 
 The Senate attached the FTFSA to a bill to authorize short-term extension of 
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the Defense Production Act (DPA), which was passed in October 1991, and another bill 
for long-term extension, which was enacted in October 1992 (S468 and S347). On the 
other hand, the House version of the DPA bills (HR3039, HR991 and HR 347) did not 
incorporate the provision. For both bills, the provisions were dropped in the Conference 
Committee in October 1992. The Senate also attached the FTFSA to the financial 
system overhaul, but the bill, already long overdue, did not pass due to the disagreement 
among industries and regulators.
74
 The Fair Trade in Financial Service Act was also 
included in the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act 
of 1991 (S543), reported by the Senate Banking Committee on October 1, 1991. While 
it passed the Senate, this provision of the Senate bill was also dropped from the 
Conference Report in October 1992.
75
 
 The House was not indifferent to the reciprocity bill, however. In October 1991, 
Charles E. Schumer, Democrat from New York, submitted a strengthened version of the 
FTFSA (HR3505) to the House. It differed in two ways from the Senate version. First, it 
required the Treasury Secretary to publish the list of offending countries. In the Senate 
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bill, the Treasury was not required to publish such a list. Second, the House bill 
narrowed the focus exclusively on Japan by exempting the existing U.S. subsidiaries of 
European Community and Canadian banks from its application, reflecting the fear that 




 In this Congress, other reciprocity bills that would cover securities industries 
were also submitted. In March 1991, Edward J. Markey, chairman of the House 
Telecommunications subcommittee, proposed a bill (HR1347) that stipulated similar 
reciprocal measures in securities and telecommunications industries.
77
 
 There were criticisms of the bill. The Journal of Commerce pointed out in its 
editorial that protectionist financial services laws would lead to counter-retaliation. 
Moreover, blocking foreign banks from operating in the United States would restrict the 
flow of capital into this country, and was bound to raise costs for American borrowers.
78
 
The opponents said that the most affected foreign banks would be small institutions, not 
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large Japanese or European banks.
79
 In the hearing held in November, the 
representative from the Federal Reserve Board opposed the bill. Alan Greenspan, 
chairman of the Fed, and Gerald Corrigan, the head of the New York Fed, also wanted 
flexibility. They did not want to stop strong foreign banks from lending to Americans.
80
 
 Despite these oppositions, on March 4, two subcommittees —the International 
Finance and the Financial Institutions Subcommittees—of the House Banking 
Committee approved the Fair Trade in Financial Services Act. The Treasury agreed that 
the implied threat of retaliation could bolster negotiations to erase Japanese banks’ 
“unfair advantage.”
81
 In April 1992, Japanese Finance Minister Tsutomu Hada sent a 
letter to Treasury Secretary Brady to oppose the bill. In response, Brady expressed 
disappointment at the slow progress of Japan’s financial liberalization.
82
 
All these events notwithstanding, in the end, the provision was dropped in the 
Conference Committee in October 1992 due to the disagreements between the House 
and Senate. The Senate version would give the Treasury some discretion to determine 
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whether to impose sanctions. The House version mandated action by the Secretary of 
Treasury in consultation with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
Secretary of State. 
The failure of the bill reflected the unimportance of the bill in comparison to 
other issues in the election year. While protectionist sentiment against Japan was still 
significant in the American public opinion, the financial bill was too technical to appeal 
general constituency. Under the circumstance that politicians hoped to adjourn by early 
October for election year campaigning, the priority of passing this bill was low. 
 
5.6 Summary 
During the 1990–1991 period, the relationship between the U.S. and Japan over 
financial liberalization grew more and more contentious. The main reason was the 
increased involvement of Congress in the intergovernmental relationship. 
 There three significant changes with respect the nature of the bilateral 
negotiations.  First, the topics came to include an especially comprehensive and thus 
difficult domestic issue: the liberalization of interest rates in Japan. Second, the U.S. 
administration changed its attitude toward punitive bills proposed in Congress. The 
administration had been opposed to any Congressional moves to introduce sanctions 
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against Japanese financial institutions for the closed nature of the Japanese financial 
markets. However, during this period, it attempted to use such moves as leverage to 
induce greater concessions from Japan in the bilateral negotiations, even though the 
attitude was not that of unconditional support. Third, tougher line of the U.S. 
administration did not result in greater concessions on the Japanese side. Rather, the 
Japanese side also stiffened its attitude, and the negotiations came to a deadlock. 
 As the bilateral negotiations became unproductive, there was new development 
concerning international negotiations over financial issues. The multilateral negotiations 
under the GATT Uruguay Round covered international trade in services for the first 
time in the history of multilateral trade negotiations. Financial services were one of the 
main issue areas. Even though the Uruguay Round moved much slower than originally 
planned, by 1992, member countries started negotiating concrete proposals. The 
U.S.-Japan financial negotiations continued in the new multilateral stage, which is 





Chapter 6 Financial Negotiations under a New Framework: Uruguay Round and 
Framework Talks 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), concluded in the Uruguay Round, is the 
first multilateral trade agreement to cover international trade in services. The Round ended in 
December 1993 after long and acrimonious negotiations, and formally signed in April 1994. 
The inclusion of trade in services into the multilateral trade negotiation added another point of 
contention. Along with disagreements over agricultural subsidies among was highly 
contentious point in the Round. Moreover, financial services sector was one of the issue areas 
over which negotiators could not reach an agreement even by the extended deadline of 1993. 
Negotiations continued, and the Financial Services Agreement was finally completed in 1997. 
In this chapter, I discuss how the issue of services trade became the agenda of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, and how the multilateral negotiations affected the bilateral 
financial talks between the U.S. and Japan. 
 
6.1 Service in Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Services had not been considered to be “traded” before the early 1970s. Since services cannot 
be stored, sales of services involve some sort of direct relationship between sellers and buyers. 





 It was only after the mid-1970s that international trade in services began to attract 
attention of policymakers as one of trade problems. In the 1973–1979 Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations, the issue of trade and investment in services was raised in a future negotiating 
agenda. Then, in the Uruguay Round, which was officially launched in 1986, service was 
introduced into the framework of multinational trade negotiations under the GATT for the first 
time. 
The attention paid to the service industry in the international trade seems to reflect the 
growing importance of service industry in the developed economies. Both in 1960 and 1970, 
the share of world service output in the world GDP was about 50 percent. For the period 
between 1980 and 1989, the share increased to 57.4 percent. The figure was 64.7 percent for 
1990–1999, and 68.0 percent for 2000–2006 (Lipsey 2009: 35, Table 1.5). However, the 
transformation into “service economies” occurs primarily in the domestic sectors that generate 
little international transaction, such as public administration and health care. The volume of 
world trade in services was still small compared to that of merchandise trade during the 1980s, 
when the issue of trade in services was included in the multilateral trade negotiations. 
According to the data of twenty-two countries that have reported service exports and imports to 
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the IMF since 1972, the ratio of service exports to goods exports grew from 21 to 28 percent 
between 1972–76 to 2002–2006, while the ratio for imports are 24 percent in 1972–76 and 25 
percent in 2002–2006, falling short of the expectation that trade in services would lead the 









It was thus not an inevitable consequence of transformation of economic structure that 
brought services on the negotiation table. It was mainly some specific American companies 
that pushed for the agenda. 
What is Special about Service Trades? 
According to Drake and Nicolaidis (1992), it took a “revolution in social ontology” to redefine 
the services transactions as a part of international trade. The issue of “trade in services” first 
appeared in public document in a 1972 OECD report to refer to what had been regarded as 
international transaction of invisible services.
4
 The document reported the growth of trade in 
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imports. The figures remain to be 48 percent for service exports and 52 percent for service imports in 2005 
(Lipsey 2009: 36, Table 1.6). 
4
 The report is titled Report by the High Level Group on Trade and Related Problems (Paris: OECD, 1973).  
The international transactions of services had appeared in national accounts under the broad label 
“invisibles.” See Drake and Nicolaidis 1992: 42-46. 
193 
 
services and the problems it posed.  In 1975, a seminal book, Invisible Barriers to Invisible 
Trade was published (Preeg 1995: 37). 
 Services are “traded” in international markets through either cross-border trade or 
sales through foreign affiliates. While many consumer services, such as restaurant and haircut, 
require physical presence to transmit, some services can be traded without physical proximity 
between providers and users. Traditional banking falls into this category, since loans can be 
made by mail or phone. Other examples include securities, insurance, advertising, and 
accounting. These producer services are more likely to be traded internationally. The 
development of telecommunication and computer technologies, which made the transmission 
of data across national borders easier, facilitated internationalization of services industry. The 
liberalization of goods and capital markets created international business opportunities for 
service industries (Bhagwati 1987, McCulloch 1990). 
However, liberalization of trade in services has never been an easy task. In addition to 
all the same kinds of economic and political considerations that arise with liberalization of 
merchandise trade, such as employment, adjustment, and the infant-industry argument, there 
are some specific factors that hinder trade in services (McCulloch 1990: 342–43). The most 
important has been the existence of heavy local regulation. Governments typically regulate 
service industries rigorously. Entry into many of service industries, such as medicine, law, 
accounting, and finance, are licensed. Utility prices, from electricity and waters to 
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transportation and telecommunications, are controlled. Setting rules internationally to govern 
services sector, therefore, goes into the realm of domestic policies deeper than it does with the 
case of trade of goods (Ruggie 1994). Similarly, as trade in services usually involves foreign 
direct investment, liberalization in financial services requires not only lowering border barriers 
but harmonizing domestic regulations.
5
 Moreover, many service industries are also considered 
to play an important role in achieving national security. Finance is no exception.  
 Because of these factors, liberalization of trade in services often faces more 
complicated domestic interests than that of trade of goods does. Liberalization of trade in 
services can be intrusive in other areas of national policy, and requires more harmonization of 
domestic regulations. 
America’s Push for Services Negotiations 
Despite these difficulties, the U.S. led the launch of multilateral negotiations in services, while 
opposition came mainly from the developing countries. The U.S., whose multinational 
companies wanted to expand their service provisions in foreign markets, jumped on the new 
concept of “trade in services.” This redefinition of service transactions as trade brought the 
issue of international liberalization of service on the GATT negotiation table, although the 
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 According to the survey conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the most important 
non-tariff barriers U.S. service firms encounter in foreign markets was the basic right of establishment in 
foreign countries. Specific barriers to provision of a service by foreign firms and foreign exchange controls 
are also significant obstacles. United States International Trade Commission (1982), The Relationship of 
Exports in Selected U.S. Service Industries to U.S. Merchandise Exports. USITC Publication 1290, 
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multinational body took more than a decade since then to reach a comprehensive agreement on 
the rules to govern the international transactions of services. 
 Three groups of U.S. participants pushed to include services into the GATT 
negotiations.  First, some U.S.-based financial firms, most notably American Express, sought 
to ensure their access to foreign markets. American Express, along with Bechtel, Peat Marwick, 
Citibank, and other firms, established the Coalition of Service Industry (CSI) in January 1982 
(Yoffie 1990: 376). It supported the passage of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1984 and made 
strong commitment to reducing barriers to trade in services at the 1984 London Economic 
Summit and to completing the U.S. National Study on Services (Greenberg 1988: 410-11). 
Corporate leaders included James Robinson of American Express, Maurice Greenberg of 
American International Group, and John Reed of Citicorp. In the early 1980s, the American 
Enterprise Institute embarked on an ambitious research initiative on the issue. In the 1974 
Trade Act, Congress included in the definition of international trade “trade in both goods and 
services” (Preeg 1995: 37–38). 
 Second, U.S. government officials and the business community also supported the 
inclusion mainly out of concern for the growing US trade deficit. However, the export potential 
of services in the overall U.S. trade had been exaggerated. Some advocated that liberalization 
of trade in services would contribute to reduce the U.S. trade deficit as the country’s 
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comparative advantage was shifting from goods to trade services.
6
 Indeed, the surplus on 
services grew during the first half of the 1980s. Yet, most of the services surplus during the 
period came from earnings on U.S. investment abroad at a time of unusually high interest rates. 
The U.S. net investment position reversed since then. The surplus by other services had risen, 
but it constituted only a small fraction in the total trade (McCulloch 1988: 371-75, Olmer 
1988: 415–417). 
Finally, trade-policy experts, such as Geza Feketekuty of the Office of the USTR, 
supported it, hoping to maintain the momentum of multilateral negotiations on trade. The 
expectation for increase in services trade could help revitalize waning political support at home 
for maintaining open markets (McCulloch 1990: 333, see also McCulloch 1988: 370–75 and 
Hamilton and Whalley 1989). 
 The introduction of services into the GATT negotiations was actively debated in the 
U.S. from early 1981 on, between some U.S. financial service firms led by American Express 
Company (under its chairman, James Robinson) and then-U.S. Trade Representative William 
Brock. In 1982, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that liberalization of trade in services 
would be one of the key elements of U.S. trade policy in the 1980s. That year, he appointed 
Robinson to be one of six private sector members of the American delegation to an upcoming 
meeting of the GATT (Yoffie 1990: 367). The U.S. trade officials first raised the subject 
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officially at the November 1982 GATT ministerial meeting (Dobson and Jacquet 1998: 70). 
 
6.2 The Uruguay Round  
The consideration of new codes on trade in services became one of the most ambitious agendas 
of the GATT ministerial meeting held in Geneva in 1982.
7
 The communiqué of the meeting 
recommended national studies on service trade (Yoffie 1990: 367). Even though GATT 
members could not launch a new round of negotiations as was intended, the work program that 
was agreed in the meeting became the basis for the agenda of the coming round. 
Next year, the Reagan administration started a campaign to launch a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Informal discussion in GATT in the early 1980s resulted in a 
broad understanding of the structure and problems of international trade in services by the 
mid-1980s. The U.S., with the support from the UK, proposed the creation of a comprehensive 
framework for trade in services comparable to the GATT. However, until the launch of the 
Uruguay Round in 1986, developing countries “refused to enter into discussion of how 
international rules might be developed for the sector, and of how trade in services might be 
liberalized (Croome 1999: 102).” After the 1982 meeting, however, 10 developing countries, 
led by India and Brazil, argued against including negotiations on services in the run up to the 
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 Other agenda include the action on GATT dispute settlement procedures and efforts to bring agriculture 
under the GATT regime. 
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launch of the Uruguay Round. They wanted to separate the services from goods in the GATT 
discussions in order to avoid the linkage between the two. Argentina, Brazil, India, Egypt and 
Yugoslavia formed a coalition in 1984. They had blocked the launch of the Round for some 
time (Haltiman and Whalley 1989: 550–551). 
In September 1986, ministers finally agreed to launch the new round in a meeting held 
in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The new round, known as the Uruguay Round, would broaden the 
scope of the GATT to cover nontraditional trade issues such as services, intellectual property 
right, and investment. Trade in services became the subject of the multinational negotiations 
for the first time. The target date for conclusion of the new round was initially set in 1990. 
The negotiations of the Round started in February 1987. The Group of Negotiations on 
Services (GNS), established under the Trade Negotiating Committee, began considering 
general framework of the rules governing trade in services, including the definition of trade in 
services, existing measures concerning such transactions, and the relationship between the new 
rules and the GATT. In the early years of the Uruguay Round, the new GNS spent a 
considerable amount of time on the problem of definition and statistics, in part because of the 
desire of the countries that were reluctant to start substantial negotiations on liberalization, and 
the progress was slow in the first two years. Countries disputed over the scope of application of 
the new rules. The discussion on the contents of basic principles and rules that should be 
applied to trade in services, such as national treatment and non-discrimination, was finally 
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accelerated in the late 1987 and 1988 (Croome 1999: 103–9, Miyaie 1996). 
The Mid-term Review Agreement, adopted in April 1989, declared the primary 
inclusion of all areas in services in the new rules and the adoption of general principle of MFN. 
Besides, the Montreal Agreement set the timetable and identified the key principles and 
concepts necessary for subsequent negotiations on services. Even though the timetable was not 
met in the following years, it had the effect of setting the negotiations in motion (Croome 
1999: 207). Since then, in addition to deliberations on general framework, sector-by-sector 
negotiations on services were held based on reports each member country had submitted 
(Miyaie 1996, Preeg 1995: 90).
8
 By that time, the attitude of many developing countries 
toward the negotiations on services had changed. They had become more willing to participate 
in the negotiations to grab whatever gains the negotiations might produce (Croome 1999: 207). 
In July 1990, Felipe Jaramillo, Ambassador of Colombia and Chair of GNS, proposed 
his own draft for a framework agreement on trade in services, which served as the basis for the 
subsequent negotiations. While the draft stated that all areas of services would be subject to the 
new rules, some countries insisted that some sectors should be exempted from the obligations 
(Miyaie 1996). 
Special Treatment of Financial Services  
In the process of incorporating trade in services into the agenda of the Uruguay Round, 
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officials from financial authorities hoped not to have the area of financial services covered by 
broad trade negotiations for fear of the involvement of people outside of the financial circles. 
The U.S. Treasury, as well as financial authorities from other countries including Japan, hoped 
to keep the financial services sector outside of the GATS framework. The U.S. agreed to have 
the sector within the GATS by the time the draft was compiled, however. Within Japan, the 
MOF, which wanted to exclude financial services from the GATS, and the MITI, which 
preferred its inclusion, opposed to each other.
9
 As the U.S. Treasury accepted the inclusion, 
the MOF backed down, and instead proposed to set a separate body within the GATT to discuss 
financial services, together with Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden in December 1990.
10
 
 Upon the insistence of financial officials, the GATS Annex on Financial Services 
adopted later stipulates that, if a financial service issue reaches a WTO dispute settlement panel, 
the panel should have the expertise necessary to deal with “the specific financial service under 
dispute (paragraph 4).” It is more narrowly drawn than the general standard in the GATS, 
which requires panels to have “necessary expertise relevant to the specific services sectors 
which the dispute concerns” (Key 2003:26). 
Deadlock 
The Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to end in December 1990. However, member 
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 Asahi Shimbun July 29, 1990, p.9. 
10
 Asahi Shimbun December 4, 1990, p.1. 
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countries could not agree on how to reform agricultural trade, and decided to extend the talks. 
 The negotiations on services also came to a total deadlock. The most contentious was 
how to deal with the MFN principle. The U.S., concerned about the slow pace of liberalization 
of other countries in such areas as maritime services and basic telecommunications, 
jeopardized the services talks by insisting that the GATT’s most-favored-nation (MFN) 
principle should not be extended as the automatic obligation of the GATS. It claimed that the 
automatic application of the MFN principle would let countries with relatively closed services 
markets free-ride, while enjoying wider access to American’s own markets. The U.S. wanted to 
retain the power to decide whether to extend the MFN benefits to others based on negotiations. 
In November 1990, the U.S. proposed the selective application of the MFN principle in all 
service areas on a condition that market access and national treatment would be granted based 
on bilateral liberalization negotiations (Miyaie 1996: 11-12). This demand rocked the 
foundation of the GATT framework. 
 In the final session of the Uruguay Round, due to close on December 7, there was a 
prospect that the financial service accord was in reach. In the hope that the agreement would 
pave the way for their companies to enter new markets, James Robinson, then Chairman of 
American Express, and John Reed, then Chairman of Citicorp, were in Brussels at that time to 
lobby on behalf of an accord.
11
 With a few days remaining before the end of the session, Japan, 
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Canada, Sweden and Switzerland jointly submitted a new proposal to break the impasse in the 
financial negotiations.  
 The four-country proposal contained two important schemes. First, it proposed a 
“two-track approach.” It would allow less developed countries to have the option to take a 
slower approach to opening their markets to financial firms. The flexibility would lure 
developing countries to accept the plan. On the other hand, the US was unlikely to adopt it, 
even though American officials welcomed the plan as a basis of further negotiations.
12
 
 The second feature, which is important for this study, was the call for the creation of 
an international supervisory group, the Financial Services Body. The purpose was to prevent 
cross-retaliation, in which banking disputes would spill over into other commercial sectors. 
This point was also aimed at attracting developing countries into the agreement. They feared 
that, when financial services would be subject to the multilateral disputes settlement 
mechanism, rich countries would deny access to their own markets for other products in 
retaliation for the resistance to market openings.
13
 An American newspaper argued, however, 
that it was Japan’s own concern for cross-retaliation, rather than the consideration for the 
LDCs, that incorporated this issue into the four-country proposal. The Japanese financial 
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authority intended not to have the activities of Japanese financial institutions abroad restricted 
in retaliation for Japan’s denial to open up a market for other product.
14
 
 This point related to the shared concern among the financial authorities for having the 
financial services incorporated to a broader trade framework. Together with the US officials, 
Japanese financial officials wanted to keep the financial services a special sector overseen by 
specialists. According to the New York Times, “finance ministries around the world jealously 
protect their regulatory powers from other business regulators.
15
 
 All these intentions notwithstanding, the financial issue became a victim of the 
breakdown in the broader trade talks over the crucial issue of agricultural subsidies.
16
 
Resumption of the Negotiations, 1991–1993 
The negotiations in the Uruguay Round resumed in 1991. In the negotiations on services, each 
country submitted their offer on their initial commitments by July. The issue of MFN also 
moved somewhat forward, as member countries agreed to establish a procedure through which 
each country would submit a list of MFN exemptions. The Financial Service Annex was 
discussed in October. However, the negotiations on services stalled again by the end of the 
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In December1991, Arthur Dunkel, the then Director-General of GATT, complied the 
first draft of the Final Act. The paper, called the “Dunkel draft,” became the basis for the final 
agreement, but each country’s lists of commitment remained far from settled. The subsequent 
negotiations were conducted based on the framework established by his draft. Over the next 
two years, in the negotiating services agreement, participating countries discussed their initial 
commitments and the list of MFN exemptions. In January 1992, countries submitted their lists 
of requests to other countries. Then, they were to present their offers and schedule for 
liberalization based on requests they had received.
17




 The negotiation in the service sector was based on a series of bilateral negotiations. 
The measures agreed bilaterally would be applied to other member countries on a MFN basis, 
although countries attempted to exempt certain areas from the MFN principle.
19
 Along with 
telecommunication and lawyers, financial services sector became one of the main targets in 
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 Most developing countries did not submit their offers that time, however. 
18
 Financial authorities of developed countries were also perplexed with the procedure. They wanted to 
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requests made to Japan.
20
 The requests made by the U.S. toward Japan were mainly those 
discussed in the previous bilateral financial talks, such as the issuance of commercial papers by 
nonbank firms, promotion of foreign banks’ participation in the ATM network, and the full 
liberalization of interest rates. Importantly, the U.S. added insurance sector to the list. In 
February 1992, Japan expanded its offer to cover 105 sectors. The offers in financial services, 
however, were limited to the scope of existing plans for financial liberalization.
21
 The EC also 
called on Japan to complete abolition of interest rate ceilings and liberalization in insurance 
services, including full privatization of the automobile insurance business, and removal of 
barriers between banking, securities, and insurance businesses. The latter reflected EC’s 
appetite for universal banking in Japan.
22
 
 In the first half of 1992, the negotiations on services halted as a result of stalemate in 
agricultural talks, even though the quad countries (the U.S., EC, Canada and Japan) originally 
intended to complete services negotiations in March.
23
 Yet, in June, member countries decided 
to resume services talks, and both multilateral and bilateral negotiations were held. Then, a 
new series of negotiations took place in December that year, and the Japanese government 
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206 
 
made its second “offers.” But the Uruguay Round as a whole could not be concluded by the 
end of that year. 
 In 1993, negotiations heated up. In addition to multilateral meetings, bilateral talks 
were held.  The quad also met to discuss the sector. Participating countries tried to conclude 
the Round by the summer Summit meeting, but without success.   
GATS and Financial Services 
At the quadrilateral trade talks held on May 14, 1993 in Toronto, in which representatives from 
the U.S., Japan, the EC and Canada agreed to conclude the stalled Uruguay Round negotiations 
by the end of the year, the liberalization of access to Japan’s financial-service sector was 
discussed.
24
 However, the Japanese MOF did not attend the meeting. It implied that the MOF 
hoped to prevent the financial issues from being used as a tradeoff to other issues in the 
Uruguay Round talks, most notably the issue of rice imports, which was politically more 
salient than financial services.
25
 In this quad meeting, the four agreed on the plan for 
concluding the Uruguay Round by the end of 1993. According to the time schedule, market 
access and services should be concluded at least in principle before the July summit meting 
held in Tokyo, and then overcome the issues of agriculture and other politically sensitive areas 
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The main obstacle to the financial services negotiations was the differences between 
most of the OECD countries, whose financial markets were already relatively open, and many 
developing countries and Japan. Those countries with relatively closed financial sector were 
unwilling to commit to a substantial opening of their markets. It raised a concern that they 
would free ride on a new MFN-based multilateral agreement, as they would be able to enjoy 
wider access to other countries’ financial markets while keeping their markets relatively closed. 
Industrialized countries, especially the U.S., were thus unwilling to commit themselves to an 
MFN-based multilateral agreement in the area of financial services (Dobson and Jacquet 1998: 
80-85). 
In October 1993, the US proposed the so-called “two-tier approach” in financial 
services, which would grant MFN only to countries with relatively open markets (Miyaie 
1996). Just like the proposal of selective application of the MFN principle in the service sector 
made by the U.S. earlier in the Round, such a proposal threatened the entire process of trade 
negotiations. Even though the Uruguay Round negotiations finally ended in December 1993 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was concluded,
27
 countries could not 
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resolve the issue of MFN treatment in the financial services sector. The sector became one of 
the issue areas that remained to be negotiated after the conclusion of the Round.
28
 The 
deadline in the area of finance, together with some other areas, was thus extended to July 1, 
1995, with the U.S. insisting on getting more offers from other countries. 
Post-Uruguay Round Negotiations 
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, Interim Group on Financial Services was 
established to oversee the post-Uruguay Round negotiations in the financial services sector 
(under the WTO Preparatory Committee’s Sub Group on Services). The Group was taken over 
by the Committee on Trade in Financial Services when the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization came into force in March 1995 (Shimizu 1995). 
 As the negotiation stalled in the Uruguay Round, the U.S. and Japan resumed their 
bilateral financial talks held between the Treasury and the MOF under the Framework Talks 
umbrella. The issue of opening up the Japanese financial markets was mostly settled under this 
framework. As a result, the main focus of multilateral talks in the financial services shifted to 




                                                   
28
 Other areas included telecommunications and maritime transport. Also, the end of the Uruguay Round did 
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6.3 U.S.-Japan Framework Talks and the Financial Services Negotiations 
In 1993, Bill Clinton entered office with a mixed agenda on international economic relations. 
He attached weight to U.S. economic interests in overall international relations. While he gave 
a free trade speech, he was identified by April with a “managed trade” stance in negotiations 
with Japan.
30
 To epitomize his pledge, President Clinton brought the vision of a new 
framework that would cover a wide range of issues from macroeconomics to structural and 
sectoral matters. In their first bilateral meeting in April 1993, President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Miyazawa agreed to establish a new negotiating framework for resolving problems in 




The two state leaders led the establishment of the new framework for their respective 
reasons, while bureaucrats of the two countries were not enthusiastic to strike a deal. For 
Clinton, it was the first step toward fulfilling his campaign promise to prompt Japan to open its 
market. Miyazawa, who had lost the vote of no-confidence in the Diet in June and was waiting 
for the upcoming Lower House election, was determined to establish the framework before his 
likely loss of prime ministership. It was to help the LDP in the election by claiming that it was 
the only party that could manage Japan’s relationship with the U.S., as well as to make some 
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achievements as Prime Minister to be recorded in history books. While Miyazawa’s position 
was to oppose to U.S. demands for numerical targets, he made concessions to the U.S. side to 
arrange the new framework during his term in office.
32
 
Within Japan’s bureaucracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported Miyazawa’s 
idea to set up a new framework to discuss economic issues with the U.S., emphasizing the 
importance of keeping good relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, the MITI and the 
MOF resisted to an agreement that could be read as a promise to introduce a numerical 
criteria.
33
 Outside of the two countries, European countries worried that the agreements 
between the two, if reached, would favor American products and exclude other countries.
34
 
 The two national leaders set the structure of the talks in July, as was scheduled.
35
 The 
subjects were divided into five baskets. They were government procurement (especially 
computers, supercomputers, satellites, medical technology, and telecommunications); 
regulatory reform and competitive measures; other major sectors, most notably autos and auto 
parts; economic harmonization; and implementation of existing agreements and measures. The 
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achievements would be announced at the heads of government meetings that were to be held 
twice a year.
36
 Deputy minister level meetings would be held biannually to prepare reports to 
be submitted to the two leaders. Consultations would be carried out either in exiting fora or 
newly established working groups. Three areas, including insurance, were designated as the 
priority areas.
37
 Other trade agreements were scheduled to be finished in a year.  After two 




Soon after the pact was reached, however, the discord between the two countries 
became obvious. The most contentious was the use of quantitative targets. Although such 
targets had been used in an ad hoc, random manner by the Reagan and Bush administrations, 
the Clinton administration sought to regularize the use of such targets in bilateral talks.
39
 As to 
the expected effects of the overall negotiations, Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers suggested 
his expectation that Japan’s trade surplus would drop to 2 percent of its GDP or less in four to 
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five years as a result of the talks.
40
 Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan Michael Armacost made similar suggestions. In response, Japanese officials criticized 
the U.S. for pretending as if there were numerical targets agreed upon.
41
 
The most contentious issue within the Framework was auto and auto parts. Not as 
visible, financial talks were by no means an easy one.  
Financial Sectors within the Framework Talks 
The Framework Talks covered various issues in the field of finance. What is significant for the 
purpose of this analysis is that the officials set two different tracks for negotiations. The first 
was the financial talks, which were conducted between the Treasury and the MOF. While it was 
officially designated as a part of the Framework Talks, it was in reality an extension of the 
previous bilateral talks, and was conducted separately from the Framework. The meetings 
started before the two countries agreed on the structure of the new talks. On the other hand, the 
issues concerning the insurance market, which was picked up for the first time for the bilateral 
negotiations under the GATS negotiations, constituted a major part of the Framework Talk. The 
greatest difference was that the negotiators for the insurance issue on the U.S. side were the 
officials from the USTR. 
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 In what was an important development for the U.S.-Japan financial talks, the new 
administration announced that Lawrence Summers would take over as Treasury 
under-secretary for international affairs on January 21, 1993. David Mulford, who was known 
as a tough and sometimes brutal negotiator during his years at the Treasury, had resigned on 
November 5, 1992, from his job as Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs. 
Mulford joined the Treasury in March 1984 as assistant secretary for international affairs and 
served for nine years as a senior Treasury official responsible for international economic policy. 
He became treasury undersecretary for international affairs in May 1989.
42
 The departure of 
Mulford did not mean softer stance of the U.S. government.  The new Treasury Secretary, 
Lloyd Bentsen, was chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and a trade hawk of long 
standing. What was more significant is that Mulford, who had been involved in the bilateral 
talks for a long period of time, was gone, and new negotiators came into the process. 
In the late May of 1993, the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese MOF held formal 
meetings over financial liberalization for the first time since October 1991. Tadao Chino, 
Deputy Vice Minister for Financial Affairs, and Laurence Summers, Undersecretary of the 
Treasury, headed the delegations respectively. The issues the U.S. negotiators raised were 
pension fund and asset management, corporate underwriting, derivative products, cross-border 
capital transactions, and interest rates. The Japanese MOF demanded the U.S. to relax the 
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restrictions of interstate operations of banks and the activities of securities subsidiaries of 
banks.
43
 The fact that financial talks started before the arrangement of the Framework Talks 
was agreed upon meant that they were in effect conducted as a separate body from the overall 
Framework Talks. The MOF and the Treasury held two meetings in Washington, D.C. in May 
and June before the July summit meeting. 
The negotiations were also intended to precede the multilateral negotiations on trade 
in services in the Uruguay Round. Even though the official bilateral financial talks had been 
suspended since October 1991, the two countries negotiated bilaterally over financial matters 
in the Uruguay Round services negotiations over the course of 1992. The resumed financial 
talks were extension of those negotiations. In order to meet the deadline of the Uruguay Round, 
the MOF initially hoped to conclude agreements with the U.S. and some European countries 
before the July summit meeting.
44
 
The MOF also prepared to hold a meeting to discuss the issues in the insurance sector 
in June. The bilateral negotiations in the area of insurance were conducted separately from 
other financial services, because insurance regulation is conducted at the state level in the U.S. 
Because insurance does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Treasury, the American 
counterparts of the MOF negotiators were the officials from the USTR. With respect to 
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institutional setting of bilateral negotiations, the issue of insurance talks provides an interesting 
case for comparison. 
Breakdown of the Framework Talks—February 1994 
In February 1994, the first highest-level meeting to oversee the developments broke down over 
three priority areas, auto and auto parts, government procurement, and insurance. It was a rare 
moment in which the two countries explicitly broke off in their summit meeting. Japan’s new 
Prime Minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, described the collapse as a symbol that the relationship 
between the two countries entered in a matured phase, in which they faced with each other as 
equal partners. Regardless of this rhetoric, the failure of the summit meeting left a stain on the 
bilateral relationship. 
The main cause of the breakdown was the U.S. demand for numerical targets. The 
consensus within the Clinton administration was that quantitative targets were essential to 
effectively improve access to the Japanese markets. The approach of the Clinton administration 
was regarded as “managed trade,” and was criticized even within the U.S. On the other hand, 
the Japanese side, especially the MITI, was firmly set against any agreement that might contain 
numerical targets subject to sanctions.
45
 The MOFA was more willing to make concessions in 
order to keep good relationship with the new administration (Bergsten, Ito and Noland 2001: 
163–66).  
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The two countries formally reopened talks in May. By that time, the Clinton 
administration had softened its line in trade talks with Japan. After the breakdown in February, 
the value of dollar plummeted, as the expectation spread that the U.S. government would 
encourage the depreciation to reduce the bilateral trade deficit. Within the Clinton 
administration, officials close to the Wall Street pushed for the shift. Roger C. Altman, Deputy 
Treasury Secretary, and Robert E. Rubin, the White House National Economic Council 
Director, were both former Wall Streeters. Another factor that contributed to the change was 
the mounting standoff with North Korea over nuclear weapon, which increased Japan's 
strategic importance. Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, U.S. Ambassador to Japan 
Walter F. Mondale, and White House National Security Adviser Anthony Lake pressed to avoid 
deterioration of overall U.S.-Japan relations.
46
 
 In exchange for giving up the “numerical targets,” the U.S. government demanded to 
elevate five new issues to the priority areas: financial services, glass, intellectual property right, 
forest products, and regulatory reforms and competitive measures.
47
 However, the talks broke 
out again in July, since the two countries again could not solve the problem of measuring 
progress over the issues of government purchases. 
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6.3.1 Insurance Talks 
Liberalization before the Bilateral Talks 
As with the case of banking and securities, the liberalization process was already under way at 
the time the bilateral negotiation started. However, the international talks did play a significant 
role in accelerating deregulation. 
The Japanese insurance industry had been regulated mostly by the Insurance Business 
Law of 1939 for decades. The Ministry of Finance started deliberation in its advisory body, the 
Insurance Council, to revise the law in the fall of 1989. Just like the case of banking and 
securities deregulation, the purpose was to meet economic maturity, demographic changes, and 
internationalization. The council produced the final report in June 1992, which called for the 
cross-entry of life and non-life insurance companies into each other’s business through 
subsidiaries. The Insurance Council continued deliberation after the publication of the final 
report, and issued a detailed plan for the revision in May 1994. The amendment of the 
Insurance Business Law passed the Diet in May 1995, and came into effect on April 1, 1996. 
Yet, as the economic bubble of the late 1980s burst at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
willingness of major insurance companies to expand their business opportunities declined by 
the time the Council issued its final report. Setting the general direction of liberalization of 
scope of business and pricing, the new Insurance Business Law left the schedule of 
liberalization to the ordinance of the Ministry of Finance. The expectation was that the 
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Ministry and the industry would confine the liberalization process to a slow and cautious one in 
order to avoid drastic changes that would lead to throat-cutting competition in a already 
damaged industry (Nishimura 2003: 284-291, Nakato 2003: 215-247). 
U.S.-Japan Negotiations and Market Share 
The issue of insurance was designated as one of the priority areas in the Framework Talks. The 
first meeting on this issue was held in September 1993 in Hawaii. It was the first working 
group meeting held under the Framework Talks. By February 1994, the officials had eight 
additional meetings either in either Tokyo or Washington, D.C. 
The elevation of the issue to a priority sector puzzled the Japanese insurers, because 
they had no significant presence in the U.S. market. Unlike banking and securities sectors, the 
problem of asymmetrical penetration thus did not exist in the field of insurance. It was the 
pressure from some major U.S. insurance companies, most notable the AIG, on the American 
government, that brought the issue on the negotiation table. They claimed that Japan’s 
insurance market was unfairly closed to foreigners.
48
 
As such, the greatest concern for the U.S. officials was how to expand the market 
share of American insurers in Japan. American negotiators often cited the figure prepared by 
U.S. insurance companies, which said that the foreign market share was less than three percent 
in Japan, whereas those of other OECD countries were between 10 percent and 33 percent. The 
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U.S. demanded that Japan should raise the share to the level of other industrialized countries in 
three to four years. In reaction to this claim, the Marine and Fire Association in Japan said that 
the U.S. market was more closed to foreigners than the Japanese one, because the diversity of 
insurance laws among states served as a major barrier to non-American insurance companies.
49
 
The Japanese negotiators also questioned the credibility of the figure presented by the U.S.
50
 
To increase access to the Japanese market, the U.S. side wanted Japanese regulators to 
ease restrictions on pricing and types of products. Although those liberalization measures 
would not improve foreign access directly, they would benefit foreign insurers, which would be 
able to take advantage of their knowledge of latest insurance technologies. For this reason, 
major foreign insurance companies had preference for drastic deregulation of Japan’s insurance 
market. As the fundamental reform of insurance system was under way for the first time in five 
decades, the U.S. intended to exert as much influence as possible on the liberalization process. 
The U.S. side also claimed that the close keiretsu relationship among Japanese companies and 
the opaque regulatory system had blocked the entry of foreign insurance companies into the 
Japanese markets. The Japanese side complained that the U.S. markets also had some entry 
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barriers, such as the differences in oversight structures across states.
51
 
The “Third” Sector 
On the other hand, they also tried to block further liberalization in one specific area: the 
so-called “third sector.” It is a part of the insurance business, which does not easily fall into 
traditional life insurance (the “first sector”) or nonlife insurance (property and casualty 
insurance or general insurance, the “second sector”). The major products in this sector include 
casualty insurance, as well as more recent innovations such as cancer insurance and nursing 
care insurance. American insurers operating in Japan were strong in this third sector.
52
 AIU 
was strong in casualty insurance, raising 45 percent of all premiums it collected in fiscal year 
1993. AFLAC had about 90-percent share in cancer insurance, and relied almost completely on 
cancer insurance and nursing care insurance in 1993.
53
 This near-monopoly position was a 
product of Japanese government’s policy. AFLAC introduced the cancer insurance when it 
started operation in Japan in 1974. It enjoyed the monopoly over the product until 1982, when 
Nippon Dantai Insurance obtained permission to sell it. Since then, some second-tier Japanese 
insurers entered the market, but major insurance companies refrained from applying for it.  
Behind the exceptional and exclusive approval for the innovative product from the Ministry of 
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Finance in 1974 was the already existing transpacific conflict over the entry of foreign insurers 
to the Japanese market. Significantly, major Japanese insurance companies even provided 
know-how of selling the cancer insurance in Japan to the AFLAC.
54
 
The attitude of the U.S. side toward the third sector embodied the “result-oriented” 
nature of the administration. Rather than advocating liberalization and competition, the U.S. 
negotiators tried to set numerical targets by using foreign share to measure the access to the 
Japan’s insurance market. An U.S. official told in a press conference that the U.S. might 
resort to retaliatory measures based on the Super 301 if the figure would not go up to 10 
percent in three to four years.
55
 
Resumption of Framework Talks 
After the February breakdown, the Framework Talks were reopened in June 1994. Although 
they scheduled to announce some agreements at the summit meeting in July, they could not 
resolve differences in all of three priority areas. One factor was the advent of the new 
Murayama government.  Uncertain about the foreign policies of the socialist prime minister, 
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Tomiichi Murayama, the U.S. side wanted to wait and see how the new government would 
approach the bilateral economic relations.
56
 Yet, the overall Framework Talks broke off again 
in the late July over the use of quantitative targets. 
The insurance negotiation was the first of the priority sectors to be resumed. Both 
sides reevaluated their positions, and reviewed the report Japan’s Insurance Council had issued 
on May 13, which would be the basis for the upcoming revision of Insurance Business Law.
57
 
Their disagreement on the issue of the third sector and keiretsu system continued. 
1994 Accord 
In early October, the two governments struck 
deals in four issue areas under the 
Framework umbrella: telecommunications, 
medical technology, flat glass, and insurance. 
The two sides failed to produce an agreement in the most prominent sector of auto and auto 
parts, however. The U.S government suggested the use of retaliatory measures under section 
301 of the Trade Act.
58
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 For auto and auto parts, the Clinton administration filed a WTO case and announced the imposition of 
100 percent punitive sanctions against Japanese luxury cars in May 1995. The Japanese filed a countercase 
against the U.S. In June, they reached a face-saving compromised and dropped the WTO cases. 
1994 Insurance Accord 
(1) Deregulation in Japanese insurance system 
  Three-step liberalization plan of products 
and rates    
(2) Entry into the third sector 
  Avoidance of radical change  
(3) Transparency and procedural protection 
(4) Keiretsu relationship 
  Analysis of keiretsu relationship 
(5) Harmonization of U.S. state regulations 
(6) Assessing implementation 
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 Among the four issue areas that came under agreements, the accord in the insurance 
sector was considered to be the most sweeping. Under the accord, Japan promised to 
implement a three-step deregulation plan of products and rates in the primary life and non-life 
sectors. The file and use system and notification system, which would make it easier to obtain 
approval for new products, would be introduced and expanded in a step-by-step manner. The 
use of data collected outside of Japan to support applications of new products would be also 
permitted for certain products. The types of products for which benchmark or free rates could 
be used would be also expanded. The first stage was before the implementation of the 
insurance system reform legislation, the second was upon the implementation of the law, and 
the third was after the implementation. Japan also agreed to introduce the broker system to 
promote competition. 
 The government also ensured more transparency in its regulatory system. Japan 
agreed to give foreign insurance providers and intermediaries fair opportunities to exchange 
information with government officials. On the keiretsu relationship, “the two governments will 
request foreign and domestic insurance providers to instruct and allow the independent 
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 While the “third sector” would be eventually opened, the Japanese government 
committed to shield the sector from large Japanese insurers until the primary life and non-life 
sectors would be made more accessible to foreign competition. It promised to avoid “radical 
change” in the business environment in introducing new or expanded products in the third 
sector until foreign insurers had a “reasonable period” to compete in a deregulated market. 
 As to the issue of numerical targets, the two governments avoided the explicit 
market-share targets. In each area, the Japanese agreed to include some sort of quantitative 
measures used to track the future developments. The insurance accord stated that “[t]hese 
criteria do not constitute numerical targets, but rather are to be used for the purpose of 
evaluating progress achieved toward the goals of the Framework.” 
 To make the negotiations two-way at least on the surface, the U.S. side also made 
some commitments by agreeing to encourage harmonization of insurance regulation at the state 
level. However, due to the decentralized regulatory system of the U.S., all the negotiators could 
promise was “to encourage National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)” to 
promote harmonization of state insurance regulations and to facilitate the entry of non-U.S. 




                                                   
60
 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the national-level regulatory support 
organization of state insurance regulators. 
225 
 
Follow-up Sessions and Supplementary Measures of 1996 
In 1995, the issue came to the fore again, concerning the interpretation of the 1994 Accord.  
The USTR brought it out again mainly as a result of lobbying by AIG.
61
 As the talk continued, 
the new Insurance Business Law and related laws came into effect in April 1996. Under the 
new law, “cross-entry” subsidiaries of life and nonlife insurance companies would start 
operation in August 1996. While the MOF temporarily restricted them from selling third-sector 
products, it was considered that the change would mean the erosion of foreign market share 
(American Chamber of Commerce in Japan 2001: 134). As the Japanese insurers prepared for 
the establishment of new subsidiaries, the U.S. side complained that the new law violated the 
1994 agreement. The 1994 Accord stated that “[w]ith regard to mutual entry of life and non-life 
insurance companies into the third sector,” the MOF would not implement liberalization as 
long as a substantial portion of the life and non-life insurance areas was not deregulated. After 
the passage of the new Insurance Business Law, the MOF and Japanese insurers interpreted 
this phrase as prohibiting the entry into the third sector by the main bodies of insurance 
companies, while the entry by their subsidiaries were possible (Tone 1996). On the other hand, 
the U.S. side complained that the agreement clearly prohibited the immediate entry by any type 
of life and non-life insurers. 
 In fact, even within the Japanese government, the MOFA considered that the U.S. 
                                                   
61
 Asahi Shimbun, May 31, 1996, p.11. 
226 
 
assertion made more sense. A MOFA official complained that the MOF was solely responsible 
for the disagreement because, in the negotiations in 1994, the MOF negotiators excluded the 
MOFA from drafting of the agreement when the issue of the third sector was discussed.
62
 
On the negotiation table, the MOF gradually made concessions. In April, the MOF 
negotiating group led by Eisuke Sakakibara, then Director-General of the International Bureau, 
offered the introduction of direct response sales of automobile insurance. It also initiated 
legislation to eliminate the authority of the rating organizations to set mandatory industry-wide 
rates for automobile, fire, and accident insurance. Then, in June, it added the suspension of 
sales of casualty insurance by subsidiaries of life insurance companies for three month. Further, 
in July, flexible pricing of automobile insurance, based on criteria such as age, gender, and 
vehicle usage, was proposed.  It could be a fatal blow for nonlife insurance companies.
63
 The 
Japanese negotiators intended to ensure the entry of life and nonlife subsidiaries into the third 
sector in exchange for those concessions. However, the U.S. side was not satisfied. They feared 
that, once allowed in, the Japanese giant insurance firms would dominate the third sector, using 
profits earned in their protected life or nonlife sectors. At the same time, the Insurance 
Department within the Banking Bureau of the MOF complained that the International Finance 
Bureau, which was at the negotiation table, made too much concession, neglecting domestic 
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1996 Insurance Accord 
(1) Approval of a direct response system (tsushin 
hanbai) for automobile insurance (October 
1996) 
(2) Flexible pricing in automobile insurance 
(September 1, 1997) 
(3) Expansion of notification system (April 1997) 
(4) Fundamental reform of the rating organization 
system 
(5) Measures to avoid radical changes with 




The talk stalled due to the split over the timing of the third-sector entry of major 
Japanese insurers. The MOF claimed that the entry should be liberalized within a year or two 
of the start of primary-sector deregulation, while the U.S. participants maintained that it must 
be delayed until three years after substantial deregulation had occurred in primary sectors.
65
 
Under the new Insurance Business Law, newly-set subsidiaries of life and nonlife insurers were 
scheduled to enter the third sector on October 1, 1996. However, as the bilateral meeting held 




On December 15, the two governments 
finally concluded the talk, resulted in 
the so-called 1996 Supplementary 
Measures.
67
 The Accord would bring 
drastic deregulation of the heavily 
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regulated insurance industry by the mid-1998. 
 First, it would introduce pricing flexibility to Japan’s insurance market.  The new 
Insurance Business Law permitted flexible rating to certain types of insurance, which are 
consider not to entail great risks for the contractors, designated by the ordinance of the MOF. 
Yet, it was the U.S. pressure that expanded the scope of insurance products to which the 
flexible pricing system would be applied.   
Starting in September 1997, writers of automobile insurance would be able to 
differentiate rates based on risk factors such as age and driving records. Before that, premiums 
had to fall within a 10 percent band around the uniform prices set by industry rating 
organizations. With commercial fire insurance, the MOF lowered the minimum amount per 
contract that could be offered at different rate from 30 billion yen to 20 billion yen in January 
1997 and to 7 billion yen in April 1998. The uniform premiums for property and casualty 
insurance would be abolished in July 1998. In addition, the MOF promised to reform the rating 
organization system fundamentally, eliminating of the obligations for members of a rating 
organization to use rates calculated by the rating organization. 
Second, the agreement would also facilitate product innovation. The MOF agreed to 
expand the notif 
ication system. It added some types of products to the list of products sold only by 
notifying to the ministry instead of getting preapproval, a change that would become effective 
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in April 1997. Moreover, the ministry had already announced on October 1 its decision to 
approve applications for a direct response system (tsushin hanbai) for automobile insurance, in 
which insurance providers sell automobile insurance by mail and telephone calls.
68
 
On the other hand, the negotiators agreed that the entry into the third sector by 
subsidiaries would be liberalized only gradually in order to avoid radical change in the third 
sector for small to medium and foreign insurance providers. Facilitating liberalization in Japan, 
the most important victory for the Clinton Administration in the 1996 Accord was that it won 
the protection of this sector. The protection of the third sector was extended to January 2001, 
two-and-a-half years after the liberalization of primary sectors.
69
 
In sum, the 1996 Accord accelerated the timetable for the deregulation of the non-life 
insurance industry by about two to three years. At the last phase of the negotiations, however, 
the demand from the U.S. officials, who stuck to the protection of the third sector, ironically 
worked against the general trend toward deregulation. 
 After the 1996 Accord, liberalization was carried out steadily. In July 1998, Japan 
liberalized premium rates, which had previously been determined by an industry rating 
organization in a cartel-like manner. On January 1, 2001, the subsidiaries of life and non-life 
                                                   
68
 By the time the two governments agreed on the “supplementary measures” in December, two insurance 
providers had received approval of their applications to provide automobile insurance through a direct 
response system. 
69
 Susan MacKnight, “United States, Japan settle insurance claims,” JEI Report No. 47, December 20, 1996. 
230 
 
insurance subsidiaries started selling third sector insurance products. It was two and half years 
after all the five requirements for the termination of the measures to avoid radical changes in 
the third sector listed in the 1996 accord were satisfied, as scheduled. In addition to measures 
promised in the 1994 and 1996 accords with the U.S., the comprehensive financial 
liberalization program, known as the Japanese version of the “Big Bang,” contributed the 
liberalization of the insurance markets in Japan since the latter half of the 1990s.
70 
 
6. 3.2 Financial Services 
In the financial services talk, the main goal of the U.S. negotiators was removal of barriers to 
market access for foreign financial firms. Precisely, the U.S. demanded liberalization in three 
broad areas: fund management, domestic securities markets, and cross-border capital 
transactions. Rather than the elimination of formal discrimination against foreign banks and 
other financial institutions, the demands from the American officials focused on general 
deregulation that would dismantle the competition-restricting regulatory system. In addition to 
the lifting of barriers to new entry and the broadening of the range of permitted products, the 
U.S. pressed for enhancing transparency in decision-making. 
 In response, the MOF announced in June 1993 that it would lift the rule that had 
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limited investment advisory service companies to manage funds put up only in April 1990 or 
later. Under the Pension Fund and Insurance Law of the time, only trust banks and insurance 
companies could manage pension funds put up before April 1990. Banks and insurance 
companies had sought for removal of this rule, and satisfied with the decision, which 
apparently resulted from U.S. pressure.
71
 With respect to the liberalization of interest rates, 
which had been the center of the bilateral talks for preceding years, those for time deposits of 3 
million yen or more were already liberalized in November 1991 as scheduled. Furthermore, 
interest rates on time deposit were completely deregulated in June 1993. As the liberalization 
program was implemented, the focus shifted to other issues. 
In the area of asset management, the U.S. wanted wider access to Japan’s public and 
private pension funds and to its investment trust. One of the major demands was to allow 
investment advisory companies to manage public pension funds. At that time, only trust banks 
and life insurance companies were permitted to manage public pension funds, which consisted 
of the national pension plan (Kokumin Nenkin) and the employees’ pension plan (Kosei 
Nenkin). This issue emerged as an important bilateral issue due to the lobbying of some major 
management advisors. The U.S. government went into the negotiations in close cooperation 
with private firms. Since around 1992, Donald Mulvihill, president of Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management Japan, and John R. Alkire, president of Morgan Stanley Asset Management Japan, 
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had lobbied the Treasury to include the issue of pension-fund management into the U.S.-Japan 
negotiations.
72
 They were active in the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ). In 
the end of 1992, the ACCJ established a committee on investment management to explore 
problems of pension fund management in Japan. They provided information to American 
policymakers. One of their accomplishments was the remark Treasury Undersecretary 
Summers made on the closed nature of pension fund management in Japan in his March-1993 
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee.
73
 
There was one specific reason for which the issue of pension fund management 
appealed the Treasury. The American officials could stress the benefit for the Japanese people 
rather than just insist on the gains U.S. firms would make. The ACCJ claimed that this 
restriction had caused a great loss for Japanese people, as it excluded investment advisory 
companies from pension management. The advisory companies, which were specialized in 
dealing with corporate stocks, would produce higher returns than risk-averse banks and 
insurance companies could.
74
   
In fact, there were some powerful supporters of the U.S. position with this issue in 
Japan. The Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan, which held jurisdiction over the state 
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pension system, had already made the same demand to the MOF in 1993, and was rejected. As 
it wanted higher returns on the state pension investments, the Welfare Ministry hoped to use 
foreign pressures to persuade the MOF to deregulate the public pension fund management.
75
 
Some Japanese actors, who were involved in pension-fund management and were not satisfied 
with trust banks and life insurance companies, indeed encouraged these two presidents, 
Mulvihill and Alkire, as they lobby their own government.
76
 European countries were also 
keen to open Japan’s pension funds to asset management companies.  The issue was brought 
on the table in the UK-Japan financial talks held in January 1993. 
As to the corporate securities area, the U.S. was looking for rights to offer new 
products such as financial derivatives. Treasury Undersecretary Summers stated in a 
Congressional hearing that U.S. investment banks were virtually excluded from Japanese 
underwriting because a combination of industry practices and legal and regulatory barrier had 
hindered the development of viable corporate finance markets.
77
 The U.S. also pushed for 
greater liberalization of cross-border capital movement.
78
  They insisted that the restrictions 
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on foreign exchange in Japan, which was the most comprehensive in the G-7 countries, had 
impeded Japanese investors’ access to a wide range of financial products offered in overseas 
markets. 
 On the other hand, Japan insisted that the U.S. financial market was far from fully 
open to foreign firms. The Japanese officials maintained that regulations that vary from state to 
state in the fragmented U.S. financial system worked as a barrier to Japanese financial 
institutions opening branches there, and required that they should be standardized. 
 The negotiation proceeded as follows. Five bilateral meetings on financial services 
were held from September 1993 to February 1994 without making any significant progress. 
Then the Framework Talks broke down mainly because of the U.S. demand for numerical 
targets. In June 1994, when the U.S. and Japanese negotiators agreed to resume the framework 
talks, they elevated financial services and intellectual property right to primary sectors in the 
framework talks. While the financial officials from the two countries continued talks almost for 
a year, the Ministry of Finance planned to start serious efforts in this area only after reaching 
agreements in three other priority areas. Now it had to deal with the issue in addition to the 
insurance negotiations.  
 The talks in financial services resumed in early June. Since then, the two governments 
held several meetings. They nevertheless did not made significant progress by November that 
year, and started to concentrate on the financial issues only in the year’s end. The MOF tried to 
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advance the bilateral negotiations along with its domestic bargaining with the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare through the course of the budget planning annually held in December. The 
MOF then made new proposals that month to win concessions from the U.S. negotiators.
79
 
 As the negotiations went on, the U.S. negotiators used the threat of FTFSA being 
discussed in Congress. Before the negotiation, Treasury Secretary Bentsen suggested that the 
U.S. might bring back the FTFSA if the talks would be stalemated, giving support to the 
reintroduction of the bill. He also implied that the U.S. would not give MFN in the financial 
services negotiations in the WTO to countries that would not give to the U.S. financial 
institutions access to their domestic markets.
80
 Before the October meeting, Lawrence 
Summers told reporters that the U.S. decision to grant MNF treatment in financial services in 
the multilateral negotiations would depend “very critically on what happens in Japan in terms 
of opening its financial services.”
81
 The 1994 Report of Foreign Treatment of U.S. Financial 
Institutions, released on December 2 by the Treasury, stated that the minimum capital 
requirement of $3 million for companies wishing to manage mutual funds in Japan served to 
limit foreign entry. With the pension fund management business, it also recounted a variety of 
legal restrictions that had limited the activities of investment advisory companies to manage 
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Accord on Financial Services in 1995 
 
(1) Opening of public pension market to 
investment advisory companies 
(2) Greater access to private pension market 
through gradual enlarging of the ceiling on 
self-managed pension money 
(3) Pension funds and investment trusts 
business conducted in one entity 
(4) Ease restrictions on the introduction of 
new financial instruments 
(5) Easing of restrictions on corporate bond 
issuance 
(6) Deregulation of cross-border financial 
transactions 
pension assets in Japan. The same report also criticized the lack of sufficient transparency of 
policies and regulations, the small foreign shares in corporate underwriting of securities, and 
remaining foreign exchange controls.
82 
US-Japan Accord on Financial Services in 1995 
In early January, just before the Summit 
meeting between Clinton and Murayama 
in Washington, the two governments 
announced that they reached an 
agreement. In February, they signed on 
the Measures Regarding Financial 
Services. The agreement covered a wide range of financial services in Japan. 
The Japanese government would permit investment advisory companies to manage 
public pension funds, and expand the portion of private employee pension funds that 
investment advisory companies could manage. Investment advisory firms would be allowed 
into the management of public pension funds from fiscal year 1995 through offshore limited 
partnership, called “investment union,” set up jointly with Japanese trust banks. They would be 
also able to access to the market by offering their services to investment trust companies. These 
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indirect measures were introduced in order to protect ailing Japanese trust banks.
83 
Moreover, Japanese firms would be required for the first time to disclose details of 
how well their fund managers perform in handling pensions. U.S. firms had long contended 
that the Japanese fund managers underperformed their foreign competitors. Japan also agreed 
to drop its requirements that foreign investment firms should offer a wide range of services. 
However, penetrating the market would still be difficult, since many of the pension funds had 
been managed by Japanese banks and insurance companies with strong ties with companies 
and government agencies that controlled the pension pools.
84
 
In Japan, while trust banks required shelter, public and private sector pension funds’ 
demanded increased access to foreign investment skill.
85
 With the issue of domestic securities 
market, various measures to broaden the range of permitted instruments, which were already 
announced in December, were included in the accord. Regulations on cross-border capital 
transactions would be also simplified and made more transparent. If they get blanket 
authorization for one-year period, Japanese residents issuing foreign-currency-dominated 
bonds (samurai bonds) and non-residents issuing Euroyen bonds would be able to do so 
without obtaining approval for a specific floatation. 
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The agreement contains no provisions that would ease the access of foreign financial 
institutions per se. Rather, it would remove some restrictions that had constrained both 
Japanese and foreign firms, expanding the scope of business available to respective type of 
companies. American financial institutions, which are strong in innovative business, would 
benefit from general liberalization. 
 Foreign fund managers regarded the agreement as a “modest step forward.”
86
 While 
the accord opened a door leading to the huge pension fund markets in Japan for the first time, 
new players were allowed in only through a complicated mechanism, in order to protect 
Japanese financial institutions facing trouble after the burst of the bubble economy. On the 
other hand, the accord included manifold and detailed commitment. The negotiation outcome 
reflected the close and long-term relationship between financial authorities on the both sides of 
the Pacific. One of the participants from the Japanese side noted that the negotiation was based 
on mutual understanding of the financial markets in both countries and on trust in each other, 
which had been fostered through the experience of financial negotiations between the MOF 
and the Treasury since 1983 (Hosomi 1995: 46). 
In the accord, the two governments affirmed their “commitment to the principles of 
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to banking, securities and 
other financial services” covered by the accord. Thus, the U.S. would grant Japan the MFN 
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status it had withheld. 
 
6.4 Bilateral Agreement and GATS 
What was the relationship between the bilateral negotiations concerning financial services and 
the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations? After the bilateral agreements in insurance and 
in financial services, Japan made a new WTO offer by June 1995, which fell short of full 
multilateralization of its agreement with the U.S. It became one of the contentious points in the 
run-up toward the December 1997 agreement. The U.S. pressed Japan to multilateralize their 
bilateral deals to make them binding under WTO rules.
87
 Japan was originally reluctant. The 
MOF was also reluctant to go along with the EU plan. For Japan, if it would join the financial 
services agreement while the U.S. remained out of the system, the U.S. would be free to 
exercise unilateral trade action when it finds Japanese liberalization measures unsatisfactory. 




In the summit meeting between the EU and Japan on June 20, however, Japan 
promised to improve its offer in the financial services.
89
 Finally in August 1995, Japan 
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committed itself to full extension of the agreement with the US to the multilateral framework 
in a letter to WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero (Dobson and Jacquet 1998: 82).
90
 
As to developing countries, the U.S. remained largely unsatisfactory with their offers. 
Those countries included Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, and Argentina, as well as more 
developed countries such as South Korea and Singapore.
91
 The U.S. thus announced the 
withdrawal of most of its offer on financial services and the introduction of a MFN exemption 
on the whole sector (Dobson and Jacquet 1998: 80-85). In December 1994, in a statement that 
accompanied the Treasury’s report on financial openness of other countries, Treasury Secretary 
Bentsen said that the U.S. would continue to work on bilateral negotiations, while it would also 
push for integration of capital markets through technical assistance and loan programs offered 
by multilateral financial institutions.
92
 
Interim Agreement of Financial Services: July 1995 
Yet, the participants could not meet the new deadline. Instead, 43 members, without the U.S., 
signed an interim agreement to consolidate existing offers in July 1995 at the initiative of the 
EU. The U.S. withdrew its offers to grant access to its financial services on a 
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most-favored-nation basis. It committed itself only to preserving market access and granting 
national treatment to existing foreign-originated service providers. The country complained 
that some countries had not guaranteed even the existing levels of access. To save the result of 
the extended negotiations, the EU campaigned to persuade other countries to remain committed 
to reaching an interim deal by the end of July.
93
 The interim agreement would expire in the 
end of 1997 if the new accord would not be reached by then. It was upon the insistence of 
France, which was upset by the U.S. move.
94
 
 Indeed, it was a gamble for Washington. Most countries that did not satisfied the U.S. 
had little interest in competing in the U.S. market. On the other hand, the country risked losing 
guaranteed access for its financial institutions in most important rich-country markets.
95
 
However, domestic concern loomed large in the U.S., with President Clinton eyeing on the 
presidential election held next year. Prospect for opening China’s market was another reason 
for Washington’s decision. The U.S. did not want to hurt its chances for pressing China to open 
its financial services markets in the negotiations for China's accession to the WTO.
96
 
 The negotiations resumed in the spring of 1997. In the late April of 1997, US Treasury 
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Secretary Robert Rubin sent a letter to governments of Thailand and other Southeast Asian 
targeted countries to urge them to comply with three proposals, such as the rights for foreign 
firms to establish and operate in the form of their choice, to conclude the agreement on 
financial services. In August 1997, Deputy US Trade Representative Jeffery Lang visited seven 
Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
India) to push the governments for greater commitment in opening up their financial services 
industries.
97
 In the new round of negotiations, the U.S., India and Thailand withdrew their 
broad MFN exemptions based on reciprocity, and other members also improved their offers. 
The Financial Services Agreement was eventually concluded on December 13, 1997. The 
Agreement includes a legal framework for cross-border trade and market access and a 
mechanism for settling the disputes. It also extends the GATS to financial services. It took 
effect in March 1999. 
 
6.5 Summary: Explaining the Bargaining Outcomes 
As this chapter traced, since the late 1980s, the financial services became subject to 
multilateral trade negotiations as a result of the inclusion of trade in services in the new 
framework of the trade regime. Consequently, the nature of bilateral financial negotiations also 
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changed considerably. Now financial services were no longer monopolized by the financial 
circles. The officials of financial authorities attempted to separate the sector from other trade 
issues for fear of having the financial issues used as a tradeoff to other, more politically 
sensitive issue areas, but without much success. 
The negotiations on financial services and the ones on insurance between the U.S. and 
Japan provide an interesting comparison. The negotiations on financial services were carried 
out mostly by the Treasury and the MOF, which had developed close relationship through a 
series of bilateral talks since the Yen-Dollar Talks in the 1980s. As a result, the agreement was 
a detailed, technical one, and mostly aimed at general liberalization rather than securing access 
of foreign financial institutions per se. It resonated with the existing call for financial 
liberalization within the Japanese economy. On the other hand, the insurance talks were 
conducted by the USTR on the U.S. side. The resulting Insurance Accord was more explicit in 
its “result-oriented nature” than the Accord on Financial Services. Both the accord of 1994 and 
the supplementary measures of 1996 no doubt accelerated the deregulation process of the 
Japanese insurance markets. The U.S. adherence to the protection of the third sector, however, 
gave strong impression that the U.S. was more interested in protecting vested interests of the 




Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
In an increasingly integrated global financial market, financial institutions face tougher 
competition and greater opportunities. Although it is commonplace to regard economic 
integration as a natural and irreversible process that followed technological innovations, 
the reality is that it is a consequence of political will. After the disruption since the 
Great Depression of 1930, political leaders—first those from major powers in the West, 
and then those of emerging economies—have been conducting economic liberalization 
at various levels to take advantage of greater markets. As they lost competitiveness in 
the manufacturing sector in the face of the remarkable rise of newly industrialized 
economies, the economic center of advanced countries moved to service sectors. The 
importance of the financial sector thus continued to increase, and the search for more 
business opportunities in foreign economies continued in the coming years. Yet, 
harmonizing regulations to enhance further integration has been no easy task for those 
leaders. It requires strong determination and political support to move on. 
This study examines the bilateral financial negotiations that occurred between 
the U.S. and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. These were the world’s first bilateral 
negotiations on the liberalization of financial markets. Through detailed case studies, 
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this thesis found that the intergovernmental negotiations had significant influences on 
the liberalization process of the formerly heavily regulated Japanese markets. Initially, 
the negotiations were held mostly exclusively by the officials from the U.S. Treasury 
and Japanese MOF specialized in international finance. The exclusiveness is often 
attributed to the technical nature of finance, but it was more a result of the existing 
network of international financial officials. Through intensive negotiations, the officials 
came to know each other personally and share an understanding of the issues. This led 
the negotiations to a moderate, step-by-step opening of Japan’s financial markets, which 
would sometimes give preferential treatment to some foreign financial institutions. 
On the other hand, the deepening of financial globalization had a profound 
effect on institutional settings. The increasing salience of foreign financial institutions 
politicized financial issues. Elected officials in the U.S. began intervening in the 
bilateral negotiations by submitting bills that would require reciprocity in financial 
regulations. With those calls as a background, the U.S. negotiators became more 
forceful on Japan. That, in turn, stiffened the Japanese attitude and resulted in less 
productive negotiations. Moreover, the inclusion of trade in services, including financial 
services, in the multilateral trade negotiations held under the GATT also expanded the 




Significance in the 21
st
 Century 
How does the insight obtained in this study apply to future international negotiations on 
financial regulations? What is the significance of studying cases from the 1980s and 
1990s in detail? This bilateral framework anticipated a new international economic 
order now being discussed. 
 Lim, Elms, and Low (2012) use the term “twenty-first century agreement” in 
their analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). A twenty-first century 
agreement is different from a “twentieth century agreement” in its attempt to encompass 
a wide range of issues ensuring fair competition among economic players, moving far 
beyond just lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade of goods. In the current global 
economy, there is a growing tendency toward international vertical integration. Now 
companies do not just trade finished products across national borders, but the 
production chain itself spreads beyond national borders. To take full advantage of this 
situation, it is not enough just to promote the trade of goods. Freer flow of knowledge 
and people, and the harmonization of a broad range of regulation are all indispensable. 
However, these are even more difficult than opening borders to finished products, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. They require changes in the deep-rooted systems of domestic 
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regulation. Massive inflow of people and information also provoke nationalist 
sentiments in many places.  
The efforts to lower barriers to a wide array of international business activities 
besides the trade of goods began in the 1980s. “Trade in services” became an agenda in 
the multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT only at the end of 1980s, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was 
adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and became effective in 1995, even 
though it falls short of facilitating comprehensive liberalization. The multilateral 
agreement on the financial services was concluded even later in 1997.  
 Preceding these efforts at the multilateral level were bilateral agreements, and 
the world’s first bilateral agreement on financial liberalization was between the U.S. and 
Japan. The case examined in this study was thus the front runner of the “twenty-first 
century trade agreement.” By studying it, we can obtain an important implication for the 
analysis of ongoing international economic negotiations. Besides, multilateral economic 
negotiations are composed of a series of bilateral negotiations. Agreements among 
major dyads are the preconditions for concluding agreements at the multilateral level. 
Therefore, the argument of this thesis, which stresses the role of networks of 




 It also has an implication that is particularly relevant to the future of 
liberalization of the Chinese financial sector. Currently, the second largest economy in 
the world, surpassing Japan in 2010, China’s domestic markets attracts attention from 
companies around the world. Companies in the service sector are aggressively seeking 
opportunities to expand their business there. Financial service was one of the most 
controversial issue areas in the negotiations for China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). To join the international body, China needed to conclude market 
opening agreements with all member countries. The agreement with the U.S. was 
considered to be crucial to its membership. The U.S. financial industries advocated for 
greater access to the Chinese markets. Eventually in the China-U.S. WTO Agreement in 
2001, China promised to open its banking sector completely and give foreign banks full 
national treatment by the end of 2006 (Peng 2006).  
The Chinese financial markets are still in the process of opening. Foreign 
governments, especially those of advanced countries with internationally strong 
financial sectors, have expressed frustration over China’s implementation its financial 
services commitments. The situation parallels what occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s between the U.S. and Japan in the follow-up process of the Yen-Dollar 
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Agreement. In China today, even though remaining regulation on a range of issues, such 
as interest rates, apply equally to local and foreign financial institutions, foreign 
financial institutions complain that such regulation serve to protect domestic ones from 
competition with more innovative, better capitalized, foreign ones. The lack of clarity 
and transparency with rules also cause concerns. For example, the difficulty to gain 
approval to open new branches is frustrating to foreign banks, as they are at a 
disadvantage with Chinese big banks that have the dense network of branches within the 
country.
1
 On the other hand, the Chinese market remains extremely promising for 
foreign financial institutions. They plan to expand their presence in lucrative areas such 
as asset management and derivative products.  
External liberalization of financial services therefore remains to be one of the 
important issues in intergovernmental economic talks that involve China. The U.S. 
government agreed with China in July 2013 to resume negotiations to reach a bilateral 
investment treaty that would cover the service sector, including financial services. The 
negotiation was launched in 2008 but stalled because of China’s desire to exclude 
certain industries in the service sector, including financial services.
2
 China and the EU 
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also agreed to negotiate an investment treaty in November 2013.
3
 The experience of the 
U.S.–Japan negotiations has an important policy implication in this context. 
Prospects for the Future 
In the last two decades, many advanced countries adopted substantial changes in the 
structure of financial regulation. There has been a shift to functional regulation to 
oversee various types of financial products created by technological innovations (G30: 
2008). In the process, some countries, including the UK and Japan, adopted a single 
regulator model, in which a single financial regulator has almost all of the regulatory 
responsibility (Pan 2011). As a result, the link between international policy networks on 
currency issues and those on financial regulation is weakened. After the period of this 
study, Japan’s MOF lost its monopoly of authority to negotiate financial issues with 
other countries. In 1998, the authority to oversee the financial sector was taken away 
from the MOF and moved to a newly established Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) 
to address a series of scandals that involved the financial authority. While issues of 
international currencies are still under the jurisdiction of the International Bureau of the 
MOF, international coordination concerning financial regulation and supervision fall 
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under the FSA, with the Bank of Japan sharing some responsibilities.
4
 The FSA is thus 
responsible for the international negotiations over the financial services under the WTO 
(Kanzaki 2004).  
Simultaneously, the network of intergovernmental negotiations over the 
financial sector has increasingly institutionalized. There have been international forums 
for financial regulators established after the financial turmoil of the 1970s. For example, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1975 by G10 advanced 
countries as a forum for bank regulators.
5
 After the global financial crisis of 2008, 
those bodies expanded the membership to include newly industrialized countries. 
Moreover, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), established in 2009, coordinates national 
regulatory agencies, international institutions, and sector-specific international groups 
and regulators (Helleiner 2010). Through these organizations, national regulators 
develop long-term relationships. The officials from Japan’s FSA consolidate their 
position as the core members of the international network of experts in the field of 
financial regulation, such as the Basel Committee, International Organization of 
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Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS).
6
 The reorganization of the Japanese government agencies is 
unlikely to result in the breakdown of international networks of financial officials.  
On the other hand, after the Lehman Shock in September 2008 and the global 
financial crisis that followed, the public became more attentive to financial regulation. 
In their efforts to restore stability in the financial sector, governments and international 
institutions such as the IMF injected public money to ailing financial institutions. The 
fact that highly paid bankers were rescued with taxpayers’ money caused resentment in 
many countries. The prolonged difficulties in the financial sector also spread to the real 
sector of the economy, aggravating the anger of the public about the injection of money 
to the financial sector. Immediately after the eruption of the global financial crisis, bank 
rescue plans prepared by governments in many advanced democracies were subject to 
severe public criticism. In the U.S., the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bill was 
initially rejected by Congress, further aggravating the financial turmoil.  
The issues concerning financial regulation also became politicized. Issues 
usually regarded as highly technical, such as executive pay in financial institutions and 
regulation of hedge funds, were exposed to public scrutiny. Affected by the public 
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demands for tough treatment to financial elites, for example, political leaders who met 
in the G20 meetings held in September 2009 endorsed the “Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices,” which set principles and standards in order to align 
compensation with long-term risks. While these standards were not legally binding, it 
was unusual for the summit meeting to approve numerical targets, such as “A 
substantial portion of variable compensation, such as 40 to 60 percent, should be 
payable under deferral arrangements over a period of years” and “A substantial 
proportion, such as more than 50 percent, of variable compensation should be awarded 
in shares or share-linked instruments.”
7
 
Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the network of financial 
experts to monopolize the process of negotiations. This study suggests that such 
politicization would change the negotiation processes outcomes into a more contentious 
and less productive one. Whether this holds is to be seen. 
Policy Implications 
What policy implications does the finding of this study have? It underscores the 
importance of developing long-lasting relationships among government officials at the 
international level. In a sense, the study also emphasizes the significance of knowledge. 
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Shared expertise, such as understandings of economic theories, plays an important role 
in international policymaking, as the theory of epistemic community suggests. However, 
the main finding of this study is the importance of networks built on shared 
understandings and the responsibility of government agencies rather than the 
importance of policy expertise per se. The international networks of governmental 
officials do not constitute an epistemic community, as the officials represent the 
interests of their respective governments. Yet, their shared views and long-term personal 
relationships do affect the manner in which intergovernmental negotiations are 
organized. Deep personal relationships and mutual understanding are the keys to 
mutually beneficial negotiations. We can thus conclude that it is be crucial to spread 
such networks across countries, including emerging economies. 
Moreover, this study highlights the significance of insulating the negotiation 
process from political intervention. When elected officials intervene in the technical 
issues of finance, the policies often become too radical. On the other hand, democratic 
control of policymaking remains crucial in ensuring sound and sustainable governance. 
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